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1.1. OBJECTIVE AND SUMMARY OF THE DISSERTATION 
Many decisions made by the organization’s top management team (hereafter 
called indifferently TMT or top management team) have a high likelihood of failure 
(Nutt, 1999). This situation might be shocking but indeed, it is much more common 
than one might think (Bloom et al., 2012). In fact, we can easily realize this reality when 
reading the current business press where we will probably be confronted with several 
cases of failures that have been caused by any type of TMT decisions. Of course, we 
will also see cases of success, exemplifying managers and recipes of good practices 
(e.g., Eide et al., 2016; Schrage, 2013); but these will be minor. Thus, as Bloom et al. 
(2012) state, the group of badly managed firms will be much bigger than those that are 
well-managed.  
Overall, these worrying facts emphasize the importance to study the top 
management teams and, in this way, to unravel the complex existing interplay between 
their characteristics, decision-making processes and contingency factors which will 
undoubtedly influence the behavior adopted by organizations (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984). Research on TMTs started to flourish after the publication of the seminal work 
by Hambrick and Mason (1984). In particular, this paper proposed the upper-echelons 
theory which basically highlighted the importance to analyze organizations’ key 
decision makers when explaining the outcomes, strategic decisions and behavior 
adopted by a firm (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Buyl et al., 2014; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
In other words, in order to understand why organizations did the things they did or 
behaved in one way or another Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggested that we had to 
study the characteristics, experiences and cognitive values of these actors (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). This assumption inspired many scholars to empirically investigate the 
impact of such features on a myriad of outcome variables such as turnover, innovation, 
diversification, and organizational performance (Boone et al., 2005). 
However, the extant upper-echelons research has typically focused on managers’ 
observable characteristics (such as demographics or functional experiences) and has 
rarely considered managerial attitudes and perceptions explicitly – even though the 
latter are actually assumed to act as perceptual filters of reality, used in decision-
making (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Hambrick, 1994; Lawrence, 1997). This argument is 
supported by Ocasio’s (1997) research where it is advocated that managers’ decisions 
 







depend to a high degree on how they perceive the reality and how much they feel the 
necessity to react. Thus, scholars seem to agree in determining that the incorporation of 
insights from a cognitive approach could generate a better understanding of 
managerial strategic decisions (Greve, 2003). 
In a related vein, performance feedback literature also bases its ideas on this 
concept. More specifically, this stream of research, heavily influenced by the Behavioral 
Theory of the Firm (BTF; Cyert & March, 1963), studies the effects of (managerial) 
performance feedback on organizational behavior. Thus, based on several assumptions 
of the Carnegie School such as bounded rationality, backward-looking orientation and 
rule-based adaptation (Cyert & March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 2012; March & Simon, 1958; 
Shinkle, 2012), the most prominent proposition in this body of literature contemplates 
that an organization’s decision makers (its managers) will (only) pursue strategic 
changes when performance falls below preset aspiration levels (e.g., Greve, 2003; 2008). 
The underlying idea is that such ‘attainment discrepancy’ leads to dissatisfaction, 
which subsequently drives managers’ intention to adapt the organization’s current 
strategies in an effort to fix this problem (also called ‘problemistic search’; Shinkle, 2012).  
However, despite the dominance of the BTF-influenced thinking, scholars have 
also developed contradictory theoretical perspectives, and found mixed evidence 
(Bowen et al., 2010). For instance, Jordan and Audia (2012) theorized that a failure to 
meet preset aspiration levels might not lead to a higher intention to change, if 
managers choose to assess their performance as satisfactory in a search to enhance their 
self-image. Similarly, Labianca et al. (2009) proposed and found that strong performers 
sometimes have higher intentions to change, if they actively strive for even higher 
performance (aspirations) levels in the future. Supporting these authors, Haleblian and 
Rajagopalan (2005) suggest that it will not be appropriate to apply the same standard 
to determine aspirations for all organizations, as aspirations can themselves fluctuate 
across managers in varying organizations. Consequently, these equivocalities 
emphasize the need for studies that scrutinize ‘attainment discrepancy’ and its impact 
on subsequent organizational behavior in more detail (Jordan & Audia, 2012).  
In this dissertation, we take up the challenge and taking into account that 
performance feedback theory is essentially a cognitive theory (Labianca et al., 2009; 
Shinkle, 2012), we contribute to this issue by digging deeper into the micro-processes and 
 







mechanisms that underlie the translation of ‘attainment discrepancies’ into subsequent 
actions. More particularly, we highlight that scholars have almost invariably 
operationalized ‘attainment discrepancy’ as the gap between an organization’s realized 
performance on the one hand and historical and/or peers’ performance levels on the 
other hand (for a review, see Shinkle, 2012). Thus, the implicit assumption which 
remains here is that aspiration levels (and ‘attainment discrepancies’) are (only) based 
on objective and visible results – either of the organization itself or of its peers – and, 
by extension, that managers’ motives to undertake changes are only – or most crucially 
– driven by such objective results. However, both practice and academic work (e.g., 
Fiegenbaum et al., 1996; Labianca et al., 2009) have made clear that many other factors 
also drive managers’ aspiration levels, and, hence, their perceptions of ‘attainment 
discrepancy’. To address this issue, in this work we propose to focus on alternative 
indicators of ‘attainment discrepancy’, more closely connected to managers’ 
perceptions of and feelings about the realized results. Specifically, we propose two 
options: 
 
(1) The use of the managerial complacency with firm’s results, a variable that 
according to several authors might be understood as a kind of conformism or 
feeling of quiet pleasure or security, while unaware of some potential danger or threat 
(e.g., see Pascal, 2011). However, as stated by Kawall (2006) the latter may seem 
problematic insofar as it could cause some confusion among scholars when linking 
appropriate or justified feelings of satisfaction as instances of complacency. 
Conversely, complacency requires that one be confused with its level of achievement, 
leading to an excessive level of satisfaction (Kawall, 2006). Miller and Chen (1996) 
support this proposition by indicating that the range of actions and the search 
knowledge of competitive alternatives adopted by a firm are influenced (and 
restricted) in part by the complacency of firm’s decision makers. Similarly, Sánchez-
Peinado et al. (2010, p. 75) establish that “the intentionality of strategic change is 
closely related (among other factors) to how managers perceive and interpret the 
environmental changes” and to their “level of complacency with the firms' 
performance”, which would specifically reduce this will. 
 







According to this stream of reasoning, in this research managerial complacency 
is measured as the difference between the traditional (objective) measurement of 
‘attainment discrepancies’ carried out by the BTF-inspired literature and the CEO’s 
satisfaction with these results. That is to say, in order to consider that a manager holds 
a complacent behavior he/she should exhibit high levels of satisfaction despite 
objectively the results obtained do not reflect the same threshold. Consequently, we 
argue that behavioral change in situations of bad results will not be direct, but will 
depend on the level of complacency that the managers (and the CEO as their 
representative) face with that situation (Gordon et al., 2000). In fact, following Gordon 
et al.’s (2000) research we argue that the objective results will be (just) an indicator of 
the degree of adjustment between the business strategy and the conditions imposed by 
the environment and will only serve as a warning system for stakeholders (including 
managers) on the validity of the current strategy. However, as long as those 
responsible for driving change are not dissatisfied with the results achieved by the 
company (meaning a little complacent evaluations), there may not be enough incentive 
to act (Sánchez-Peinado et al., 2010). That is to say, following BTF’s precepts we expect 
that the lower the CEO’s complacency, the more the CEO will be inclined to change its 
strategic behavior. 
 
(2) The use of CEOs’ satisfaction with performance as a direct indication of 
‘attainment discrepancy’. Hence, with this proposal we individually consider CEO’s 
satisfaction with performance as a measure of ‘attainment discrepancy’ (Haleblian & 
Rajagopalan, 2005) instead of using a combination of it with the relative objective 
performance obtained by the firm.  
In particular, we do so by digging on the significance and content of this 
cognitive variable which, according to several scholars, can be seen as an ‘a posteriori 
variable’ that adds perceptual information to the interpretation of performance 
feedback that is not captured by the objective results of the organization itself or its 
peers (cf., Matho & Khanin, 2015). In this line, Carree and Verheul (2011) indicate that 
besides objective results, a range of other factors, such as individual goals, 
expectations, demographic attributes, previous experiences, pressures from 
stakeholders, etc., will be also collected by this item. We therefore propose to assess 
 







CEOs’ satisfaction with performance as a more direct, perceptual indicator of 
‘attainment discrepancy’ – i.e., of how CEOs evaluate and interpret the obtained results. 
Consequently, following the BTF’s baseline logic we expect that the lower the 
CEO’s satisfaction with the obtained results (i.e., the higher ‘attainment discrepancy’), 
the more the CEO will be inclined to change its strategic behavior. The latter also 
allows us to use objective performance cues – and more in particular the relative 
performance obtained by a firm in comparison to their peers or organizations’ 
performance compared to the industry – as a moderator of this relationship. We do so due 
to while the BTF-inspired research proposes a universally negative relationship 
between dissatisfaction generated by ‘attainment discrepancy’ and subsequent change 
intentions, other theories and perspectives have suggested differently. For instance, 
high satisfaction with results (as a consequence of a small or negative ‘attainment 
discrepancy’) could instigate self-confidence and efficacy beliefs and, subsequently, 
proactive behaviors such as strategic changes (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Haleblian 
& Rajagopalan, 2005; Mahto & Khanin, 2015). Conversely, high dissatisfaction with 
such results might cause conservative behavior (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Staw et 
al., 1981). In an effort to reconcile these apparently contradictory perspectives, we 
propose that contextual cues at the organizational level might matter in determining 
organizational behavior. In particular, we argue that the organization’s performance 
compared to the industry indicates this organization’s relative position in its industry 
(Kacperczyk et al., 2015) and serves as a signal of the adequacy of the organization’s 
current strategies (Baum et al., 2005) as well as of CEOs’ overall capabilities (Chatterjee 
& Hambrick, 2011). We expect that this contextual cue will interact with CEOs’ 
satisfaction levels, and that the negative baseline effect of CEOs’ satisfaction with 
performance on the magnitude of intended strategic changes will be less pronounced 
the higher the organization’s performance compared to the industry. 
 
Once disentangled how managerial decisions are made and in which degree 
they rely on objective vs perceptual indicators, the aim of this study is to move away 
from the prism of processes and focus its attention on the effects that organizational-
level characteristics might have on generating different results among firms. In 
particular, our analysis focuses on the last financial crisis occurred globally, which 
 







reached its most virulent peak during 2008 and 2009 and which has been characterized 
by its non-munificent features and devastating effects on the (Spanish and worldwide) 
economy; and more specifically, on testing whether the fact of being a family firm 
influences the financial position obtained by an organization during such non-
benevolent contexts.  
Family firms, which represent the 88.8% of the whole Spanish business base 
(Instituto de la Empresa Familiar, 2015), are usually defined as a unique combination of 
two sets of rules, values, and expectations: the ones related to family and the ones 
related to business (Flemons & Cole, 1992; Gersick et al., 1997; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). 
Moreover, it is argued that these firms share certain characteristics that render them 
unique in terms of patterns of ownership, governance, succession and the desire for the 
continuity of the family involvement in the organization (Chua et al., 1999; Steier, 
2003). Similarly, family firms often have a strong emotional component present in their 
decision-making process that separate them from other organizational forms (Basco & 
Pérez-Rodriguez, 2009; Berrone et al., 2010; Distelberg & Sorenson, 2009; Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2011; Hall & Nordqvist, 2008). This emotional component is reflected in its will to 
preserve the socioemotional wealth of the firm that according to Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2007, p. 106) refers to “the non-financial aspects of the firm that meet the family’s 
affective needs, such as identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the 
perpetuation of family dynasty”. Closely related to this aspect, several scholars have 
highlighted that family business managers “have superior incentives for maximizing 
firm value and, therefore, need fewer compensation-based incentives” (McConaughy, 
2000, p. 121). That is to say, these managers will not have their individual interests as a 
priority but those of the organization. Similarly, family ties seem to affect the way these 
companies invest, which is more related to efficiency because of their higher 
willingness to continue (Gimeno et al., 1997). This supposition is confirmed by several 
research such as Jensen (1986) who argues that family firms create greater cash levels, 
which make them rely less on debt as a form of financing; and Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) who anticipate that these firms have greater reliance on self-financing than non-
family firms, which reduces their likelihood of default.  
Based on these findings, in this study we propose that family ownership will 
affect positively the financial strength obtained by an organization and, as we test this 
 







phenomenon under a non-munificent context (which could affect the future and 
viability of the firm), we argue that these results would do nothing but support our 
prior definition of socioemotional wealth. 
Additionally, following Hofer and Schendel (1978) and Sharma et al.’s (1997) 
research we argue that considerable understanding could be gained by appending 
strategic management insights on the family firm research approach. In this vein, we 
establish that the effect of family ownership on firm’s financial strength will not be 
isolated but will be also affected by several aspects such as the organization’s scope of 
operation (measured with firm internationalization and diversification) and the 
characteristics of its key-role players (measured by TMT educational level and TMT 
average age). In particular, and especially during the non-munificent context where we 
set our analysis, we anticipate a positive moderation effect of both internationalization 
and diversification – which will potentially minimize the global risk faced by such 
firms and will increase their opportunities for success due to their access to more 
heterogeneus markets (Goetzmann & Rouwenhorst, 2005; Sanchez-Bueno & Usero, 
2014) – on the relationship between family ownership and firm’s financial strength. 
For its part, we anticipate that TMT educational level will negatively affect this 
relationship (as opposed to older managers that will positively influence this 
interaction). We based our argumentation on concepts from the upper-echelons theory 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984) which convincingly claims that managers and their 
characteristics matter in affecting strategic decision-making processes, and, in turn, 
organization-level outcomes. More particularly we establish that highly educated 
managers will leverage more due to their inherent characteristics such as higher 
confidence with investments, more openness to change, better deal with ambiguity and 
complexity, etc. (e.g., Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Barker & Mueller, 2002); therefore 
negatively affecting the financial strength presented by their (family) firms. Contrarily, 
we anticipate that older managers will leverage less as they tend to choose for more 
conservative capital structures, be more prudent with their actions and behavior, 
possess less physical and mental stamina to seize perceived opportunities (Chen et al., 
2010; Child, 1974; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) will leverage less; therefore positively 
affecting the financial strength presented by their (family) firms. All this may be 
 








shorten in a general research question and three sub-questions that we will try to 
answer throughout this dissertation. Next, we collect them in a chart (see Figure 1). 
 




























Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
 
To summarize, the main goal of this doctoral dissertation is to investigate how 
managerial decisions are made and in which degree they rely on objective vs 
perceptual indicators. With this, we attempt to incorporate insights from a cognitive 
approach into performance feedback literature and therefore, to better understand 
organization’s behavior. As no decision can be evaluated without its consequences, in 
this research we also intend to unravel the reasons why some organizations have better 
(financial) results than others and, especially, during the last financial crisis occurred 
globally. To do so, we investigate the effect of family ownership, firm’s context of 
activity and managerial characteristics as potential factors of this phenomenon. To 
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reach these objectives we use both archival and questionnaire information from a 
sample composed by 137 Spanish medium-sized enterprises.  
 
 
1.2. OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
Chapter 2 aims to deepen the knowledge upon the intermediate hidden 
mechanisms whereby performance feedback cues generate specific reactions in 
organizations and specifically, to accentuate the relevance of evaluating the effects of 
executives’ perceptions and cognitions in these strategic decision-making processes.  
In the extant literature, the dominant perspective used to explain organizational 
behavior is the Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert & March, 1963). However, despite its 
dominance scholars have also developed contradictory theoretical perspectives, and 
found mixed evidence (Bowen et al., 2010). This chapter analyzes the different theories 
proposed and the potential causes of the results incongruity. In particular, it is argued 
that scholars have almost invariably used objective performance figures (Lawrence, 
1997; Ocasio, 1997) to determine organizational responses and have rarely considered 
managerial attitudes and perceptions explicitly – even though the latter are actually 
assumed to act as perceptual filters of reality, used in decision-making (Hambrick, 
1994; Lawrence, 1997; Cho & Hambrick, 2006). In this vein, with the objective of 
integrating apparently contrary findings and better understanding performance 
feedback consequences, it is proposed the use of the managerial complacency with firm’s 
results: a cognitive variable which combines the traditional (objective) measurement of 
performance feedback with the CEO’s satisfaction (or perception) with these results.  
Our results indicate that managerial complacency has a negative effect on 
organizational change behavior. Therefore, we may assume that firm’s strategic change 
will be enhanced (just) in front of low managerial levels of complacency with 
organizational results, disregarding the sign of the objective performance feedback 
obtained by the firm. With this, we argue that objective performance feedback by itself 
(which has almost uniquely run organizational behavior – for a review, see Shinkle, 
2012) does not properly rule organizational behavior actions. Consequently, we 
provide support to state that the ambiguous effects proposed by the different 
 








perspectives (also based on objective cues) might not be confronted; but rather form 
part of the same whole.  
Additionally, to further explore the mechanisms by which performance 
feedback cues lead to certain organizational strategic reactions, in this chapter we take 
one step back to analyze the influence of some executives’ characteristics on the 
resulting level of such managerial complacency finding that TMT functional diversity 
will negatively affect this variable; while TMT tenure will positively affect the level of 
complacency shown by the managers in their evaluations. Figure 2 (see below) shows 
the theoretical concepts and relationships analyzed throughout this chapter. 
 











Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
 
In the meantime, Chapter 3 proposes to individually consider CEO’s satisfaction 
with performance as a direct measure of performance feedback or ‘attainment 
discrepancy’ (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2005) instead of using a combination of it with 
objective values.    
In this way, this chapter studies the significance and impact of satisfaction on 
subsequent organizational behavior more deeply. More specifically, it argues that 
managers’ satisfaction with performance can be seen as an ‘a posteriori variable’ that 
adds perceptual information to the interpretation of performance feedback that is not 










change behavior  
 







Matho & Khanin, 2015). In other words, it argues that CEOs’ satisfaction with 
performance emerges from more than solely objective (financial) results. Our results 
confirm this proposition showing a superior explanatory power of this variable as 
opposed to the one presented by the traditional (objective) measurement of 
performance figures.  
However, several authors such as Audia et al. (2000, p. 849) argue that “the 
effect of satisfaction is more complex than is generally thought” and particularly, 
establish that when it comes to strategic changes, issues such as decision makers’ self-
efficacy, goal-setting behavior, and confidence in the effectiveness of the organization’s 
current strategies may also factor in (Audia et al., 2000). Following this proposition, 
Haleblian and Rajagopalan (2005) propose to account for these managers’ feelings of 
efficacy and achievement when studying the effect of performance feedback on 
strategic change. To address this aspect, this chapter proposes to introduce a contextual 
moderator – and more in particular, organizations’ performance compared to the industry – 
that would interact with CEO’s satisfaction to affect organizational behavior. 
Consequently, we obtain a relevant improvement for the palette of options. 
Thus, as Chapter 2 and the first part of Chapter 3 (just) argued for a negative 
relationship among respectively complacency (represented as the difference between 
satisfaction and objective firm’s results) and satisfaction, and strategic change1 – i.e., 
they anticipated that the higher the ‘attainment discrepancy’, the more subsequent 
change would be generated –; with the introduction of this interaction we observe that 
dissatisfaction does not always lead to higher strategic change. Hence, if objective 
performance signals that the current strategies are paying off (as reflected in the 
organization’s performance compared to the industry), it might lead to lower intended 
changes as it is more ‘rational’ to bank on and extend what you have been doing 
before. Similarly, satisfaction does not always lead to lower strategic change. In this 
sense, we find that extremely high levels of performance compared to the industry 
                                                             
1 Some of the variables/concepts used in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are exactly the same despite 
having different denominations: e.g., organizational change behavior and magnitude of intended strategic 
changes; managers’ satisfaction with performance feedback, managers’ satisfaction with the objective performance 
obtained by a firm and CEO’s satisfaction with performance; TMT educational level and TMT members with 
university studies; number of additional businesses and diversification (see methods section of each chapter to 
better clarify this issue). However, we have not brought them into alignment on purpose as we wanted to 
be faithful to reality, maintaining the purity and coherence of the research process carried out in this 
dissertation. 
 








might induce an upward strive and a boost in the CEO’s self-confidence, and 
consequently lead to an increase in the intended strategic changes. This further 
underscores that subjective interpretations and objective performance cues jointly 
affect organizational behavior, and that organizational decision-making processes 
cannot be unraveled when managers’ cognitions and interpretations are not taken into 
account.  
All of this renders us to conclude that the apparently contradictory perspectives 
in the performance feedback literature are complementary and context-driven. 
Similarly, for this chapter we have also produced a chart in order to better pinpoint the 
relationships that are analyzed (see Figure 3). 
 











Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
 
Chapter 4 moves away from the prism of decision-making processes and 
focuses its attention on analyzing the effects that organizational-level characteristics 
might have on generating different results among firms. In particular, this chapter 
focuses on the last financial crisis, which reached its most virulent peak during 2008 
and 2009 and which has been characterized by its non-munificent features and 
devastating effects on the economy; and more specifically, on testing whether the fact 
of being a family firm influences the financial position obtained by an organization 
during such non-benevolent contexts. Thus, in short, the research goal of this chapter 
CEO’s satisfaction with 
performance 
Performance compared 
to the industry 
 











could be captured by the following questions: “Why do some organizations obtain 
favorable results during crisis periods whilst others hold difficulties or fail? Does 
family ownership affect this situation?”.  
Along the literature, several studies have appraised the differences between 
family and non-family businesses in terms of goals, ethics, size, financial structure, 
strategies and corporate governance (Basco & Pérez-Rodriguez, 2009; Berrone et al., 
2010; Distelberg & Sorenson, 2009; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). In this vein, related 
research has argued that these differences will ultimately revert in distinct levels of 
performance, financing and investment options, and risk-taking due to the emotional 
component which is present within family businesses: the socioemotional wealth. In 
particular, this factor is believed to be the single most important feature to separate 
family firms from other organizational forms (Berrone et al., 2010) and refers to the 
affective needs present in these organizations such as the ability to exercise family 
control and the perpetuation of the family dynasty (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). 
Following this argumentation, in this study we find that family ownership 
affects the financial strength obtained by an organization. That is to say, we find 
support for the assumption that family firms’ prospects, which are mainly reflected in 
the preservation of its socioemotional wealth – and therefore on the continuity of the 
family business (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) –, will rule the financial 
behavior shown by these organizations. Additionally, as our research was set on a non-
munificent context (which could affect the future and viability of the firm) we argue 
that these findings would do nothing but support the peculiarities previously 
mentioned of family companies. 
Additionally, following Hofer and Schendel (1978) and Sharma et al.’s (1997) 
research we argue that considerable understanding could be gained by appending 
strategic management insights on the family firm research approach. In this vein, we 
proposed that organization’s scope of operation (measured with firm 
internationalization and diversification) and the characteristics of its key-role players 
(measured by TMT educational level and TMT average age) would affect this 
relationship. However, we do not find support for firm internationalization and 
diversification affect this relationship. This would denote that the context where the 
firm is embedded does not affect family firms’ longer outlook for survival (and 
 







therefore their financial strength). Contrarily, we find that managerial average age 
positively moderates our baseline hypothesis. Thus, it appears that age affects the 
capital structures (Chen et al., 2010), risk-taken (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984), investment behavior (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) and ability to deal with 
information (Taylor, 1975) therefore generating lower levels of leverage for managers 
with older age – and as a consequence a positive effect on the financial strength. In this 
research we also find that highly educated managers generate lower levels of financial 
strength than low educated ones; therefore negatively moderating the relationship 
between family ownership and firm’s financial strength. Thus, it seems that TMT with 
higher educational levels will indeed leverage more, which therefore would 
negatively affect the financial strength presented by their (family) firms.  
Furthermore, more in detail results suggest that there are not significant 
differences among those managers who have little training and belong to either a 
family or a non-family firm. This would suggest that despite belonging to one type of 
firm or the other, these managers will leverage less than highly educated ones and for 
that reason, there would not exist differences among this group. However, when 
managers are highly educated, the financial strength obtained by family firms will be 
greater than the ones obtained by non-family firms, i.e., there will be significant 
differences among them. We argue that such differences could be explained by family 
firms’ inherent characteristics such as to invest more efficiently, take less risk-averse 
options, rely less on debt, look for a higher continuity of the firm, etc. which would 
reduce the negative effect over firm’s financial strength actually promoted by highly 
educated managers in non-financial firms. 
In addition, a finding to highlight in our study is that TMT characteristics (in our 
study TMT average age and TMT educational level) seem to have just a marginal effect 
among family businesses. That is to say, despite the presence of high or low values of 
these TMT characteristics, the financial strength shown by these organizations keeps 
stable. However, within non-family firms, we observe that TMT characteristics do 
matter in affecting organizational outcomes. Consequently, we suggest that family 
firms’ prospects seem to rule the behavior of these organizations. Figure 4 (see below) 
collects a summary of the conceptual model analyzed in this chapter. 
 
 



























Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
 
Chapter 5 summarizes the most important empirical findings per chapter, and 
discusses the relevant theoretical and practical implications of this doctoral 
dissertation. Furthermore, it collects recommendations for future research. 
 
For its part, Chapter 6 serves to comply with the standards established by the 
University of Valencia for obtaining the International Mention on the Doctoral Degree. 
Thus, it provides a summary (in Spanish) of the objective, theoretical basis, findings and 
conclusions of the dissertation. 
 
Chapter 7 shows the documents sent to the organizations that composed our 
sample: questionnaire, introduction letter and pre-notice letter. Additionally, this 
section illustrates the tests performed to control for common method variance within 
our analysis. 
 



















To conclude, Chapter 8 collects a list of all the references used for the 
elaboration of this dissertation. A brief summary of the parts and contents of this 
dissertation may be observed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Structure of the dissertation: Parts and contents 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Description of the objective and outline of the dissertation. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: HOW CAN COMPLACENCY MOLD MANAGERIAL DECISIONS? THE 
ROLE OF PERCEPTIONS IN STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING 
 
Research on organizational strategic reaction to performance feedback by using the 
managerial complacency with firm’s results: a cognitive variable which combines the 
traditional (objective) measurement of performance feedback (or ‘attainment discrepancy’) 
carried out by the BTF-inspired literature with the CEO’s satisfaction (or perception) with 
these results. In this study it is also analyzed the influence of executives’ characteristics on 
the resulting level of this managerial complacency.  
 
 
CHAPTER 3: CEO SATISFACTION AND INTENDED STRATEGIC CHANGES: THE 
MODERATING ROLE OF OBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE CUES 
 
This investigation gives a turn of screw to the micro-processes and mechanisms that 
underlie the translation of ‘attainment discrepancies’ into subsequent actions. To do so, (1) 
CEOs’ satisfaction with performance is used as a direct indication of ‘attainment discrepancy’ to 
collect perceptual information of his/her interpretation of performance feedback, and (2) 
organization’s performance compared to the industry2 is incorporated as a contextual variable 




CHAPTER 4: FINANCIAL STRENGTH OF FAMILY FIRMS DURING NON-
MUNIFICENT PERIODS: THE EFFECTS OF TMT’s CHARACTERISTICS AND SCOPE 
OF OPERATION 
 
Study of the reasons why some organizations obtain good (financial) results during crisis 
periods whilst others hold difficulties or fail. In this investigation family ownership is defined 
and analyzed as a potential factor of the differences in financial strength presented among 
organizations. Moreover, it is also tested whether firm’s context of activity and TMT’s 
characteristics may affect this relationship. 
 
                                                             
2 Evidently, this variable is related to CEOs’ satisfaction with performance, as higher levels of organization’s 
performance compared to the industry should make CEOs feel better (more satisfied) about their firm’s results 
(see the corresponding chapter for more information). This is probably why many performance feedback 
scholars have simply used organization’s performance compared to the industry as a proxy for ‘attainment 
discrepancy’. However, as we further discuss, organization’s performance compared to the industry will be 
simultaneously much less and much more than ‘attainment discrepancy’. 
 








CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
Outline of empirical findings, theoretical implications, practical connotations and future 
lines of research which underlie from our investigation. 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: RESUMEN Y RESULTADOS DE LA TESIS DOCTORAL 
 




CHAPTER 7: APPENDICES 
 
In this section we collect the questionnaire, introduction letter and pre-notice letter sent to 
the firms which compose our sample. Moreover, we describe the controls for common 
method variance carried out in our investigations. 
 
 
CHAPTER 8: REFERENCES 
 
List of references used in the elaboration of this dissertation3. 
 






                                                             
3 Both this section and the rest of the dissertation follow the APA (American Psychological Association) 
citation standards: the most commonly style to cite sources within the social sciences. For more 
information, consult the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (American 
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The study of the strategic response of organizations to performance feedback 
has aroused the interest of a substantive stream of scholars (e.g., Greve, 2003; Shinkle, 
2012) since Cyert and March (1963) started to research the reasons why organizational 
change was promoted. The most prominent perspective in this research area is the 
Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert & March, 1963), which has heavily inspired 
organizational behavior literature. This theory anticipates that organizations set goals 
and adjust their behavior in response to performance cues. More specifically, the BTF 
contemplates that organizations’ decision makers pursue a search and change behavior 
(only) after perceiving a negative performance feedback – i.e., when performance is 
below a predetermined aspiration level, which is generally delineated from the average 
of its peers’ performance or from its own performance in previous years –, a 
postulation which has been extensively accepted and proved in the literature (for a 
recent review, see Shinkle, 2012; for an exception, see Lohrke et al., 2006). Nevertheless, 
without regard to the prevalence of the BTF-inspired view, scholars have also found 
some ambiguous evidence that support contrary assumptions. For instance, there are 
some findings in the literature which suggest that organizational change behavior is 
instigated by positive performance feedback instead of by a negative one, as proposed 
by the ‘organizational slack’ (Daniel et al., 2004) or the ‘capability cue’ perspective 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). In the same vein, scholars have also carried out studies 
where negative performance feedback is not related to higher organizational change 
behavior, but lower one. The latter has been explained, for instance, by the ‘threat-
rigidity’ perspective (Staw et al., 1981).  
These findings emphasize the lack of results concordance on this assumption 
and highlight the necessity to go into the depth and identify potential factors that 
influence the translation of performance feedback cues into subsequent organizational 
behavior actions (Jordan & Audia, 2012). Inspired by this, in this study we accentuate 
the relevance of evaluating the effects of executives’ perceptions and cognitions in 
strategic decision-making processes (Ocasio, 1997) – something which has unusually 
been under investigation despite having been considered to act as filters of reality, 
used in decision-making (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Hambrick, 1994; Lawrence, 1997; 
Ocasio, 1997). One illustration of this situation is shown by the little attention that has 
 







been paid to understand the decision makers’ assessment process of performance 
feedback despite, along the literature, it is profoundly argued that these interpretations 
work as perceptual filters of the actual state of things and may largely help to 
disentangle the reasons why strategic change is promoted (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; 
Staw, 1980). Thus, taking the latter into account a company could be performing poorly 
according to informed outside observers, but whether their managers unrealistically 
“assess their own performance as positive, then performance feedback theory’s critical 
prediction that low performance induces the decision maker to intensify problem-
solving responses is less likely to hold” (Jordan & Audia, 2012, p. 214), which would 
contradict the BTF assumptions and would open future directions for research.  
In this vein, with the aim of supplementing organizational behavior research 
and integrating apparently contrary findings about performance feedback 
consequences, we propose to add into the equation the managerial complacency with 
firm’s results, a cognitive variable which combines the traditional (objective) 
measurement of firm’s performance carried out by the BTF-inspired literature when 
determining the strategic response of organizations (which is basically obtained as the 
difference between firm’s current performance and its peers/historical results), with 
the executives’ perception (or valuation) of these results. Consequently, this variable 
would permit to show the level of managerial conformism with firm’s outcome 
regardless its objective value (Kawall, 2006; Pascal, 2011). In particular, the managers’ 
level of complacency would reach its minimal value when despite the fact the firm 
obtains high levels of (objective) performance, their perception is rather poor. 
Nevertheless, it would reach its maximal value when in spite of getting bad (objective) 
results, the managerial perception presents elevated values. Several scholars such as 
Sánchez-Peinado et al. (2010) support these precepts anticipating that the intentions to 
change of the managers jointly rely on their perceptions and interpretations of the 
results achieved and on the objective data. Additionally these authors argue that in 
spite of perceptions incorporate measures based on subjectivity, they include a tacit 
assessment of the previous expectations, and can pick up other ‘unobservable’ 
influences such as the degree of satisfaction with a certain outcome, the demand for 
better results by shareholders, or the taking of consideration of different variables that 
can affect the results (e.g., they may take into account periods of crisis or 
 







restructuration that a firm is suffering), etc. Thus, below-average objective results could 
even be valued as good if, for instance, previous expectations were more pessimistic. 
In this research, we do find that BTF’s change reasoning is kept against 
managers who are not complacent with firm’s results. Hence, we anticipate that firm’s 
strategic change behavior will be enhanced (just) in front of low managerial levels of 
complacency with organizational results, disregarding the sign of the objective 
performance feedback obtained by the firm. This conjecture would confirm that 
perceptions with results also drive firms’ strategic change behavior instead of being 
merely based on ‘visible’ measures of performance feedback. This argument is 
supported by Ocasio’s (1997) research where it is advocated that managers’ decisions 
depend to a high degree on how they perceive the reality and how much they feel the 
necessity to react. Thus, by incorporating insights from a cognitive approach, this 
chapter builds upon recent efforts to advance performance feedback theory (Greve, 
2003). 
To further explore the mechanisms by which performance feedback cues lead to 
certain organizational strategic reactions, in this research we take one step back to 
analyze the influence of executives’ characteristics on the resulting level of managerial 
complacency. Prior literature about upper-echelons view (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) has 
likewise focused its attention on this aspect highlighting the importance to analyze 
organizations’ decision makers, and more particularly their characteristics, when 
explaining the outcomes, strategic decisions and behavior adopted by a firm (Bantel & 
Jackson, 1989; Buyl et al., 2014; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Similarly, as widely 
recognized by this literature stream, research seems to agree in determining that the 
study of these characteristics will be critical to delineate their perceptions (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984) which, in the last instance, will rule the change actions carried out by the 
organization (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Sánchez-Peinado et al., 
2010). 
Hence, in line with these suppositions, in this study we focus our attention on 
assessing the influence of several managerial characteristics on the level of managerial 
complacency. In particular, we analyze the top management team (TMT) functional 
diversity, TMT educational diversity and TMT tenure as these variables have 
previously received extensive interest in the literature about organizational behavior 
 







and decision-making (e.g., Buyl et al., 2012; Diaz-Fernandez et al., 2015; Escribá et al., 
2009; Messersmith et al., 2014). 
Thus, due to TMT functional diversity and TMT educational diversity are 
usually related to a greater breadth of perspectives and higher levels of information 
computation (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Olson et al., 2006; Randel & Jaussi, 
2003), in this research we anticipate a negative relationship between these two 
variables and the level of managerial complacency. That is to say, we expect that decision 
makers which hold high levels of functional and educational diversity in their teams 
produce less complacent evaluations. 
Meanwhile, longer-tenured managers tend to limit their information processing 
and be more easily satisfied due to, over time, these individuals develop more fixed 
habits, rely more on past experience instead of on new stimuli and generate more 
steady routines and structures (Escribá et al., 2009; Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Katz, 
1982; Miller, 1988; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Pfeffer, 1983; Pla et al., 2010). Thus, along this 
research we propose a positive relationship between the TMT tenure and the level of 
managerial complacency. That is, we anticipate that decision-making teams with longer 
firm services will yield more complacent or conformist evaluations. 
In this way, in our research we integrate Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) upper-
echelons perspective with Cyert and March’s (1963) BTF research. Figure 5 (see below) 





















          TMT characteristics 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
 
To empirically test our hypotheses we compile both subjective data (obtained 
throughout a questionnaire) and objective data (collected from an accounting and 
financial organizational information database) from 137 Spanish SMEs for a four years’ 
time window as a sampling framework. As expected, we do find a negative 
relationship between managerial complacency and organizational change behavior which, in 
the first place, shows the importance of deepening the knowledge upon the 
intermediate hidden mechanisms whereby performance feedback cues generate 
specific reactions in organizations; and secondly, suggests that the study of cognitive 
and perceptual variables in strategic decision-making processes should be taken into 
account, as these variables could contribute to better understand organizations’ change 
behavior. Thus, based on our findings, we argue that firms will be able to follow 
distinct change behavior despite obtaining similar objective results and this is due to 
the potentially different perceptions of managers over such results (or what we call 
managerial complacency). In particular, these discoveries connote that the effects 
predicted by the BTF-inspired view and the apparently contradictory literature may 
not be in conflict, but rather form part of the same continuum. Additionally, they 


















help to shed light on deviations from the predictions of conventional performance 
feedback research, which are not yet fully understood.  
Likewise, to further understand the mechanisms by which performance 
feedback cues lead to subsequent organizational behavior actions, in the present study 
we aim to disentangle the potential effects of executives’ characteristics on the resulting 
level of managerial complacency. As anticipated, we obtain a negative relationship 
between TMT functional diversity and the managerial complacency obtained and a 
positive relationship between TMT tenure and the latter; while we do not detect any 
significant results for TMT educational diversity. 
 
In the following sections, we first introduce the conceptualization and 
characteristics of the BTF research stream and the apparently contradictory 
perspectives found in the literature. Then, introducing a perceptual performance 
variable, the managerial complacency with results, we describe under which situations 
organizational change behavior is consistent with the BTF reasoning. The chapter 
concludes by mentioning several limitations of the article and addressing implications 
for future research. 
 
 
2.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
2.2.1. Performance feedback and organizational change: the BTF and alternative 
perspectives 
When and how executives make the decision to engage in organizational 
change is both theoretically and practically consequential as shown by its deep study 
across a wide set of organizational and behavioral theories. In particular, 
organizational change is argued to be source of adaptation, learning and evolution 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Similarly, this variable is frequently 
associated with performance implications, which emphasizes the relevance of 
understanding the reasons why managers make such decisions (Gavetti, 2012). 
The dominant perspective in this domain is the BTF (Cyert & March, 1963). This 
theory, established under several assumptions of the Carnegie School such as bounded 
rationality, backward-looking orientation and rule-based adaptation (Cyert & March, 
 







1963; Gavetti et al., 2012; March & Simon, 1958; Shinkle, 2012), contemplates that firms 
(and their managers) determine their strategic behavior as result of assessing its 
performance feedback, following simple decision rules. The latter has been 
operationalized in the organizational behavior literature through many different ways 
(Short & Palmer, 2003); however, most studies consider that organizations use some 
form of preset aspirations in order to determine whether their performance feedback is 
positive or negative (Chen, 2008). In particular, this stream of literature anticipates that 
when perceiving a negative performance feedback, that is to say, when performance 
drops below a particular aspiration level – usually drew as firm’s peers performance 
(social comparison performance feedback) or firm’s performance in prior years (historical 
performance feedback) –, organization’s decision makers will start a ‘problemistic search’ 
behavior through which they will attempt to find solutions to improve this dropping 
performance (Cyert & March, 1963). In particular, these solutions may be related to 
different issues such as strategic change (Greve, 2003; Lant et al., 1992), increase in 
firm’s risk-taking (Bromiley, 1991) or innovation (Bolton, 1993), etc. Accordingly, 
‘problemistic search’ generally involves deviations from the main organization’s 
activities (Greve, 1998). 
Following BTF’s assumptions, a wide range of scholars have empirically 
proposed and proved this negative relationship between performance feedback and 
change and search behavior (e.g., Greve, 2008; for a review, see Shinkle, 2012). 
However, despite the validity and dominance of this theory in the performance 
feedback research, opposite results have been similarly found (Bowen, et al., 2010). For 
instance, several researchers have put forward alternative theoretical positions which 
confront the BTF precepts, proposing a positive relationship between those variables; 
the latter has been deeply supported by the ‘organizational slack’ perspective (Daniel et 
al., 2004), the ‘threat-rigidity’ perspective (Staw et al., 1981) or the ‘capability cue’ 
perspective (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). In line with the ‘organizational slack’ 
perspective, it is stated that positive performance feedback may be perceived as an 
increase of organizations’ excess resources, also called slack, which in turn might be 
used to increase the organizational change and search behavior (Daniel et al., 2004). 
Similarly, the ‘threat-rigidity’ perspective suggests that when facing a threat – such as a 
proximal discontinuance situation or a simple negative performance feedback –, 
 







organizations might decrease their change and search behavior (Miller & Bromiley, 
1990; Staw et al., 1981; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996). However, the ‘capability cue’ 
perspective (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011) dives more on psychological aspects of 
decision-making processes articulating that performance feedback is seen by firm’s 
managers as an indicator or a ‘cue’ of its current level of ability to perform a certain 
level of former performance. In this sense, this perspective argues that “when a person 
receives negative or positive feedback in a domain of central importance to his or her 
psychological self-concept (such as its level of capacity to obtain a certain 
performance), it spills over and influences his or her sense of potency in multiple 
domains” (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011, p. 206). Therefore, these ‘cues’ will encourage 
or discourage managerial self-confidence in their abilities when respectively positive or 
negative performance is previously perceived. In particular, positive performance 
feedback will increase managers’ self-confidence in their abilities and stimulate their 
risk-propensity and change behavior. Nevertheless, negative performance feedback 
will have contrary effects, decreasing managerial ability-confidence and their will to 
change and innovate (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). 
Our study is inspired by the existence of these inconsistent results along with 
the call for a reconciling perspective made by some scholars such as Chatterjee and 
Hambrick (2011) and Jordan and Audia (2012). Additionally, this research is motivated 
by the “questionable” premise established in the existing performance feedback 
literature, which suggests that researchers understand how managers make strategic 
change decisions: by assessing organizational performance feedback, and more 
concretely, by comparing the current performance obtained by the firm with their 
previous aspirations (Shinkle, 2012, p. 448). However, as Shinkle (2012) and Mahto and 
Khanin (2015) claim, this statement is somewhat pretentious and other factors, such as 
managers’ perceptions with these results, will also need to be under consideration to 
better understand strategic decision-making processes. 
 
2.2.2. Decision makers as performance feedback evaluators 
The lack of analytic precision when predicting the impact of performance 
feedback on organizational behavior is argued to be one of the main determinants of 
the existing incongruences in the literature (Greve, 2003). In fact, the traditional 
 







performance feedback theory suggests that decision makers’ subjective assessment of 
organizational performance must be analyzed and understood “as it really is” and not 
simply discerned as an inherent “specification of the situation” (March & Simon, 1958, 
p. 172). Nevertheless, practically most of the studies in this literature stream show 
performance feedback as a mere objective element that compares the organization’s 
current performance with its past or peers’ performance (understanding these values 
as previously default aspiration levels by the organization) and, in case this level of 
performance falls short according to its preordained standards, it is explained that an 
alert mechanism will be generated which will enhance the search for solutions and 
changes in the activities of the organization (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003; Greve, 
2008). This premise is based on the assumption that decision makers present temporal 
consistency in their standards for evaluating performance and accordingly set 
prospectively their goals (aspirations), which remain fixed across the whole assessment 
process. 
We argue that as performance feedback theory is essentially a cognitive theory 
(Labianca et al., 2009; Shinkle, 2012), a more comprehensive model of how decision 
makers assess organizational performance and respond to it must go beyond this 
objective assumption. Hence, following Jordan and Audia’s (2012) recommendation, in 
this chapter we extend the component of the theory that concerns performance 
assessment by identifying a broader range of cognitive strategies that affect decision-
making processes. In fact, along the literature little attention has been paid to these 
performance evaluation processes despite it is argued that managerial perceptions and 
interpretations may broadly help to more precisely understand whether strategic 
change is (or is not) promoted within organizations (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996).  
However, some steps have been taken in this sense lately. For instance, 
Labianca et al. (2009) propose that many factors other than objective performance cues 
might affect organizational behavior. In this vein, Jordan and Audia (2012) argue that 
decision makers may generate self-enhancing assessments of objective low 
performance when seeking to improve their self-image by assessing this performance 
as satisfactory – and therefore aligning it more favorably with the observed 
performance. This, in turn, would diminish behavioral responses to poor performance 
due to “the gap between desired performance and actual performance is minimized, 
 







reducing or even eliminating the perception of performance problems” (Jordan & 
Audia, 2012, p. 214) – which would contradict BTF-conventional reaction of decision 
makers to negative performance feedback. Similarly, Labianca et al. (2009) propose that 
strong performers sometimes have higher intentions to change if they actively strive 
for even higher performance levels in the future, therefore generating a modification of 
their aspirations. In the same vein, Haleblian and Rajagopalan (2005) suggest that it is 
not appropriate to apply the same standard to determine aspirations for all 
organizations, as aspirations can themselves fluctuate across managers in varying 
organizations. The latter is supported by the original work of Cyert and March (1963), 
which states that decision makers hold the chief subjective influence on performance 
assessment and, therefore may critically distort this evaluation process. In a relative 
vein, Jordan and Audia (2012, p. 218) argue that this consideration is especially 
important for advancing in performance feedback theory, since it may help to “assess 
performance as accurately as we can”.  
Building on these precepts we argue that the impact of performance feedback 
on strategic change and the causal processes behind it need to be considered more 
fully. In particular, in this research we relax the assumption that strategic reactions of 
organizations to performance feedback are (exclusively) driven by the traditional 
(objective) measurement of firm’s performance carried out by the BTF-inspired 
research – which is based on some form of aspirations and generally operationalized as 
the difference between firm’s current performance and its peers or historical results –, 
but they will also depend on executives’ perceptions and cognitions with the current 
results obtained by the firm, i.e., managerial actions will likewise be affected by their 
own insights of the reality (Ocasio, 1997). Therefore, in order to better grasp the 
translation of performance feedback cues into subsequent organizational behavior 
actions (Jordan & Audia, 2012) we propound to combine both streams, and specifically 
look for the existent differences between the objective measurement of the performance 
obtained by the firm and the managers’ satisfaction (or perception) over it. That is to 
say, we suggest adding into the organizational behavior equation what we call 
managerial complacency (with firm’s results). Hence, we specify that appending 
managerial judgments we will shed light on the understanding of the enterprises’ 
adaptive processes eliciting a more meaningful answer from performance feedback 
 







cues. In this sense, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) pinpoint that the isolated study 
of subjective variables – as the secluded analysis of objective variables – would also 
cast serious doubts on organizational behavior literature because of its measurement 
error appears to correlate with a large set of characteristics and behaviors (e.g., a drop 
in reported racism over time may simply reflect an increased reluctance to report 
racism). Additionally, they also suggest that subjective variables are useful in practice 
for explaining differences in behavior across individuals though do not appear useful 
in explaining changes in behavior. 
 
2.2.3. Managerial complacency and organizational change behavior 
“In all life one should comfort the afflicted, but verify, also, one should afflict the 
comfortable, and especially when they are comfortably contentedly, even happily wrong.”  
(John Kenneth Galbraith) 
 
John Kenneth Galbraith’s oft-quoted statement, commonly referred to as 
complacency, has been studied along different areas of the literature. Generally 
approached theoretically, research has focused on its influence over assessment 
processes, arguing about its potential effects on subsequent actions. In discussing 
complacency connotation, several scholars have indicated that this variable might be 
understood as a kind of conformism or feeling of quiet pleasure or security, while 
unaware of some potential danger or threat (Pascal, 2011). However, as pointed out by 
Kawall (2006, p. 343) this variable “is not as easily recognized as cruelty, dishonesty, 
and those vices which lead to distinctively vicious forms of behavior. Instead it works 
quietly, an often subtle drift into an easy self-satisfaction with one's efforts and 
accomplishments (no matter how meager)”. The latter seems problematic insofar as it 
could cause some confusion among scholars when linking appropriate or justified 
feelings of satisfaction as instances of complacency. In fact, this looks too broad and, as 
stated by Kawall (2006), surely good or outstanding performance might generate some 
level of satisfaction but this ought not to be seen as complacency. Conversely, 
complacency seems to require that one be confused with its level of achievement, 
leading to an excessive satisfaction (Kawall, 2006). That is to say, complacent evaluations 
 







will exhibit high levels of satisfaction despite objectively the results obtained do not 
reflect the same threshold.  
Deepening in its effects, Miller and Chen (1996) indicate that the range of 
actions and the search knowledge of competitive alternatives adopted by a firm are 
influenced (and restricted) in part by the complacency of firm’s decision makers. 
Similarly, Sánchez-Peinado et al. (2010, p. 75) establish that “the intentionality of 
strategic change is closely related (among other factors) to how managers perceive and 
interpret the environmental changes” and to their “level of complacency with the firms' 
performance”, which would specifically reduce this will. 
As previously mentioned, the present research introduces this variable into the 
organizational behavior equation. This determination is based on the premise that 
managers make decisions about the necessity to react to particular performance cues 
not only on the basis of what they objectively know, but also depending on what they 
subjectively perceive and believe (Ocasio, 1997) – something which has been 
theoretically highlighted on numerous occasions but not investigated in deep (Jordan 
& Audia, 2012). In this vein, as complacency jointly combines the objective performance 
obtained by the firm (generally measured by the traditional BTF-inspired literature as 
the difference between firm’s current performance and its peers/historical results) and 
the managerial satisfaction (or perception) over this performance, we anticipate that its 
use when determining the strategic response of organizations will probably help to 
build important advance in organizational behavior literature. Supporting our study, 
Gordon et al. (2000) theoretically point out that change in situations of bad results is 
not direct, but depends on the level of complacency that the managers face with that 
situation. In fact, they argue that the objective results are an indicator of the degree of 
adjustment between the business strategy and the conditions imposed by the 
environment and serve as a warning system for stakeholders (including managers) on 
the validity of the current strategy (Gordon et al., 2000). However, as long as those 
responsible for driving change are not dissatisfied with the results achieved by the 
company (or show a little complacency with them) there may not be enough incentive 
to act (Sánchez-Peinado et al., 2010).  
One illustration of this situation would occur when a firm that achieves a 
relative objective high performance (and according to BTF-view would not feel the 
 







urgency to develop a change behavior) gets a little complacent or non-conformist 
evaluation by its managers – due to for example their elevated ambition and 
expectations – which, as a consequence, would enhance (instead of reducing) its 
change motivation in order to remedy this ‘problematic’ peculiarity. Hence, this 
circumstance would be explained by the ‘unpredicted’ low levels of managerial 
satisfaction obtained despite the positive figures shown by the objective performance. 
The contrary situation would happen when in spite of a firm obtains a relative poor 
objective performance (which regarding BTF-logic would motivate the take of remedial 
actions to ‘solve’ the problem of poor performance), managers present a great 
acceptance or complacency with the results achieved which, as a consequence, would 
maintain (instead of increasing) the will to change due to the managerial complacency 
and conformism shown with these results. This situation could be given by, for 
instance, a managerial fail to diagnose a convulsive situation – through an ‘unrealistic’ 
perception of good performance –, i.e., managers of this specific firm would be 
‘unpredictably’ satisfied with the poor results obtained because of their unawareness 
of existing potential dangers over performance. Some scholars go further in their 
research and anticipate that limitation on change will be accentuated over time, so that 
resistance to change will grow as the results are considered satisfactory or acceptable 
over a longer period of time (Boeker & Goodstein, 1991). 
Taking these argumentations together, we anticipate that organizational change 
behavior will be boosted in the event that managers show low levels of complacency (or 
conformism) when assessing organizational performance. Conversely, when managers 
present complacent evaluations over firm’s results organizational change behavior will 
show an opposite reaction. This situation would be explained by the introduction of 
the managerial subjective evaluations of organizational performance into the 
organizational behavior equation. The aforementioned, in turn, would allow disclosing 
managers’ perceptions over the firm’s accomplishments and therefore could affect their 
subsequent actions (Greve, 2003; Ocasio, 1997).  
Thus, despite a firm obtains poor objective results (and contrarily to BTF-
inspired view conclusions), organizational change behavior could not be increased in case 
that managers show high levels of complacency with this performance. In particular, this 
circumstance would come established by the ‘unlooked-for elevated' managerial 
 







satisfaction with these results, which would eliminate the feel of urgency to ‘solve’ the 
problem of low performance (Kawall, 2006; Miller & Chen, 1996). Consequently, our 
contribution introduces certain boundaries on performance feedback traditional theory 
arguing that organizational behavior will not be (only) dependent on the sign of 
objective performance obtained by a firm, but on a combination of these results with 
managerial perceptions over them. Accordingly, we postulate: 
 
Hypothesis 1. There will be a negative relationship between the level of managerial 
complacency with firm’s results and the organizational change behavior. 
 
2.2.4. Antecedents of the managerial complacency: the effect of TMT characteristics 
To further understand the mechanisms by which performance feedback cues 
generate specific reactions in organizations, in this study we take one step back to 
assess the effects of managers’ characteristics on the resulting level of managerial 
complacency. Prior literature about upper-echelons perspective has likewise focused its 
gaze on this aspect arguing that the analysis of organizations’ key role players, and 
specifically their characteristics, is essential in explaining organizational strategic 
decisions and behavior (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Similarly, the extant literature on 
this area seems to agree in determining that the study of these characteristics will be 
decisive to outline their perceptions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) which, ultimately, will 
rule the change actions followed by the organization (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Sánchez-Peinado et al., 2010). 
In line with these assumptions, in the present research we particularly focus our 
attention on assessing the influence of several managerial characteristics, such as TMT 
functional diversity, TMT educational diversity and TMT tenure, on the level of 
managerial complacency obtained. Specifically, we take this set of variables as its study 
has previously received extensive regard in the literature about organizational 
attention and reaction (e.g., Buyl et al., 2012; Diaz-Fernandez et al., 2015; Escribá et al., 
2009; Messersmith et al., 2014). 
In this way, in our research we integrate Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) upper-











TMT functional diversity 
Upper-echelons related research determines that diversity in team composition, 
i.e., the heterogeneity or inequalities between team members, is related to the breadth 
of perspectives and perceptions shown by its members (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992; 
Yokota & Mitsuhashi, 2008) and, generally, it is regarded as an important explanatory 
factor of organizational outcomes (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004). Thus, according to 
prior studies, it is argued that the knowledge base of a heterogeneous team will play a 
crucial role in using broader fields of vision, processing bigger amounts of information 
and producing more precise assessments (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1993). Similarly, several scholars show that higher heterogeneity will 
generate greater levels of innovation and will improve the cognitive resources and 
capabilities of a team to solve problems (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990).  
Nevertheless, other authors demonstrate that this variable certainly hampers 
interaction (Williams & O'Reilly, 1998), enhance the occurrence of conflicts (Wagner et 
al., 1984), decreases strategic consensus (Knight et al., 1999) and deteriorates group 
cohesion (O’Reilly et al., 1989), therefore constraining the wideness of views and 
interpretations in the decision-making processes (Hambrick et al., 1996). In this sense 
and due to the lack of consistency of results, Hambrick et al. (1996) research brings 
light to this issue arguing that despite the existence of both positive and negative 
factors, the benefits of team heterogeneity outweigh its costs significantly (which 
suggests a global positive effect of this variable). 
Following this approach, next we focus our attention on the study of TMT 
functional diversity. This variable, defined as the variety of job related knowledge 
derived from different functional experiences, is argued to improve the access to 
external information (Aguilar, 1967), increase the attentiveness to various 
environmental sectors (Daft et al., 1988) and bring “different but complementary 
knowledge and expertise to the teams” (Bunderson, 2003, p. 458). Moreover, the 
diversity in the functional background is expected to influence TMT problem solving 
and decision-making processes (Bunderson, 2003) embracing, in this way, wider and 
deeper assessments due to differences in perspectives and opinions. Consequently, 
teams with higher levels of functional diversity will be more aware of the environment 
 







and the circumstances which surround the organization, and will generate more 
complete interpretations of the reality (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988) which, in turn, will 
imply obtaining less complacent evaluations and more sifted analyses. Taken together, 
our second hypothesis runs as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2. TMT functional diversity will be negatively associated with the level of 
managerial complacency. 
 
TMT educational diversity  
Educational diversity has been argued to provide an indicator of the variety of 
skills, knowledge and cognitive processes embedded in a managerial team (Bantel & 
Jackson, 1989; Boeker, 1997; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). More particularly, upper-echelons 
research has usually related this variable to increments of cognitive abilities and 
overall problem-solving skills of the group (Bunderson, 2003; Hambrick et al., 1996). 
Similarly, prior literature establishes that teams with a higher educational diversity 
will tend to be more efficient at addressing vast information from varying categories in 
their information processing (Day & Lord, 1992) and will study the industry 
environment, assess the strengths and weakness of firms, and weigh the pros and cons 
of strategies more in depth than homogeneous teams will do (Olson et al., 2006).  
Thus, following prior approach, we argue that teams with more diversity in the 
educational background will generate wider perspectives and richer interpretations of 
the reality (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988) which, in turn, will imply generating less 
complacent evaluations. In sum, we hypothesize: 
 




Although upper-echelons research highlights the relevance of assessing top 
management team’s characteristics to easier understand strategic decision-making 
processes, there is no single characteristic that has been sufficiently analyzed to 
completely understand its entire effects. However, the managerial tenure is one of the 
most significantly studied variables, both under a theoretical and pragmatically point 
 







of view (Pfeffer, 1983). In this sense, prior literature has extensively set out its effects on 
(1) the commitment to the status-quo, (2) the perceptions towards risk, and (3) the 
diversity of information analysis.  
In the first place, it is expected that longer-tenured executives have stronger 
bias and are more committed to the status-quo and non-action processes (Hambrick & 
Fukutomi, 1991). This behavior is sustained in the literature by arguing that managers 
with long firm services tend to closely adhere to industrial recipes, inertia and 
dominant logic (Escribá et al., 2009; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Pla et al., 2010) and 
hardly abandon them (Newell, 1997). Likewise, these responses are supported on the 
fact that as executives spend time in the organization they start being convinced by the 
wisdom of the organization’s way of proceeding (Wanous, 1980) and become more 
committed to their own prior actions – even if they are not triumphant (Staw & Ross, 
1987). Some scholars further analyzed this issue arguing that managerial tenure also 
generates commitment to policies and practices (Katz, 1982) which enhances the 
continuity of top management members over the time (March & March, 1977).  
The second main effect highlighted by the literature is the influence that this 
variable has on the attitude towards risk. In this issue, scholars predict that as these 
individuals have most surely struggled for years to achieve their positions and usually 
are well established (e.g., in their work, family, friends, communities, etc.) they will 
have much more to lose than to gain by taking superfluous risks (Coffee Jr, 1988). 
Therefore, as tenure increases, risk perceptions will become more restricted and 
managerial risk-averse actions will be pursued more frequently (Coffee Jr, 1988).  
Thirdly, it is argued that as key decision makers get longer firm services they 
tend to limit and restrict their information processing (Miller & Friesen, 1984) due to, 
over time, these individuals develop fixed habits (Katz, 1982), rely more on past 
experience instead of on new stimuli (Katz, 1982) and generate more steady routines 
and structures (Miller, 1988; Miller & Friesen, 1984). In effect, scholars anticipate that 
under the presence of higher levels of tenure, executives will create a common view 
(Pfeffer, 1983) that will potentially develop a set number of responses to act against any 
change (Miller, 1988) which, therefore, will enhance behavioral stability (Katz, 1982). 
Consequently, Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) argue that longer-tenured managers 
will be more easily satisfied with the actions and results performed by the firm. 
 







In short, teams with greater tenure will generate more biased analyses, less 
number of perspectives and opinions, less information processing about the 
environment and larger levels of satisfaction (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Katz, 1982; 
Miller & Friesen, 1984) which, in turn, will imply obtaining more conformist and 
complacent assessments. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
 






To test our hypotheses we assembled a dataset containing both subjective and 
objective information from 137 Spanish medium-sized firms. In particular, our sample 
was formed by medium-sized organizations due to although its size allows them to 
present a formal organizational structure they are normally short of resources, support 
functions and technical assistance to make strategic decisions. Hence, the abilities of 
their managers but also their attitudes, perceptions and cognitions turn up as even 
more important tools for the decision-making processes in this type of firms (Lubatkin 
et al., 2006). Moreover, the characteristics shown by this setting, e.g., the heterogeneity 
in its sector of activity: where 60% of these companies belonged to manufacturing 
industries, whereas 40% were operating in service industries; or the heterogeneity in its 
main strategic activities of change: encompassing both internationalization and market 
penetration/consolidation, diversification, etc. help to improve its external validity. 
Along this study we followed the ‘Tailored Design Method’ designed by Dillman 
(2000). With this technique, we aimed to create a greater proximity and follow-up of 
the process in order to obtain a higher response rate. As starting point, we took a 
random sample of 1000 medium-sized firms (with over 100 and up to 500 employees). 
Next, we sent a pre-notice letter to the CEO of each firm explaining our study and 
assuring them the confidentiality of their responses. We specifically selected these 
actors as respondents due to generally they are considered central, experienced, able to 
gather specific information not reachable for other key players of the firm and 
ultimately responsible for the firm’s strategic decisions (Arendt et al., 2005; Priem, 
 







1994). We confirmed their participation in completing the questionnaire through 
random telephone calls to 20 of these firms. It is important to mention that three 
professors specialized on strategic management and organizational behavior area 
validated our questionnaire before sending it. Moreover, a revised version was pre-
tested with five CEOs from medium-sized firms (not included in the final sample).  
Unfortunately, a total of 52 out of these 1000 firms had to be excluded from our 
database because of incorrect addresses. Ten days after sending such pre-notice letter 
we sent to the rest of the firms (948) the questionnaire with its corresponding cover 
letter. We obtained a total of 131 responses, meaning a response rate of 13.8%. 
However, with the aim of improving this response rate, we forwarded the 
questionnaire again to the remaining firms. Consequently, we obtained 59 extra 
responses. Thus, our final sample was composed by 190 questionnaires (representing a 
response rate of 20.04%). Nevertheless, 7 of these 190 questionnaires had to to be 
removed for reasons of incompleteness. Therefore, that left us with a total number of 
183 valid questionnaires, meaning a response rate of 19.3%. Nonetheless, at this point 
and due to the chief hypothesis that underlined from our research demanded both 
subjective and objective information, we complemented the information gathered from 
the questionnaires (representing the subjective data) with organizations' financial 
statements obtained from SABI Informa Database, the most important source of 
business, accounting and financial information in Spain. As a consequence, our final 
sample got valid information from 137 firms (representing a valid response rate of 
14.45%) due to a total number of 46 firms did not have full information available and, 
therefore, had to be eliminated from our final sample. Hence, the average firm in our 
sample counted € 31 million, was 37 years in the industry and had a management team 
of 43 years comprising 7 members with 9 years of tenure. 
Comparison t-tests were developed between early and late respondents and 
between sectorial percentages of the original sample of 1000 firms and the final one to 
test differences among them. No significant differences were observed between the 
groups (p < .05) (analyses available from the authors on request). Likewise, we checked 
for the residuals behavior, linearity among variables and inexistence of collinearity 
between such variables in order to the test the veracity of our analyses.  
 







Additionally, although demographic data was obtained in this research by our 
survey, to the extent possible, its validity was verified through the objective 
information obtained through the SABI Informa database. Therefore, potential 
common method variance4 problems associated with the collection of information from 
single informants were minimized. Nevertheless, as most of our variables may be 
tackled as straightforward variables (e.g., TMT diversity, TMT tenure, TMT size, etc.) 




Dependent variable (1): ‘managerial complacency’ 
The equivocal nature of the state of the art suggests that more research is 
needed in order to better understand the impact that performance feedback cues have 
on organizational behavior actions (Jordan & Audia, 2012). In this sense, scholars seem 
to agree in arguing that richer interpretations could be obtained when introducing 
perceptual and cognitive variables in the analysis of decision-making processes (Greve, 
2003; Shinkle, 2012). However, despite its relevance, prior literature has hardly 
empirically tested these assumptions (Lawrence, 1997; Ocasio, 1997). 
With the aim of fixing this situation and complementing performance feedback 
research, in the present study we introduce into the equation the managerial complacency 
with firm’s results5, a cognitive variable which combines the traditional (objective) 
measurement of firm’s performance carried out by the BTF-inspired literature when 
determining the strategic response of organizations (which is generally operationalized 
as the difference between firm’s current performance and its peers or historical results), 
with the executives’ perception (or valuation) of these results. In particular, this 
variable shows the difference between both evaluations, which will thereby determine 
the level of managerial conformism/satisfaction or non-conformism/dissatisfaction 
with the objective results obtained by the firm. Thus, managerial complacency will 
                                                             
4 A most exhaustive definition of the controls for common method variance executed along the 
investigations of this dissertation may be found in Chapter 7. 
5 Note that as previously stated, this variable represents a kind of conformism or feeling of quiet pleasure 
or security, while unaware of some potential danger or threat (Pascal, 2011). That is to say, to obtain a 
complacent evaluation one must be confused with its level of achievement, leading to an excessive 
satisfaction (Kawall, 2006). 
 







achieve its minimal values when even if the firm reaches high values of objective 
performance, managers’ perceptions with these results are low. On the contrary, this 
variable will obtain its maximal values when despite the firm gets low values of 
objective performance, manager’s perceptions about them are high. Consequently, we 
argue that the consideration of this variable will generate more meaningful results in 
organizational behavior research. 
Decision-making processes involve multiple actors from the upper managerial 
level; however the CEO of the firm, who is usually central, able to gather specific 
information not reachable for other key players and experienced in strategic decision-
making (Priem, 1994), will be ultimately responsible for the firm’s strategic decisions 
(Arendt et al., 2005). Accordingly, in order to untangle the first part of the managerial 
complacency, the degree of conformism/satisfaction with the organization’s results, we 
use a single-item measurement based on the CEOs of the firms. We do so by directly 
asking them for their level of satisfaction with the results obtained by the organization 
regarding their prior expectations through a Likert scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = ‘highly 
unsatisfactory’ and 5 = ‘highly satisfactory’. This measure has been analogously used in 
the literature by several scholars with the aim of comparing current outcomes with 
initial expectations (e.g., Carree & Verheul, 2011; Cooper & Artz, 1995) and to analyze 
different grades of commerce satisfaction (e.g., Peterson & Wilson, 1992; 
VandenHeuvel & Wooden, 1997). 
Concerning the second (or objective) part of the managerial complacency and 
following Buyl and Boone (2014), Greve (2008) and Moliterno et al. (2015) research 
among others (for a review, see Shinkle, 2012), in this study we consider that 
company’s decision makers compare its results with peer firms that carry out the same 
activities – which is understood in the literature as ‘social comparison performance 
feedback’. In this sense, we consider the average sectorial performance as an aspiration 
level against which organizations assess their performance when they examine their 
actual performance. In addition, due to our sample is formed by medium-sized 
companies that potentially might suffer pressures from inertia, dominant logic and 
sectorial recipes, we state that most likely this sample will collect similar individual 
reference levels near the average (Lehner, 2000). Hence, this argumentation 
corroborates the use of ‘social comparison performance feedback’ in our study. However, as 
 







a robustness check we also used the ‘historical performance feedback’ (full analyses are 
available from the authors upon request), a self-evaluation of the firm’s performance 
commonly operationalized in the literature as the difference with the performance 
obtained by the firm in the previous year. Following prior research, we operationalize 
‘social comparison performance feedback’ as the firm’s ROA minus the industry’s median 
ROA (e.g., Buyl & Boone, 2014; Greve, 2007). ROA has been repeatedly used by 
managers to self-evaluate the performance of their firms, and consequently it makes 
sense to use this variable when assessing firm’s performance feedback (Lant et al., 
1992). Next, to be able to operationalize managerial complacency we calculate quintiles of 
this objective part. Consequently we generate a 5-points scale, where ‘5’ would 
represent the maximum value = companies with an outstanding result with respect to 
their peers; meanwhile ‘1’ would show the minimum value = companies with very 
poor performance concerning the average firms of the sector.  
Finally, we subtract the second part (or objective data) from the first part (or 
‘subjective’ data) in order to obtain the overall value of the variable. Consequently, 
managerial complacency will range from ‘-4’ (when the lowest CEO’s levels of 
satisfaction with firm’s results are obtained while getting the highest objective levels of 
firm’s relative performance) to ‘4’ (when the highest CEO’s levels of satisfaction with 
firm’s results are obtained while reaching the lowest objective levels of firm’s relative 
performance) and will be expressed as follows: 
 
Managerial complacency = ‘subjective’ data  –  ‘objective’ data 
where, ‘subjective’ data = CEO’s level of satisfaction with the general course of the company 
      ‘objective’ data = company’s performance relativized by the sectorial mean  
 
Dependent variable (2): ‘organizational change behavior’ 
The study of the effects of performance feedback on organizational strategic 
behavior has drawn the attention of numerous research (for a review, see Shinkle, 
2012). However, despite its extensive evaluation (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; 
Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003), scholars do not appear to come to an agreement in 
terms of reporting a homogeneous evidence. One of the causes of such results may be 
grounded on the use of distinct or, even more remarkably, distal variables of 
performance feedback consequences (Ketchen & Palmer, 1999; Shinkle, 2012) as can be 
 







risk-taking, innovation, R&D expenditures, etc. (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Chen, 
2008). Following this argumentation, some authors such as Holmes et al. (2011) and 
Schillebeeckx et al. (2016) have questioned the use of these variables due to its 
difficulty and distance to reflect the decisions that organizations’ key decision makers 
actually make based on organizational performance feedback. 
Consequently, with the aim of solving this situation and reducing the noise in 
the analysis of our hypotheses, in this study we propound to measure the organizational 
change behavior through the managerial intention to change (cf. Greiner & Bhambri, 1989; 
Sánchez-Peinado et al., 2010) instead of with the actual, realized change. This point of 
view is not new in the literature, as Schillebeeckx et al. (2016) do something similar by 
analyzing the preference to collaborate instead of actual collaboration, stating that 
“preferences that do not result in established ties remain hidden from investigation so 
that existing ties are a poor proxy for tie-formation intention” (Schillebeeckx et al., 
2016, p. 1494). Using the same logic, Buyl and Boone (2015) go back one step in the 
casual change and use the executives’ exploratory attention instead of actual search 
behavior; similarly, Holmes et al. (2011) criticize the poor use of risk because of the lack 
of attention to the decision makers’ risk perception. In addition, the use of the intention to 
change in place of the actual change allows collecting a broader and richer 
understanding of the organizational change behavior (as opposed to, e.g., only changes in 
specific investments such as R&D) due to the possibility of analyzing a higher number 
of domains or categories of change (see below). In this sense and following a procedure 
similar to the one proposed by Hambrick et al. (1993), in the present study we calculate 
the variable organizational change behavior using a set of six items focused on different 
strategic options that configure the corporate strategy of an organization, including 
both scope (internationalization; market penetration/consolidation; and diversification) and 
growth methods (organic growth; strategic alliances; and mergers & acquisitions).  
As carried out by the authors, to obtain the information about the 
organization’s organizational change behavior we directly asked CEOs to define the 
importance of those six strategic options or categories during the last two years 
(representing the current corporate strategic actions) and among the following two 
years (representing the future/intended corporate strategic actions). To facilitate the 
analysis, for every period, they just had to select the options that got a ‘very low’ (‘= 1’) 
 







and a ‘low’ (‘= 2’) importance under their understanding, as well as a ‘high’ (‘= 4’) and 
‘very high’ (‘= 5’) relevance6. Accordingly, we codified the two remaining options (in 
every period) as ‘medium/neutral’ (‘= 3’) importance. Next, we calculated the sum of 
the absolute differences between the current and future/intended corporate strategy. 
In particular, this sum would reach higher values in case that the strategic options 
were categorized in an opposite way for the present and future7. However, it would 
reach lower values when the different strategic options were categorized similarly in 
both terms. Subsequently, we divided this result by the maximum score of absolute 
differences that could be obtained (12). Hence, the organizational change behavior will 
achieve its maximum value (1) when the CEO of the company aims to modify the 
current strategic pursued actions (both in terms of scope and growth methods) in the 
maximum possible value; meanwhile, this variable will reach its minimum value (0) 
when the CEO of the firm wills to persist in the future with (exactly) the same 
combination of corporate strategic options currently followed. 
 
Organizational change behavior  =  Σ(ABS[pi-current - pi-future]) / MAX(Σ(ABS[pi-current - pi-future])) 
where, pi-current = value of the ‘i’ current corporate strategic action 
      pi-future = value of the ‘i’ future/intended corporate strategic action 
 
Independent variables: ‘Functional and educational diversity’ 
Respondents were first provided with a definition of a TMT: ‘a group of senior 
managers that generally make decisions that are important to the firm’s future’ 
(Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Papadakis & Barwise, 2002). Coming up next, we asked 
CEOs to identify and provide functional and educational information about those who 
had been members of their TMTs over the past three years. In particular, they 
individually differentiated TMT members among six functional categories: ‘production’, 
‘finance’, ‘human resources’, ‘marketing’, ‘R&D’ and ‘international business’; and among 
three main educational groups: ‘business / economy / social sciences’, ‘sciences / 
                                                             
6 More particularly, we asked CEOs to identify the two options that had been/will be the most important 
for their respective companies, as well as the two options that had been/will be the least important ones. 
Among these selected options, we asked him/her to identify only one option, which had been/will be the 
most important, as well as one option that had been/will be the least important. 
7 Note that with this we mean that such value will not depend on the direction of the scope (or growth 
methods), i.e., a CEO who intends to increase the currently low level of internationalization (or strategic 
alliances) in his/her organization will have the same value as another CEO who wishes to decrease 
his/her organization’s currently high level of internationalization (or strategic alliances). 
 







engineering’ and ‘humanities / others’. Functional categories were selected following 
previous studies such as Auh and Menguc (2005; 2006), Lant et al. (1992), Musteen et 
al. (2006) and Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann (2006). Meanwhile, educational categories 
imitated the ones beforehand used by Michel and Hambrick (1992) or Naranjo-Gil and 
Hartmann (2006) among others. 
Following prior research, functional and educational diversity was calculated 
using the Blau’s (1977) index, which reflects the different types or categories there are 
in a dataset, and simultaneously takes into account how evenly its entities or 
individuals are distributed among those types or categories: 
 
FD (or ED) = 1- Σ pi2,  
where, D = diversity (being FD = functional diversity, and ED = educational diversity) 
and pi = % TMTs in the “i” functional/educational category 
 
This index has been widely used in the literature (e.g., Allison, 1978; Finkelstein 
and Hambrick, 1996) and ranges from 0 to 1. Thus, a perfectly homogeneous 
population would obtain a score of 0 (i.e., all the individuals would belong to the same 
category). Conversely, a perfectly heterogeneous population would get a score of 1 
(i.e., there would be infinite categories with equal representation of the individuals in 
each category). That is to say, as the number of categories and its eveness increase, the 
maximum value of the diversity index score also increases – and so do its degree of 
heterogeneity . For instance, a population with four categories represented in the 
following way: 70%, 10%, 10% and 10% would score .48. However, a population with 
four categories evenly represented (i.e., representing 25% each category) would score 
.75. Meanwhile, a population with five categories evenly represented (i.e., representing 
20% each category) would score .80. 
 
Independent variable: ‘TMT tenure’ 
This variable was measured as the mean number of years of employment in the 
firm as TMT members over the past three years. Several alternative measures of 
managerial tenure were considered, including tenure in the firm as TMT member or not 
and tenure in the industry as TMT member of this or other companies. Tenure in the firm as 
TMT member was adopted here because it was the tenure variable most highly 
 







correlated with other tenure measures, hence serving as a central indicator of the 
different tenure possibilities. Regardless, the other tenure options produced patterns of 
results that were very similar to those reported in our study. 
 
Control variables 
CEOs are distinguished by their diverse experiences and vast preparation to 
make complex decisions (Priem, 1994). Consequently, they are typically considered as 
central actors in strategic decision-making processes. However, they unusually act 
alone but interact with the other members of the TMT in order to take strategic 
decisions and plan the future course of the organization (Tang & Crossan, 2016). That 
is to say, decision-making processes do not just involve the CEO of the firm but the 
TMT members, whose participation will also influence firms’ actions (Hambrick, 1994; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). On top of that, several studies have pinpointed the 
importance of internal forces of the organization such as power and political structures, 
economies of scale, sunk cost, etc. in limiting decision-making actions. In the same 
vein, external forces to the organization such as competitors’ reactions, bargaining 
power of suppliers, etc. has also been pointed as potential influencers to organizational 
strategic change (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Lant et al., 1992; Tushman et al., 1986). 
Regarding this research stream, company- and industry-level factors should also be 
considered to understand strategic decisions. Hence, for the sake of completeness in 
our study we include control variables at the managerial-level, at the company-level, 
and at the industry-level.  
To do so, we distinctly differentiate between both analyses performed in this 
research. Thus, for the first one, where the relationship between managerial complacency 
and organizational change behavior is assessed (Hypothesis 1) we control for ‘TMT size’, 
‘TMT average age’ and ‘TMT members with university studies’ at the managerial-level; for 
‘size of the organization’, ‘age of the organization’ and ‘number of additional businesses’ at the 
company-level; and for ‘industry innovation intensity’ at the industry-level. Meanwhile, 
for the second one, where the relationship between the TMT characteristics and 
managerial complacency is evaluated (Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4), we control for exactly the 
same variables at the managerial-level and at the industry-level; however, at the 
company-level we do not control for ‘age of the organization’ and ‘number of additional 
 







businesses’ for not considering them potentially influential to the managerial complacency 
(which, to some extent, may be considered as more managerial-related than firm-
related) and to potentially avoid that our model was vitiated by the accumulation of 
(unrelated) variables. 
At the managerial-level we focus our attention on TMT characteristics including 
the CEO due to, as previously stated, both actors will be responsible for firm’s strategic 
decision-making processes (Hambrick, 1994; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Tang & 
Crossan, 2016). ‘TMT size’ shows the total number of executives that are part of the 
TMT and therefore are taken into account by the CEO for strategic decision-making. 
Besides, Cho and Hambrick (2006) consider TMT size as an important covariate of 
executive attention which might closely be associated with perceptions and change 
concepts. ‘TMT average age’ contains the average number of years of the organization’s 
TMT members. This variable helps to predict individuals’ non-work-related 
experiences (Yang & Wang, 2014). Thus, people of a similar age will have experiences 
in common and will share comparable attitudes and beliefs (Rhodes, 1983) which may 
introduce bias into their perceptions, thoughts and decision-making processes. 
Additionally, managerial age may also influence organizational strategic changes 
(Elbanna et al., 2013) in such a way that organizations composed by younger (and 
more energetic, open to accept higher risks, etc.) TMT members may be more prone to 
initiate changes (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Finally, ‘TMT members with university 
studies’ represent the percentage of TMT members who has higher educational studies. 
This variable is regularly associated with more favorable attitudes toward change (e.g., 
Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), which may facilitate the 
predisposition of CEOs to foster larger changes. Likewise, highly educated individuals 
further tend to be more efficient at tacking huge quantity of information, which may 
affect their ability to generate more complete interpretations of the reality (Day & Lord, 
1992; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). 
At the company-level we control for ‘size of the organization’ measuring the 
average company’s operating income as several other scholars did in prior studies 
(e.g., Cho & Hambrick, 2006). We account for this variable as larger organizations 
might have more organizational slack to engage in exploratory activities (Lavie et al., 
2010) and to meticulously analyze processes of change (Boeker, 1997). At this level, we 
 







also control for ‘age of the organization’, which is calculated as the total number of years 
since the firm was founded. In particular, we account for this variable as several 
authors such as Sánchez-Peinado et al. (2010) have argued that it might negatively 
affect the probability of undertaking strategic changes due to elder companies are 
characterized by having consolidated routines and practices that hinder the prospects 
of change (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Finally, we take into account ‘number of additional 
businesses’, that is to say, the number of businesses that the firm has apart from its main 
activity. This variable is collected due to its close relationship with executives’ search 
behavior (Carter, 1998). In fact, the literature has repeatedly stated that diversified 
firms have higher levels of risk tolerance, which in turn boosts strategic change and 
seizes business opportunities (e.g., Kihlstrom & Laffont, 1979). However, 
diversification may also promote complexity and generate difficulties to the CEO in 
order to control, influence and address strategic actions (Heese, 2015). 
Finally, at the industry-level, we include ‘industry innovation intensity’ 
(operationalized as the industry average of organizations’ R&D expenses divided by its 
sales) to capture the industry’s average degree of innovation, as a proxy for 
environmental dynamism, as this most probably affects strategic change (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). Moreover, innovation is argued to be closely related to both external 
knowledge access and internal learning capacity (Tsai, 2001), therefore likely affecting 




The values of the means, standard deviations and correlations for all variables 
included in the analyses are presented in Table 2 (see below). We tested our 
hypotheses using multiple hierarchical regressions (see below, Table 3 and Table 4). 
We also checked for the presence of multicollinearity in our analyses, founding 
variation inflation factors (VIF) below 2.5 for all variables (analyses available from the 
authors on request). 
 







Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
 
Measures Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
Dependent variables               
1. Organizational change behavior  .3527  .1785  1.00            
2. Managerial complacency   .3548  1.53 – .182*  1.00           
 
Independent variables              
3. TMT functional diversity  .7375  .1203  .205* – .072  1.00          
4. TMT educational diversity  .3765  .2283  .286***  .080  .003  1.00         
5. TMT tenure  9.48  7.10 – .339***  .179* – .127 – .175*  1.00        
 
Control variables               
6. Industry innovation intensity  1.22  .7736  .072  .090  .185**  .120 – .002  1.00       
7. Size of the organization  31820.67  72234.13  .172 – .209**  .003  .142 – .169*  .041  1.00      
8. Age of the organization  37.20  28.18  .084 – .215**  .159* – .056  .178**  .088 – .023  1.00     
9. Number of additional businesses  3.03  2.28  .026 – .209 – .054  .012  .071  .190  .378** – .011  1.00    
10. TMT size  7.40  6.68  .116 – .015  .091  .032 – .315*** – .032  .264**  .091  .293*  1.00   
11. TMT average age  42.54  6.36 – .059 – .133  .050  .056  .418***  .021  .140  .286***  .191 – .041  1.00  
12. TMT members with university studies  70.09  42.16  .315***  .116 – .001  .370*** – .306***  .239***  .209**  .057  .095  .073 – .135  1.00 
 
 
N = 137 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed) 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 







2.4.1. Hypotheses tests 
The present study includes two differentiated analyses. In the first one, and due 
to the lack of results concordance on organizational behavior research, it is proposed to 
add managerial perceptions when determining the strategic response of organizations 
to performance feedback and more specifically, to test the effect of managerial 
complacency on organizational change behavior (see Table 3). In the second one, and taking 
one step back, the attention is focused on the influence that executives’ characteristics 
present in decision-making processes, and in particular in determining the resulting 
level of managerial complacency (see Table 4). 
Model 1 of Table 3 includes control variables only. As can be observed, these 
results seem to point out that firms’ change behavior will be higher the younger the 
organizations are (B = -.361; p < .1), the less additional business they have (B = -.495; p 
< .05) and the more superior studies their TMT members hold (B = .423; p < .05). These 
results are not surprising but follow previous predictions. Thus, older companies, 
generally characterized by having consolidated routines and practices, will probably 
hinder change prospects (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Meanwhile, the rise of the 
number of additional businesses within an organization, usually associated to a greater 
complexity, will diminish the influence and power of the managers in taking strategic 
action (Heese, 2015). Finally, higher educational levels, often related to more efficient 
information processing (Day & Lord, 1992), will be associated to more favorable 
attitudes toward change (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). 
In Model 2 (Table 3) we include the managerial complacency in the analysis. Our 
findings indicate that there is a direct significant negative effect of this variable on the 
organizational change behavior (B = -.510; p < .001). Thus, we are able to support our 
hypothesis (H1), which anticipates that organizations are prone to change more 
substantially when facing low managerial levels of complacency with firm’s results, 
disregarding the sign of the objective performance obtained by the firm – which, 
however, has precisely (and almost exclusively) guided prior BTF-inspired research 
(Lawrence, 1997; Ocasio, 1997). Obtaining these results suggest that the appending of 
managerial judgments to the equation will help to shed light to the understanding of 
organizations’ adaptive processes and to improve the knowledge about organizational 
 







behavioral attention and reaction present in the literature (for a recent review, see 
Shinkle, 2012). In the discussion section, we extensively come back to this finding. 
 
Table 3. Results of linear regression analysis (1) 
  




Industry innovation intensity – .079 – .144 
Size of the organization  .338  .271 
Age of the organization – .361* – .332** 
Number of additional businesses – .495** – .670*** 
TMT size  .150  .090 
TMT average age  .061  .062 
TMT members with university studies  .423**  .446** 
Managerial complacency   – .510*** 
 
 
R2  .387  .575 
Adjusted R2  .216  .427 
R2 change  .387*  .188*** 
F-value  2.259*  3.888*** 
 
 
N = 137 
Dependent variable: Organizational change behavior 
Standardized coefficients are shown; *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (one-tailed) 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
 
Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 are tested in Table 4. Model 1 of Table 4 incorporates 
control variables. Among them, only the size of the firm seems to significantly and 
negatively affect the level of managerial complacency (B = -.228; p < .05). However, we 
previously established that bigger firms would have more available resources to 
engage in exploratory activities (Lavie et al., 2010) and to carefully analyze processes of 
change (Boeker, 1997), and therefore, we argued that the size of the organization 
should be positively related to more complete interpretations of the reality. A potential 
explanation of these results could be the greater levels of complexity and the more 
predictability, rigidity and lack of flexibility present in the behavior of such firms 
(Quinn & Cameron, 1983), which could therefore generate a larger tendency towards 
inertia and poorer strategic analysis (Boeker, 1997). 
Models 2, 3 and 4, for their part, are responsible for showing the sequential 
introduction of TMT functional diversity, TMT educational diversity and TMT tenure 











Table 4. Results of linear regression analysis (2)  
   
Measures Model 1 Control Var. 
Model 2 
Indep. Var. 1 
Model 3 
Indep. Var. 2 
Model 4 
Indep. Var. 3 
Model 5 
Total effect 
   
Industry innovation intensity  .127  .164  .141  .105  .151 
Size of the organization – .228** – .229** – .211* – .203** – .198* 
TMT size  .008  .014 – .017  .076  .054 
TMT average age – .108 – .107 – .171* – .212** – .237** 
TMT members with univ. studies  .102  .106  .043  .167  .037 
TMT functional diversity   – .112     – .172* 
TMT educational diversity      .074    .143 
TMT tenure        .279***  .259** 
 
 
R2  .098  .117  .118  .153  .212 
Adjusted R2  .058  .066  .066  .106  .145 
R2 change  .098**  .019  .001  .035***  .059** 
F-value  2.436**  2.309**  2.239**  3.284***  3.135*** 
   
   
N = 137 
Dependent variable: Managerial complacency 
Standardized coefficients are shown; *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (one-tailed) 
   
 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
 
Meanwhile, Model 5 introduces all these variables together and thus, shows the 
results for hypothesis 2, hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4. In hypothesis 2 (H2), we test 
the influence of TMT functional diversity on the managerial complacency. Our findings 
indicate the existence of a significant negative effect (B = -.172; p < .1; Model 5), which 
gives us evidence to support this hypothesis. Consequently, we can argue that the 
variety of job related knowledge will be related with less complacent evaluations 
which, as previously stated, will be given by the greater breadth of perspectives and 
higher levels of information computation generated within these teams (Wiersema & 
Bantel, 1992; Yokota & Mitsuhashi, 2008). The effect of TMT educational diversity on 
the managerial complacency, i.e., hypothesis 3 (H3), is also tested in Model 5. However, 
no significant results are found. Thus, the findings of this analysis suggest that the 
educational diversity present in the background of a team does not affect its level of 
complacency. Hypothesis 4 (H4) controls the effect of TMT tenure on the managerial 
complacency. Our findings (also in Model 5) indicate the existence of a direct significant 
positive effect (B = .259; p < .05), which allows us to support this hypothesis. In 
particular, this result suggests that long firm services will be associated with more 
 







conformist and complacent assessments which, as earlier mentioned, will be generated 
due to the more biased analyses, less number of perspectives and opinions, less 
information processing about the environment and larger levels of satisfaction hold by 
these teams (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Katz, 1982; Miller & Friesen, 1984). 
 
2.4.2. Additional analyses and robustness checks 
In this study we argue that performance feedback consequences will be better 
understood through the analysis of the managerial complacency, a cognitive variable 
which combines the traditional (objective) measurement of firm’s performance carried 
out by the BTF-inspired literature when determining the strategic response of 
organizations, with the executives’ perception (or valuation) of these results. To 
operationalize this variable and following Buyl and Boone (2014), Greve (2008) and 
Moliterno et al.’s (2015) research, we consider that company’s decision makers 
determine the level of (objective) results reached by a firm by comparing its 
performance with the average sectorial performance, i.e., with the average 
performance obtained by the firms that carry out the same activities – or what is called 
‘social comparison performance feedback’ (this aspect is discussed in more 
detail in methods section). Particularly, as our sample is formed by medium-sized 
companies which potentially suffer pressures from inertia, dominant logic and 
sectorial recipes, we can corroborate the correctness of using reference levels near the 
industry mean in this study (Lehner, 2000). 
Nevertheless, for the sake of robustness we redid the analysis using the 
performance obtained by the firm in the prior year as the aspiration level against which 
the organization compares its actual performance – or what is also understood in the 
literature as ‘historical performance feedback’ (for a review of papers which use one 
measure or another, see (Shinkle, 2012). The results obtained follow the same line, 
however they are slightly less convincing – which is not surprising given the prior 
reasoning for the use of the ‘social comparison performance feedback’ according to our 
sample characteristics. Particularly, for our first analysis we still found a direct 
negative effect of the managerial complacency on the organizational change behavior 
(analyses available from the authors on request), though this effect was lower both in 
 







effect size and significance level as compared with the reported one (B = -.327; p < .1; 
adjusted R2 = .289 versus prior results: B = -.510; p < .001; adjusted R2 = .427). 
On the other hand, for our second analysis we also found similar results (full 
analyses can be requested from the authors), though with a lower effect size and 
significance level (TMT functional diversity B = .037; no significant; TMT educational 
diversity B = .093; no significant; and TMT tenure B = .244; p < .05; adjusted R2 = .149 
versus prior results: TMT functional diversity B = -.172; p < .1; TMT educational 
diversity B = .143; no significant; and TMT tenure B = .259; p < .05; adjusted R2 = .145).  
Therefore, despite no big discrepancies from the prior reported models can be 
raised, we detect a better behavior of our results when using the ‘social comparison 





In this study we aimed to deepen the knowledge upon the intermediate hidden 
mechanisms whereby performance feedback cues generate specific reactions in 
organizations and specifically, to accentuate the relevance of evaluating the effects of 
executives’ perceptions and cognitions in these strategic decision-making processes. 
Using a dataset comprising both archival and questionnaire information of 137 Spanish 
medium-sized firms, we found support for our main hypotheses, therefore generating 
a very interesting pattern of results. In particular, our findings suggest that 
performance feedback consequences will be better understood through the analysis of 
the managerial complacency, a cognitive variable which combines the traditional 
(objective) measurement of firm’s performance carried out by the BTF-inspired 
literature when determining the strategic response of organizations, with the 
executives’ perception (or valuation) of these results. More specifically, managerial 
complacency is found to have a negative effect on organizational change behavior. This 
result is in line with our postulations, through which we anticipated that firm’s 
strategic change would be enhanced (just) in front of low managerial levels of 
complacency with organizational results, disregarding the sign of the objective 
performance feedback obtained by the firm – which, however, has precisely (and 
 







almost exclusively) guided prior BTF-inspired research (Lawrence, 1997; Ocasio, 1997). 
Thus, our findings infer that perceptions will also drive firms’ strategic behavior, 
which will not be merely based on ‘visible’ measures of performance feedback 
(Lawrence, 1997; Ocasio, 1997).  
Reinforcing our study, Sánchez-Peinado et al. (2010, p. 106) theoretically point 
out that “organizational strategic change is intimately related to perceptions and more 
specifically to the degree of complacency of those responsible for strategic decisions, 
which filter and interpret the situations and realities to which they objectively face”. 
This argument is also supported by Ocasio’s (1997) research, which advocates that 
managers decide about the necessity to react to particular cues not only on the basis of 
what they objectively know, but also based on what they subjectively perceive and 
believe. In fact, this author also states the importance of increasing the knowledge of 
how interpretations become manifested in choices. In the same vein, Labianca et al. 
(2009) and Shinkle (2012) argue that as performance feedback theory is essentially a 
cognitive theory, a more comprehensive model of how decision makers assess 
organizational performance and respond to it must go beyond this objective 
assumption, which will be essential to advance performance feedback theory (Greve, 
2003).  
According to this argumentation, organizational behavior literature seems to 
agree in determining that the lack of analytic precision when predicting performance 
feedback effects (and especially the non-inclusion of perceptual variables) might be one 
of the main causes for the existence of alternative perspectives in the literature (Greve, 
2003), where the BTF (Cyert & March, 1963), the most prominent perspective, proposes 
that decision makers will pursue strategic change behaviors (only) after perceiving a 
negative performance feedback; but where other perspectives such as the 
‘organizational slack’ perspective (Daniel et al., 2004), ‘capability cue’ perspective 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011) or the threat-rigidity’ perspective (Staw et al., 1981) 
suggest just a contrary relationship, proposing that these strategic change behaviors 
will be promoted (only) after receiving a positive performance feedback. Thus, despite 
the broad empirical support found for each of these perspectives (Shinkle, 2012), no 
comprehensive solution has been achieved to fully understand when and how 
executives make the decision to engage in organizational change. 
 







As previously mentioned, to solve this situation in this study we propose to use 
a different approach of performance feedback which, guided by BTF original research 
view, has been almost invariably understood as an objective measurement of the 
results obtained by a firm – and operationalized as the difference between firm’s 
current performance and its peers/historical results (Lawrence, 1997; Ocasio, 1997). In 
particular, we propose to use the managerial complacency with which it is achieved that 
apart from objective performance figures, perceptual variables are also taken under 
consideration in strategic decision-making processes. Doing so, our findings suggest 
that the ambiguous effects proposed by the different perspectives might not be 
confronted; but rather form part of the same whole. Next, we discuss some of them: (1) 
the BTF describes the generation of a ‘problemistic search’ situation when firms confront 
a negative performance feedback, which makes the firm to start initiating changes to 
revert the situation in order to achieve again a correct fit between the organization and 
the environment8. However, in our study these theoretical grounds will not be totally 
true due to, as previously stated, manager’s perceptions will be also responsible for 
driving strategic change and a (mere) objective negative performance may not be 
enough incentive to act (Sánchez-Peinado et al., 2010). Consequently, we argue that in 
spite of a firm obtains a poor objective performance, whether managers present an 
excess of satisfaction or complacency with these results, lower levels of strategic change 
or stagnation will be generated. In particular, we anticipate that this situation will be 
done by the great acceptance or conformism with organizational results which will 
produce that managers assume them as better than actually are and they are not able to 
perceive the necessity to follow any strategic change behavior to ‘solve’ the situation. 
Some of the circumstances that might provoke this situation could be, for instance, the 
unawareness of existing potential dangers over performance, expected restructuration 
in the firm or the market/customers structure, known business cycles, the 
prioritization of non-economic objectives (e.g., given that 88.8% of Spanish companies 
are family firms (Instituto de la Empresa Familiar, 2015), some managers might be 
inclined to prioritize non-financial objectives, such as socio-emotional wealth 
                                                             
8 Hence, the underlying idea is that this ‘attainment discrepancy’ leads to a state of dissatisfaction (usually 
measured by objective levels of firm’s relative performance), which subsequently drives managers’ 
intention to adapt the organization’s current strategies in an effort to fix the problem (also called 
‘problemistic search’).  
 







preservation (Martin & Gomez-Mejia, 2016)), etc. Meanwhile, (2) the ‘organizational 
slack’ perspective explains that positive performance feedback provides new resources 
(or a slack) to the organization, which facilitates the search for new opportunities. 
Similarly, following our precepts although a positive performance feedback might 
generate this slack and therefore help to boost strategic change, we should also look at 
the perceptions of the managers with these results. Then, it could be the case where 
managers are complacent (or not dissatisfied) with the results achieved by the 
company and therefore, they would not have enough incentive to act (Sánchez-Peinado 
et al., 2010). For its part, (3) the ‘threat-rigidity’ perspective argues that when facing a 
threat (such as a negative performance feedback), organizations decrease their change 
and search behavior. However, in order to perceive this threat and start acting, 
regarding our arguments managers should hold a low level of complacency with these 
results, which will be considered as a turning point. That is to say, the objective 
performance will be a sufficient but not necessary condition. Finally, (4) the ‘capability 
cue’ perspective stipulates that previous performance is seen by organizations’ 
managers as a ‘cue’ for their capability – i.e., as an indicator of their overall level of 
ability. Thus, this perspective proposes that these ‘cues’ will either encourage or 
discourage managers’ self-confidence and in turn their inclinations to engage in search 
and change-related behavior. However, as previous perspectives, this one is also based 
on objective values of performance feedback to determine the promotion of strategic 
change. Consequently, we argue that its line of reasoning will not be (completely) valid 
as cognitive patterns will also affect organizational behavior9.  
Note that this research is not interested in supporting one theoretical 
perspective or another, but in providing a common frame of reference to analyze 
performance feedback consequences. With this aim, we propose that objective data and 
subjective interpretations jointly affect strategic change, and that organizational 
decision-making processes cannot be unraveled when managers’ cognitions and 
interpretations are not taken into account. 
 
                                                             
9 Note that further explanation of this perspective is provided in Chapter 3 where cognitive and objective 
cues are regressed independently to determine strategic change. 
 







In the second part of our analysis, we analyze the influence of executives’ 
characteristics on the resulting level of managerial complacency. As expected, we found 
significant and confirmatory results for the proposed effects of TMT functional 
diversity and TMT tenure on managerial complacency. Nevertheless, we did not find 
significant results for TMT educational diversity. Following prior literature, we can 
argue that the educational diversity present in the background of a team increases the 
breadth of perspectives, boosts the information computation, promotes the sharing of 
ideas and information, and improves the awareness of the current course of action 
(Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; 
Katz, 1982). Then, by its own definition, TMT educational diversity should have a 
negative relationship with managerial complacency10 – as TMT functional diversity 
shows. However, we do not find significant results for this interaction. One possible 
explanation of the lack of significant results shown by this variable could be grounded 
on analytical aspects. Thus, TMT diversity could not produce a relationship with 
neither high nor low managerial complacency, but a relationship with realism. This value 
is represented by a ‘0’ in the managerial complacency (see measures section) and 
therefore, could be the reason why this variable does not show a stronger significance. 
To accurately discover this assumption, scholars could rescale the managerial 




With this research, we mainly contribute to the extant literature with a number 
of contributions. First, we contribute to the performance feedback literature by 
denouncing the (traditional) common practice to proxy performance feedback by 
simple comparisons of prior performance with industry mean performance and/or the 
organization’s historical performance. This assumption is supported by prior scholars 
such as Jordan and Audia (2012) and Ocasio’s (1997) research which propose that these 
evaluation processes will be affected by individual perceptions and cognitions of the 
organization’s main decision makers – that therefore will work as perceptual filters of 
reality. Cho and Hambrick (2006) similarly sustain this statement by arguing that 
                                                             
10 Meanwhile, contrary effects are theorized and found for TMT tenure (see results section). 
 







managers will differ in how they perceive the stimuli around them which, in the last 
instance, will be reflected in strategic differences (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Hence, 
we argue that this proposition is not new for the literature but despite having been 
theoretically highlighted on numerous occasions, it has rarely been under direct 
scrutiny in prior research (Hambrick, 1994; Jordan & Audia, 2012; Lawrence, 1997; 
Ocasio, 1997). In this study, we take this call and introduce the level of the managerial 
complacency into the equation. Consequently, different interpretations of performance 
feedback will be able to be obtained, which may have important implications for some 
of the key predictions made by the conventional performance feedback research and 
thus, become source of reinterpretation of their expected responses. Based on our 
findings, we argue that the use of the managerial complacency in our analyses generates 
a better understanding of organizational behavior. Additionally, we anticipate that 
under this approach apparently contradictory perspectives of performance feedback 
literature may be reconciled. In sum, our study suggests that objective performance 
feedback by itself does not properly rule organizational behavior actions, but it needs 
to be interpreted and contextualized by the decision makers in order to generate more 
accurate predictions. Thus, with this research we propose a more nuanced 
understanding of how decision makers assess and respond to performance cues. 
In the second place, our research also complements performance feedback 
literature with ideas from the upper-echelons research tradition, which emphasizes the 
relevance of managers' values, perspectives and experiences on strategic decision-
making processes and organizational outcomes (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). However, to predict these variables the extant research has typically 
focused on managers’ observable characteristics of management teams (such as 
demographics or functional experiences) and has rarely considered managerial 
cognitions and perceptions explicitly – even though the latter are actually assumed to 
act as perceptual filters of reality and therefore could generate richer interpretations of 
the decision-making processes (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Hambrick, 1994; Lawrence, 
1997). Our study addresses this dearth of research by analyzing how managerial 
perceptions, and more specifically the managerial complacency with firm’s results, affect 
organizational strategic response. As a consequence, our findings allow us to further 
substantiate the explicative value of these variables (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Hambrick, 
 







1994; Lawrence, 1997) and cognitive implications for strategic choices (Herrmann & 
Datta, 2002). 
 
2.5.2. Limitations and future research avenues 
Like any research, ours does not remain free from limitations which similarly 
represent new research opportunities. In the first place, we intentionally focus our 
study on explaining the effects of performance feedback cues on intentions to change 
instead of on the actual change. As we discussed in the methods section, we do so due to 
this variable is much closer and appropriate to reflect the decisions that organizations’ 
key decision makers will actually make based on organizational performance feedback 
(Holmes et al., 2011; Schillebeeckx et al., 2016). However, an interesting research 
avenue for future scholars could test whether these intentions (at the managerial level) 
are also reflected in actual change (at the company-level) or even in performance-related 
variables (also at the company-level). This presumes insights in the implementation 
process of strategic changes (Hailey & Balogun, 2002) and might require longitudinal 
data. Additionally, another fruitful research line could be obtained by assessing the 
type of change achieved. As previously explained, the variable organizational change 
behavior includes both scope (internationalization; market penetration/consolidation; and 
diversification) and growth methods (organic growth; strategic alliances; and mergers & 
acquisitions). However, this variable is calculated by the sum of the absolute differences 
between the importance given to each of these six categories in the present and in the 
future/intended strategy. Thus, we argue that to improve our findings we could report 
actual change based on these six categories or a group of them. In this way, for instance, 
a firm could present a high level of change based on an increase of market 
penetration/consolidation and organic growth. However, another firm could present a 
similar level of change but in this case based on internationalization and strategic 
alliances. Therefore, despite its similar meaning in terms of absolute change values, the 
first case would be more related to exploitative or inner solutions. Meanwhile, the 
latter would be more associated with exploratory or expansive actions11. 
                                                             
11 In Chapter 3 we take up the challenge and through an exploratory analysis, we provide information 
about the magnitude, scope and direction of these intended strategic changes. However, because of 
pragmatic reasons (related to the availability of longitudinal data) no further analysis could be generated.  
 







Second, following prior research (e.g., Greve, 2008; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 
2011) we consider that company’s decision makers assess firm’s performance by 
comparing it with the average sectorial performance, i.e., we implicitly consider the 
industry mean as the aspiration level against which managers assess their 
organizations’ performance. Accordingly, we calculated managerial complacency. 
Nevertheless, there is a growing literature which establishes that similar organizations 
or reference groups might influence one another more than the sectorial mean 
(Fiegenbaum et al., 1996; Labianca et al., 2009; Panagiotou, 2007; Short & Palmer, 2003). 
Thus, future research could focus its attention on these sets of individuals which in 
fact, might be different from prior levels of comparison. In particular, in this study we 
do not implement this approach due to two main reasons. The first one is related to the 
inability to obtain this data from our sample. Meanwhile, the second one concerns the 
fact that firms of our sample belong typically to mature sectors. These sectors usually 
generate strong pressure from inertia, dominant logic and sectorial recipes; thus we 
argue that in our sample there will be anyway many similar individual reference levels 
near the median (Lehner, 2000). 
Third, in the organizational performance feedback literature several scholars 
have discussed that there could be a direct link between prior (objective) performance 
and satisfaction (e.g., Audia et al., 2000, Mahto and Khanin, 2015). Indeed, one 
illustration of the latter may be found in Cooper and Artz’s (1995, p. 441) research 
where it is argued that “those who do better should feel better”. If so, our results 
would lack of relevance as, managerial complacency, would present values close to ‘0’ 
(see methods section to go into more detail) and thus would not be able to provide 
significant information. However, this circumstance is not sustained by several 
reasons. In the first case, because in practical research of organizational behavior the 
link between objective cues and satisfaction appears to be weak at best (Christen et al., 
2006); and because many scholars have delved into this topic indicating that although 
firm’s (objective) performance is found to be a determinant of satisfaction, a range of 
other factors such as expectations, demographic attributes, previous experiences, 
stakeholders’ pressures, etc. will also influence this variable. And, in the second case, 
because our investigation presents significant interactions where managerial 
complacency is found to influence organizational change behavior (B = -.510; p < .001; 
 







adjusted R2 = .427) and likewise be affected by some TMT characteristics (TMT 
functional diversity B = -.172; p < .1; TMT educational diversity B = .143; no significant; 
and TMT tenure B = .259; p < .05; adjusted R2 = .145). 
The final point pertains to methodological issues. Thus, based on prior research 
and intuition (as for instance the previous difference shown by scholars between 
objective performance and satisfaction), further research could propose to test different 
regression models using performance cues and satisfaction in an individual way. 
Consequently, we suggest that potential interesting effects among performance 
feedback, satisfaction and organizational change could be found through mediation, 
moderation or even moderated mediation analyses and, therefore, generate 
relationships with more explanatory power. For instance, prior research such as Audia 
et al. (2000) tried to do something similar using the level of satisfaction as a mediator 
between past success and persistency in strategies. Indeed, incipient empirical tests 
provide initial support for the existence of a mediation relationship as evidenced by the 
positive and significant correlation between performance feedback and satisfaction 
(.371; p < .001; full analyses are available from the authors upon request) and the 
negative correlation between satisfaction and organizational intended change (-.124; no 
significant; analyses available from the authors on request)12,13. Further research could 
appropriately test these propositions in order to clarify the existent relationship among 
these variables14.  
In sum, our study represents one of the first studies in performance feedback 
research which incorporates both objective performance figures and managerial 
perceptions to determine the strategic behavior shown by a firm. Thus, we complement 
conventional BTF precepts helping to broadly analyze its predictions and the 
ambiguous results existing in the literature. With this research, we hope to set the stage 
for many others to come and open the range of considered options in this issue. 
 
  
                                                             
12 This information may be obtained from Table 5 (Chapter 3). 
13 Additionally, in Chapter 3 we found a negative and significant regression coefficient of CEO’s satisfaction 
with performance on the magnitude of intended strategic changes (-.309; p < .1; Table 6, Model 2; Chapter 3). 
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“Change before you have to.”  
(Jack Welch) 
 
Despite Jack Welch’s oft-quoted statement, one of the most crucial drivers of 
organizations’ strategic changes cited in literature are cues about (declining) 
performance levels (e.g., Kacperczyk et al., 2015). Heavily influenced by the Behavioral 
Theory of the Firm (Cyert & March, 1963), a substantive stream of scholars has studied 
the effects of ‘performance feedback’ on organizational behavior. Arguably, the most 
prominent proposition in this research stream is that an organization’s decision makers 
(its managers) will (only) pursue (strategic) changes when performance falls below 
preset aspiration levels (e.g., Greve, 2003; 2008). The underlying idea is that such 
‘attainment discrepancy’ leads to dissatisfaction, which subsequently drives managers’ 
intention to adapt the organization’s current strategies in an effort to fix the problem 
(‘problemistic search’; Shinkle, 2012).  
However, despite the dominance of the BTF-influenced thinking, scholars have 
also developed contradictory theoretical perspectives, and found mixed evidence 
(Bowen et al., 2010). For instance, Jordan and Audia (2012) theorized that a failure to 
meet preset aspiration levels might not lead to a higher intention to change, if 
managers choose to assess their performance as satisfactory in a search to enhance their 
self-image. Similarly, Labianca et al. (2009) proposed and found that strong performers 
sometimes have higher intentions to change, if they actively strive for even higher 
performance levels in the future (see also Jack Welch’s quote above). These 
equivocalities emphasize the need for studies that scrutinize ‘attainment discrepancy’ 
and its impact on subsequent organizational behavior in more detail (Jordan & Audia, 
2012). As performance feedback theory is essentially a cognitive theory (Labianca et al., 
2009; Shinkle, 2012) we contribute to this issue by digging deeper into the micro-
processes and mechanisms that underlie the translation of ‘attainment discrepancies’ into 
subsequent actions. We do this in three ways: (1) by studying CEOs’ intention to change 
as an outcome variable instead of actual strategic changes at the organization-level, (2) 
by assessing CEOs’ satisfaction with performance as a direct indication of ‘attainment 
discrepancy’, and (3) by incorporating the organization’s performance compared to the 
 







industry as a contextual variable that interacts with CEOs’ satisfaction to affect change 
intentions.  
Firstly, prior performance feedback research has mostly studied outcome 
variables which directly point to actual, realized organizational change behavior (e.g., 
Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Chen, 2008; Greve, 2003). However, inspired by 
Mintzberg’s (1978) fundamental distinction between intended and realized strategy, 
and in analogy with Schillebeeckx et al.’s (2016, p. 1494) claim that “existing ties are a 
poor proxy for tie-formation intention”, we argue that actual, realized organizational 
change might not be the best assessment of managers’ inclinations towards strategic 
change. Indeed, the strategic change literature has emphasized that the successful 
implementation of intended strategic changes is complex and strongly context-driven 
(Hailey & Balogun, 2002). By going back one step in the causal chain and studying 
CEOs’ intentions to change directly –and more in particular: the magnitude of the changes 
in the organization’s current strategy intended by the CEO –, we are able to test the 
effects of ‘attainment discrepancies’ with less noise (Labianca et al., 2009; Lohrke et al., 
2006; Schillebeeckx et al., 2016).  
Secondly, the BTF in essence proposes that managers engage in change 
behavior when they are dissatisfied with results (because they fail to reach a preset 
aspiration level). In general, performance feedback scholars have tested this 
proposition by proxying aspiration levels by (a combination of) historical results and 
performance of organizations’ peers (Shinkle, 2012; for an exception, see Lohrke et al., 
2006). However, in practice many factors other than such objective (and visible) 
performance cues could affect organizations’ aspiration levels – and, hence, ‘attainment 
discrepancy’. For instance, Labianca et al. (2009) found that decision makers did not 
only account for their peers when comparing their performance to aspiration levels, 
but also for the performance of organizations to which they strive to be like in the 
future. In the same vein, Haleblian and Rajagopalan (2005) suggest that it is not 
appropriate to apply the same standard to determine aspirations for all organizations, 
as aspirations can themselves fluctuate across managers in varying organizations. To 
address this issue, in this study we follow Haleblian and Rajagopalan’s (2005) 
suggestions to focus on CEOs’ satisfaction with performance as a direct indication of their 
‘attainment discrepancy’, and – in line with the BTF – we propose that the magnitude 
 







of intended strategic changes will be higher the lower CEOs’ satisfaction with 
performance. Put differently, we relax the implicit assumption in the extant 
performance feedback literature that ‘attainment discrepancy’ is based only on 
(objective) performance cues.  
Thirdly, the latter also allows us to use objective performance cues – more in 
particular, organizations’ performance compared to the industry – as a moderator. 
While the BTF would propose a universally negative relationship between CEOs’ 
satisfaction with performance and subsequent change intentions, other theories and 
perspectives have suggested differently. For instance, high satisfaction with results 
could instigate self-confidence and efficacy beliefs and, subsequently, proactive 
behaviors such as strategic changes (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Haleblian & 
Rajagopalan, 2005; Mahto & Khanin, 2015). Conversely, high dissatisfaction with 
results might cause conservative behavior (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Staw et al., 
1981). In an effort to reconcile these apparently contradictory perspectives, we propose 
that contextual cues at the organizational level might matter. In particular, the 
organization’s performance compared to the industry indicates this organization’s relative 
position in its industry (Kacperczyk et al., 2015) and serves as a signal of the adequacy 
of the organization’s current strategies (Baum et al., 2005) as well as of CEOs’ overall 
capabilities (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). We expect that this contextual cue will 
interact with CEOs’ satisfaction levels, and that the negative baseline effect of CEOs’ 
satisfaction with performance on the magnitude of intended strategic changes will be 
less pronounced the higher the organization’s performance compared to the industry. 
We empirically test the model with data collected from 137 medium-sized 
Spanish firms for a four years’ time window, using a combination of primary data 
(collected through a questionnaire) and secondary data (obtained from databases of 
firm’s annual accounts and financial statements). Our results support our propositions. 
In line with the baseline prediction of the BTF, we find a negative direct effect of CEOs’ 
satisfaction with performance on the magnitude of intended strategic changes. 
Moreover, we also find that this effect is moderated by performance compared to the 
industry, which underscores our proposition that the organization’s objective 
performance serves as a contextual variable providing cues about the organization’s 
and the CEO’s overall efficacy. Extending the conventional performance feedback 
 







theory, we find that the combination of subjective and objective performance cues 
provides the most explanatory power. Additionally, in exploratory post-hoc analyses, 
we more closely examined the number, scope, and direction of strategic changes intended 
by CEOs. The results of these analyses suggested that dissatisfied CEOs in a context of 
declining performance considered more contractive moves – which aligns with the 
BTF’s idea of ‘fixing’ the problem that caused the ‘attainment discrepancy’ (cf., Greve, 
2003). Satisfied CEOs in a context of high performance, conversely, were more inclined 
towards expansive moves – corresponding to the more proactive drive for change 
proposed by other scholars (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Haleblian & 
Rajagopalan, 2005; Labianca et al., 2009). Hence, these exploratory findings underscore 
once again the importance of integrating insights from different theories and 
perspectives when exploring the effects of performance feedback.  
 
 
3.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
3.2.1. Attainment discrepancy and CEOs’ intention to change: The BTF-inspired 
view 
In the extant literature, the dominant perspective used to explain managers’ 
reactions to performance feedback is the Behavioral Theory of the Firm, which is based on 
the Carnegie School’s concepts of bounded rationality and ‘problemistic search’ (e.g., 
Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958). Building on the premise that in their 
decision-making processes individuals are rationally constrained, scholars have 
explored firms’ backward-looking learning from feedback on prior performance levels 
(Arrfelt et al., 2013; Chen, 2008; Gavetti et al., 2012). The main hypothesis in this stream 
of literature is that organizations’ main decision makers are guided by ‘attainment 
discrepancy’ – i.e., the gap between organizations’ actual results and predetermined 
aspiration levels. Generally, it is expected that the higher ‘attainment discrepancy’ – 
i.e., the more performance is below the aspiration level – the more dissatisfied the 
organization’s decision makers will be, and the more they will engage in ‘problemistic 
search’ behavior where they attempt to find solutions to improve the poor results. 
‘Problemistic search’ generally involves deviations from the organization’s main 
activities (Greve, 1998), such as strategic changes (Lant, 1992) or risk-increasing 
 







strategies (Bromiley, 1991). In contrast, performance above aspiration levels – i.e., low 
levels of ‘attainment discrepancy’ – will fuel decision makers’ satisfaction with these 
results, reducing their inclinations to change the current strategies (Chen, 2008; Gavetti 
et al., 2012).  
While this is an intuitively appealing line of reasoning and several scholars 
have found a negative relationship between performance feedback and change 
behavior (Greve, 2008; Shinkle, 2012), other scholars have found opposing results (e.g., 
Bowen et al., 2010). One reason for these contrasting results might lie in the (imprecise) 
operationalization of the core concepts. For instance, many scholars focus on 
organizations’ actual, realized strategic changes (e.g., Chen, 2008). However, as 
performance feedback theory is in essence a cognitive theory about the motives and 
behaviors of decision makers, it is more apt to focus on these decision makers’ planned 
or intended behavior (Gavetti et al., 2012; Labianca et al., 2009). In this study, we follow 
the recommendations by Rajagopalan and Spretizer (1997) and Haleblian and 
Rajagopalan (2005) to differentiate cognitions (perceptions) from managerial intentions 
and actions, and to consider them as the antecedents of actual changes in the content of 
strategy. We, therefore, examine CEOs’ intentions regarding strategic change, and more 
in particular the magnitude of strategic changes the CEO intends to pursue (cf., Haleblian & 
Rajagopalan, 2005), which depends both on the number of domains in which the CEO 
wishes to implement changes, and on the degree of change within these domains.  
Second, scholars have almost invariably operationalized ‘attainment 
discrepancy’ as the gap between an organization’s realized performance on the one 
hand and historical and/or peers’ performance levels on the other hand (for a review, 
see Shinkle, 2012). The implicit assumption is thus that aspiration levels (and 
‘attainment discrepancies’) are (only) based on objective and visible results – either of 
the organization itself or of its peers – and, by extension, that managers’ motives to 
undertake changes are only – or most crucially – driven by such objective results. 
However, both practice and academic work – see, for instance, Labianca et al.’s (2009) 
work on ‘striving aspirations’ or Fiegenbaum et al. (1996) theory on ‘strategic reference 
points’ – have made clear that many other factors also drive managers’ aspiration 
levels, and, hence, their perceptions of ‘attainment discrepancy’. We therefore propose 
to focus on an alternative indicator of ‘attainment discrepancy’, more closely connected 
 







to managers’ perceptions of and feelings about the realized results: their satisfaction 
with performance. Managers’ satisfaction with performance can be seen as an ‘a 
posteriori variable’ that adds perceptual information to the interpretation of 
performance feedback that is not captured by the objective results of the organization 
itself or its peers (cf., Matho & Khanin, 2015).  
Empirical research on satisfaction with performance has been reported 
primordially in literature on organizational behavior and human resource 
management, generally focusing on individual employees’ (job) satisfaction, and 
arguing that this will affect these individuals’ behavioral intentions and actual 
behavior (e.g., Cooper & Artz, 1995; Mahto & Khanin, 2015). In the organizational 
performance feedback literature, several scholars have also discussed satisfaction 
levels, generally arguing that there should be a direct link between prior (objective) 
performance and satisfaction (e.g., Audia et al., 2000; Mahto & Khanin, 2015), hence 
justifying the use of objective performance indicators as proxies for ‘attainment 
discrepancy’. For instance, Cooper and Artz (1995, p. 441) argue that “those who do 
better should feel better”. In a laboratory study, Audia et al. (2000) indeed found a 
strong first-order correlation (r = .56) between past success and participants’ 
satisfaction with performance.  
However, in organizational practice the link between objective performance 
feedback and satisfaction appears to be weak at best (Christen et al., 2006), suggesting 
that performance (only) might not represent a suitable proxy for ‘attainment 
discrepancy’. Indeed, many scholars have identified several alternative determinants of 
satisfaction with performance, complementary to objective results (e.g., Audia et al., 
2000; Garbuio et al., 2015; Michalos, 1986). For example, Carree and Verheul (2011) 
indicate that besides objective results, a range of other factors, such as individual goals, 
expectations, demographic attributes, previous experiences, the firm’s age, pressures 
from stakeholders, etc., also influence managers’ level of satisfaction with their 
performance. On the organizational level, Mahto et al. (2010) show that contingencies 
such as organizational identification, managerial commitment, and family 
involvement, also weigh on CEOs’ level of satisfaction when they are assessing prior 
performance. Family involvement might be especially relevant, as family firms 
represent the majority of organizations in most countries, and owner-managers of 
 







family firms are known to not only take into account financial results, but also 
outcomes related to the preservation of the socioemotional wealth of the owner-family 
members (Berrone et al., 2012; Martin & Gomez-Mejia, 2016).  
Based on all of this, we argue that CEOs’ satisfaction with performance emerges 
from more than solely objective (financial) results. We therefore propose to assess 
CEOs’ satisfaction with performance as a more direct, perceptual indicator of 
‘attainment discrepancy’ – i.e., of how CEOs evaluate and interpret the obtained results. 
It not only accounts for objective results, but also for all other factors that affect 
managers’ interpretation of these results, and is hence a more pure indicator of 
‘attainment discrepancy’. In their theoretical framework on the effects of past 
performance on strategic change, Haleblian and Rajagopalan (2005, p. 84) exactly call 
for the use of such a direct perceptual measure of satisfaction to assess ‘attainment 
discrepancy’: “We believe, in contrast [to the standard assumption of homogenous 
aspiration levels across all firms (either industry performance or historical 
performance)], that aspirations can themselves vary across top managers in different 
firms. Hence, instead of using objectively determined aspiration level and applying the 
same standard to all firms, we recommend a perceptually based measure of satisfaction 
that allows for variations in managerial aspirations”. Consequently, following the 
BTF’s baseline logic we expect that the magnitude of strategic changes intended by 
CEOs will be inversely related to their satisfaction with performance. Put differently, 
we expect that the lower the CEO’s satisfaction with the obtained results (i.e., the 
higher ‘attainment discrepancy’), the more the CEO will be inclined to change the 
organization’s current strategies, and hence the higher the magnitude of strategic 
changes envisaged by this CEO. We therefore propose the following baseline 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. A CEO’s satisfaction with performance is negatively related to the 
magnitude of the intended strategic changes being considered by this CEO. 
 
3.2.2. The moderating role of performance compared to the industry  
Though overall, we expect a negative association between satisfaction and the 
magnitude of strategic changes intended by the CEO, in their laboratory study Audia 
et al. (2000, p. 849) already argued that “the effect of satisfaction is more complex than 
 







is generally thought”. They found that when it came to strategic changes (or, 
conversely, strategic persistence), issues such as decision makers’ self-efficacy, goal-
setting behavior, and confidence in the effectiveness of the organization’s current 
strategies also factored in (Audia et al., 2000). Haleblian and Rajagopalan (2005) echo 
these argumentations, urging scholars to account for managers’ efficacy beliefs and 
strategic goals when studying the effect of past performance on strategic change. To 
address this issue, we propose to introduce a contextual moderator that might affect 
CEOs’ feelings of self-efficacy, goal-setting, and confidence in current strategies when 
assessing their organization’s performance, and that might in this way interact with 
satisfaction to affect CEOs’ intentions to engage in strategic changes. 
The organization’s performance compared to the industry is a likely candidate in 
this matter. Evidently, it is related to CEOs’ satisfaction with results, as higher 
performance compared to the industry should make CEOs feel better (more satisfied) 
about their organization’s results (see above). This is probably why many performance 
feedback scholars simply use performance compared to the industry as a proxy for 
‘attainment discrepancy’. However, we argue that performance compared to the 
industry is simultaneously much less and much more than ‘attainment discrepancy’. It 
is much less, as ‘attainment discrepancy’ is based on more than only objective results, 
as we explained in length above. But it is also much more, as it provides CEOs with 
contextual information about how their organization is doing in comparison with their 
industry peers, their competitors. As such, it helps them to recognize their organization’s 
relative position in the industry (Kacperczyk et al., 2015). It provides CEOs with clues 
about the validity and effectiveness of the organization’s current strategies, affecting 
their confidence in these current strategies (Audia et al., 2000; Haleblian & 
Rajagopalan, 2005). Moreover, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2011) elucidate that the 
organization’s recent performance compared to the industry also represents a 
contextual stimulus that shapes CEOs’ confidence level, as CEOs might reasonably 
interpret it as an indication of their level of overall ability. Good results, especially in 
comparison to their competitors, might make CEOs “come to think of themselves as 
‘on a roll’ or having a ‘hot hand’” (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011, p. 206).  
All of this suggests that the organization’s performance compared to the 
industry might act as a contextual moderator – i.e., that it will weigh in when CEOs 
 







ponder about the potential strategic changes they intend to undertake in the near 
future. Hence, we argue that the magnitude of strategic changes the CEO intends to 
pursue will be driven by a combination of (1) the CEO’s (subjective) satisfaction with 
performance and (2) the organization’s (objective) positive or negative performance 
feedback as compared to its peers (i.e., a positive or negative context). This is in line 
with Ocasio (1997) who advocates that managers decide about the necessity to react to 
particular cues based on both what they objectively experience, and what they 
subjectively perceive and believe. Below, we describe our expectations on the 
moderating effect. 
First, CEOs who are dissatisfied with their organization’s results are expected to 
undertake actions to remedy their disgruntlement. The BTF describes this as 
‘problemistic search’ behavior. In a context of poor performance compared to the 
industry, they moreover receive the signal that their current strategies are not paying 
off. Hence, in order to revert their disadvantageous situation, CEOs will most probably 
be motivated to initiate changes in their current strategies (Greve, 2007). However, the 
situation will be different when dissatisfied CEOs experience high levels of 
performance compared to the industry. This might happen, for instance, when highly 
ambitious CEOs have even higher expectations, and consequently are not satisfied 
despite their objectively positive performance among industry peers. In this situation, 
we argue that CEOs will still seek for ways to alleviate their dissatisfaction, but they 
are not inclined to do this by pursuing a high magnitude of strategic changes. To the 
contrary, the positive performance compared to the industry signals the effectiveness 
and adequacy of the organization’s current strategies (Audia et al., 2000; Hambrick et 
al., 1993). Hence, dissatisfied CEOs might rather be inclined to increase their efforts 
incrementally and related to the current strategies, rather than to change them (Foo et al., 
2009). Moreover, even if CEOs are dissatisfied, the positive (and highly visible) 
objective performance cues might not enable them to present this to the organization’s 
stakeholders as a significant and urgent threat that warrants strategic changes 
(Chowdhury & Lang, 1996; Garbuio et al., 2015).  
Second, it is commonly expected that satisfaction with performance leads to 
complacency. For instance, Miller and Chen (1994, p. 3) said that “success can make 
managers so complacent, so content with the status quo, that they resist change”, and 
 







Labianca et al. (2009) talked about being “lulled in complacency”. However, several 
scholars have made clear that satisfaction does not always lead to inaction. Audia et al. 
(2000) found that higher levels of satisfaction corresponded to higher levels of self-
efficacy and higher future goals – suggesting that satisfaction might instigate proactive 
behavior (see also Foo et al., 2009; Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2005). We expect that this 
tendency towards proactive behavior will be especially relevant when CEOs receive 
positive cues about their performance compared to the industry, as the latter is not 
only an indication of the organization’s success, but will also be perceived by the CEO 
as a cue of his/her overall ability and capability (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). As 
Chatterjee and Hambrick say (2011, p. 206): “When a person receives negative or 
positive feedback in a domain of central importance to his or her psychological self-
concept [such as their organization’s performance compared to the industry], it spills 
over and influences his or her sense of potency in multiple domains.” This sense of 
potency will subsequently boost the CEO’s confidence and eagerness to engage in 
proactive strategic actions, such as innovation and strategic changes (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2011; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). Hence, we expect that the negative effect of 
CEOs’ satisfaction with performance on the magnitude of intended changes will be 
attenuated (or even reversed) in case of positive performance compared to the 
industry.  
Finally, CEOs might be satisfied, despite receiving negative performance 
signals from the industry. This may happen, for instance, when CEOs consider that 
there are organizational or contextual issues that have influenced the company’s 
activities and performance, and that there are still reasons to be satisfied with the 
results achieved, despite the lower objective figures (Jordan & Audia, 2012). We expect 
CEOs in this situation less inclined to undertake actions related to strategic changes, as 
CEOs lack the appropriate incentives and motivation to pursue changes (given their 
high satisfaction levels). One illustration would be a CEO of an organization which is 
immersed in a reorganization process and who ascribes any poor objective results 
within the industry to the organization’s internal contingencies related to the 
reorganization process. Alternatively, CEOs’ satisfaction might be explained by 
managerial oversight due to incompetence or inexperience, or simply low levels of 
ambition (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996). 
 







Taking everything together, we expect that the combination of CEOs’ 
(subjective) satisfaction with the organization’s results and (objective) performance 
compared to the industry will explain the magnitude of strategic changes intended by 
the CEO. More in particular, we anticipate that the negative association between CEO 
satisfaction and intended strategic changes will be less pronounced (or even inverted) 
when organizations perform well in comparison with their industry peers. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2. The negative relationship between the CEO’s satisfaction with 
performance and the magnitude of intended strategic changes will be moderated by the 
organization’s performance compared to the industry; the higher performance compared 
to the industry, the weaker the negative relationship between CEO satisfaction with 
performance and the magnitude of intended strategic changes.  
 
 Note that above we have described two different situations in which we expect 
a higher magnitude of intended strategic changes: (1) dissatisfied CEOs who face 
negative feedback of poor performance compared to the industry, and (2) highly 
satisfied CEOs whose companies are performing very well compared to the industry. 
Whereas the former situation corresponds to a reactive, ‘problemistic search’-driven 
argumentation, the latter is founded on a logic of proactive search behavior, prone to 
the idea of ‘organizational slack’ – i.e., that positive performance might increase 
organizations’ resources, hence providing slack that can be used to experiment and 
pursue proactive strategic changes (Daniel et al., 2004; Greve, 2003). This dichotomy is 
in line with Haleblian and Rajagopalan’s (2005) suggestion that strategic change can be 
reached through both a reactive and proactive pathway. Moreover, these different 
pathways may lead to change intentions that emphasize different repertories of 
strategic options (i.e., contractive vs. expansive moves, respectively). Although a 
comprehensive study of such differences in change intentions falls beyond our 














For this study we use a sample of 137 Spanish medium-sized firms from a wide 
range of industries, for which we complemented data from questionnaires with 
objective data obtained from SABI Informa Database (Bureau Van Dijk), the most 
important source of business, accounting and financial information in Spain. This 
sample is particularly suited to test our research questions. The heterogeneity in 
industries in the set of organizations improves external validity. Moreover, medium-
sized organizations are large enough to have a limited formal organizational structure, 
potential forces of inertia, and relevant stakeholders, while they usually lack the excess 
resources, extensive organizational structure and decision-making support that larger 
companies get. Therefore, managers and their capabilities are more relevant in 
organizational decision-making in medium-sized organizations (Lubatkin et al., 2006), 
making the CEO a central and key actor in decision-making.  
We selected a random sample of 1000 medium-sized organizations (over 100 
and up to 500 employees). Sixty percent of these companies belonged to manufacturing 
industries, whereas forty percent were operating in service industries. As a first step, 
we sent a pre-notice letter to the CEO of each organization explaining our study and 
assuring the confidentiality of the responses. We sought the participation of the 
organizations’ CEOs, as they are generally well-informed, central, and experienced 
actors, highly involved in their organizations’ strategic decision-making (Priem, 1994; 
Tang & Crossan, 2016). We monitored the CEOs’ actual direct participation in 
completing the questionnaire through random telephone calls to 20 responding 
companies.  
We excluded fifty-two organizations from the database because of incorrect 
addresses. Ten days after the pre-notice letter, we sent the questionnaire to the 
remaining organizations (948). Note that before sending out the questionnaire, three 
professors in strategic management and organizational behavior validated it and we 
ran a pre-test with five CEOs from medium-sized firms (not included in the final 
sample). Within the first eight weeks, 131 CEOs responded (13.8%). With the aim of 
improving the response rate, we sent the questionnaire again to the CEOs of the 
remaining organizations (817), and we received 59 additional answers. After removing 
 







seven more questionnaires for reasons of incompleteness, our new sample contained 
183 valid questionnaires (a response rate of 19.3%). As our hypotheses require the 
combination of subjective and objective data from the organizations, we complemented 
the information from the questionnaires with objective data of the financial statements 
of the firms in the sample. Unfortunately, 46 companies did not have full information 
available and, therefore, we had to drop them from our final sample. In the end, our 
final sample comprised full information from 137 firms (representing a valid response 
rate of 14.45%).  
Our final sample had industrial percentages proportional to those of the 
original sample of 1000 organizations. Furthermore, we performed t-test comparisons 
between early and late respondents (analyses available from the authors on request). 
However, we did not find significant differences between these two groups (p < .05)15. 
 
3.3.2. Variables 
Dependent variable: ‘Magnitude of intended strategic changes’  
A broad variety of dependent variables and measures has been used in prior 
performance feedback literature (Shinkle, 2012). As mentioned above, one of the causes 
of the divergent results in the performance feedback literature may exactly be related 
to the use of different, and – more importantly – mostly rather distal variables of 
performance consequences such as risk-taking, innovation, R&D expenditures, etc. (e.g., 
Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Chen, 2008; Greve, 2003). These are relatively remote 
proxies and may not be sufficiently close to the decisions that organizations’ key 
decision makers actually make based on organizational performance feedback (Holmes 
et al., 2011; Schillebeeckx et al., 2016). To reduce the noise in testing our hypotheses, we 
therefore directly study the CEO’s intention to change (cf., Greiner & Bhambri, 1989) 
instead of actual, realized strategic changes. This also allows us to take into consideration 
a broader set of strategic variables related to CEOs’ willingness to change (as opposed 
to, e.g., only changes in specific investments such as R&D) and therefore, provides a 
                                                             
15 As we mentioned in Chapter 2, along the investigations of this dissertation we have performed 
exhaustive controls for common method variance. All these analyses, as well as their specifications, may 
be found in Chapter 7. 
 







richer and less-noisy variable which is more strongly related to CEOs’ real intentions in 
decision-making.  
We operationalize CEOs’ intention to change as the magnitude of the intended 
changes in strategy being considered by the CEO, following a procedure similar to the 
one proposed by Hambrick et al. (1993). In particular, we formulated a set of six 
options that configure the organization’s main strategic direction, including both scope 
(internationalization, market penetration/consolidation, and diversification) and growth 
methods (organic growth, strategic alliances, and mergers & acquisitions). We asked CEOs 
to identify the two options that had been the most important for their respective 
companies in the last two years, as well as the two options that had been the least 
important ones. Among these selected options, we asked him/her to identify only one 
option, which had been the most important, as well as one option that had been the 
least important. Those options not being rated either as important or unimportant were 
considered of neutral importance. This resulted in a codification of each option 
according to its importance using the following scale: 1 = ‘the least important’; 2 = 
‘unimportant’; 3 = ‘neutral’; 4 = ‘important’; 5 = ‘the most important’. Subsequently, we 
asked them to do the same for the strategic options they intended to foster in the 
following two years. 
To obtain an index of the ‘magnitude of intended strategic changes’, we calculated 
the sum of absolute differences between the current (last two years) and intended 
(following two years) strategic options and divided the result by the maximum 
possible score of absolute differences, using the following formula:  
 
MISCindex = Σ(ABS[pi-current - pi-future]) / MAX(Σ(ABS[pi-current - pi-future])) 
where, MISCindex = index of the ‘magnitude of intended strategic changes’ 
pi-current = value of the ‘i’ strategic option carried out in the last two years by the firm 
pi-future = value of the ‘i’ intended strategic option in the next two years by the firm 
 
The resulting index has a minimum value of ‘0’ and a maximum of ‘1’ (0 < 
MISCindex < 1). An MISCindex close to 1 indicates that the CEO intends to pursue a 
high magnitude of strategic changes (both in terms of scope and growth methods), 
 







while an MISCindex close to 0 means that the CEO intends to persist in the same 
combination and priorization of the organization’s current strategic options16.  
 
Independent variable: ‘CEO’s satisfaction with performance’ 
We use a single-item measure of the CEO’s degree of satisfaction with 
performance. More in particularly, we directly asked CEOs for their level of 
satisfaction with the outcomes (economic performance / profitability) obtained by the 
organization. Concretely, this value is measured in the questionnaire through a Likert 
scale from 1 to 5, where 1 = ‘highly unsatisfactory’ and 5 = ‘highly satisfactory’. This 
measure is in line with the ones used by several scholars such as Audia et al. (2000), 
Carree and Verheul (2011), and Cooper and Artz (1995). Similar measures of self-
reported satisfaction have been used in the areas of customer satisfaction (Peterson & 
Wilson, 1992), self-employment satisfaction (VandenHeuvel & Wooden, 1997), and job 
satisfaction (Wanous et al., 1997). 
 
Moderator variable: ‘Performance compared to the industry’ 
In performance feedback studies, organizational performance feedback has 
been operationalized in many different ways (Short & Palmer, 2003), but the majority 
of scholars use ROA (return on assets) as a basis (Greve, 2007). Research has indicated 
that ROA is indeed used in practice by executives in a variety of industries when they 
self-assess their organizations’ performance (Lant et al., 1992). Following prior scholars 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Buyl & Boone; 2014) we subtract the industry’s mean 
ROA from the organization’s ROA to obtain a measure of the organization’s 
‘performance compared to the industry’.  
Note that this calculation is often used by performance feedback scholars to 
operationalize ‘social performance feedback’ – i.e., ‘attainment discrepancy’, in which 
the performance of the organization’s peers (here: the whole industry) is considered as 
                                                             
16 Note that this operationalization implies that for our main analyses, we see the magnitude of intended 
strategic changes on a continuous basis, irrespective of the precise content and direction of the intended 
changes. Put differently, ceteris paribus, a CEO who intends to increase the currently low level of 
diversification in his/her organization will have the same MISCindex as another CEO who wishes to 
decrease his/her organization’s currently high level of diversification. In the same way, changes in various 
content domains (i.e., internationalization, diversification, etc.) are treated as equivalent and given equal 
weight. In post-hoc analyses (in the results section), we explore the content and direction of intended 
changes in more detail. 
 







the aspiration level against which organizations assess their own performance (Buyl & 
Boone, 2014). We, however, use a more direct proxy of ‘attainment discrepancy’ (i.e., 
CEOs’ satisfaction with performance; see above), and propose that organizations’ 
‘performance compared to the industry’ represents a contextual cue that signals the 
appropriateness of the organization’s strategies and the CEO’s competence (Baum et 
al., 2005; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011).  
Moreover, performance feedback scholars often also compute ‘historical 
performance feedback’ – i.e., ‘attainment discrepancy’, in which the organization’s own 
historical performance levels are used as aspiration levels – either separately or in 
combination with ‘social performance feedback’ (Greve, 2007). However, we advocate 
that comparison of organizations’ performance to the industry provides a better fit 
with our research purposes than comparison with organizations’ own historical 
performance. As Buyl and Boone (2014) and Baum et al. (2005) argue, both represent 
different types of performance comparisons. In particular, comparing performance to 
historical levels is related to an internal self-evaluation of the organization’s 
performance, whereas comparison to the industry is outward-oriented, includes 
additional information on economic and industry cycles, and pays attention to the 
organization’s relative position between its competitors. The latter more closely aligns 
with our theoretical considerations. Nevertheless, for the sake of robustness we also 
performed tests in which we include ‘performance compared to historical performance 




CEOs are typically the central actor in strategic decision-making in medium-
sized organizations. However, they do not operate in isolation. To start with, most of 
them actively interact with the other members of the top management team (TMT) in 
order to diagnose the situation and plan future actions (Tang & Crossan, 2016). Prior 
scholars have therefore suggested that the whole TMT might have an influence on 
managerial propensity to undertake strategic changes (Hambrick, 1994; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). In the same vein, Sánchez-Peinado et al. (2010) highlight that the TMT’s 
composition plays an important role in limiting or encouraging strategic change. 
 







Furthermore, many studies have shown that forces both internal and external to the 
organization limit the CEO’s ability to pursue organizational change (e.g., Hannan & 
Freeman, 1989; Lant et al., 1992; Tushman et al., 1986). Hence, in our analyses we 
include control variables at the TMT-level, at the organization-level, and at the 
industry-level.  
At the TMT-level we focus on TMT characteristics as in line with other scholars 
we argue that the TMT – together with the CEO – is ultimately responsible for firm’s 
strategic decision-making, and that hence the composition of the TMT may influence 
managerial intentions to pursue strategic change (Sánchez-Peinado et al., 2010; Tang & 
Crossan, 2016). In particular, we control for ‘TMT size’, ‘TMT average age’ and ‘TMT 
members with university studies’. ‘TMT size’ represents the total number of managers 
who take responsibilities for strategy definition and implementation. CEOs may take 
into account the TMT’s size when considering the magnitude of the intended strategic 
changes and the challenge that they entail. In addition, prior literature considers TMT 
size as a covariate of executive attention (Cho & Hambrick, 2006) which might be 
closely associated with perceptions and change intentions. ‘TMT average age’ (in years) 
may also influence CEOs’ intention to foster changes in strategy (Elbanna et al., 2013). 
CEOs may be more prone to initiate larger changes when the TMT is formed by 
younger members, more energetic, and open to accept higher risks (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). Finally, ‘TMT members with university studies’ (percentage of TMT 
members with a university degree) is regularly associated with more favorable 
attitudes toward change (e.g., Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), which 
may facilitate the predisposition of CEOs to foster larger changes.  
At the organization-level we control for ‘size of the organization’, ‘age of the 
organization’ and ‘number of additional businesses’ as these variables also might influence 
the CEOs’ intention to change (Elbanna et al., 2013). We account for ‘size of the 
organization’ (measured as operating income) as larger organizations might have more 
organizational slack to engage in exploratory activities (Lavie et al., 2010) and to 
meticulously analyze processes of change (Boeker, 1997). We include ‘age of the 
organization’ (in years) as scholars have argued that this might have a negative 
influence on the likelihood of strategic changes (e.g., Sánchez-Peinado et al., 2010) 
because older organizations are characterized more strongly by consolidated routines 
 







and practices which hinder the likelihood of change (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). 
Finally, we consider ‘number of additional businesses’ (total number of businesses that the 
organization has apart from the main one) due to its close connectedness with 
managers’ search behavior (Carter, 1998). For instance, Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) 
explain that diversified companies have, on average, higher levels of risk tolerance 
than non-diversified ones, which in turn enhances strategic change. Alternatively, 
CEOs of diversified organizations may encounter more difficulties to reorient their 
organization’s corporate strategy due to larger organizational complexity and stronger 
inertia, and because CEOs as a result will have lower power to influence strategic 
actions (Heese, 2015). 
In the end, at the industry-level, we include ‘industry innovation intensity’ 
(operationalized as the industry average of organizations’ R&D expenses divided by its 
sales) to capture the industry’s average degree of innovation, as a proxy for 
environmental dynamism, as this most probably affects CEOs’ intention to change 




The values of the means, standard deviations and correlations for all variables 
included in the analyses are presented in Table 5 (see below). We tested our 
hypotheses on the effects of CEOs’ satisfaction with performance and performance 
compared to the industry on the magnitude of intended strategic changes using 
multiple hierarchical regressions (see below, Table 6). Before generating the interaction 
terms, we centered variables to reduce potential problems of multicollinearity. 
However, we also checked ex-post for the presence of multicollinearity in our analyses, 
and found that the variation inflation factors (VIF) were below 2.5 for all variables 
(analyses available from the authors on request). 
 











Measures Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Dependent variable             
1. Magnitude of intended strategic changes  .3527  .1785  1.00          
 
Independent variable             
2. CEO’s satisfaction with performance  3.02  1.15 – .124  1.00         
 
Moderator             
3. Performance compared to the industry  6.06  10.51 – .031  .371***  1.00        
 
Control variables             
4. Industry innovation intensity  1.22  .7736  .072 – .156*  .083  1.00          
5. Size of the organization  31820.67  72234.13  .172  .069 – .035  .041  1.00         
6. Age of the organization  37.20  28.18  .084 – .108 – .009  .088 – .023  1.00        
7. Number of additional businesses  3.03  2.28  .026 – .296* – .274*  .190  .378** – .011  1.00       
8. TMT size  7.40  6.68  .116  .078 – .106 – .032  .264***  .091  .293*  1.00     
9. TMT average age  42.54  6.36 – .059 – .145* – .080  .021  .140  .286***  .191 – .041  1.00   
10. TMT members with university studies  70.09  42.16  .315***  .094  .060  .239***  .209**  .057  .095  .073 – .135  1.00 
 
 
N = 137 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed) 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 







3.4.1. Hypotheses tests 
Model 1 (Table 6) includes control variables only. It appears that the magnitude 
of intended strategic changes is higher in younger organizations – as could be expected 
because older organizations usually have more strongly established procedures and 
routines that create inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Intended strategic changes are 
also higher in magnitude in organizations with lower degrees of diversification, which 
supports the notion that diversification amplifies organizational complexity and lowers 
the power and influence of CEOs on strategic actions (Heese, 2015). Additionally, the 
magnitude of strategic changes is elevated in organizations with more TMT members 
with university degrees, which aligns with the idea that more highly educated people 
are more favorable towards and more apt for change (Bantel & Jackson, 1989).  
 
Table 6. Results of linear regression analysis 
                             
Measures Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Industry innovation intensity – .079 – .173 – .431** 
Size of the organization  .338  .353  .244 
Age of the organization – .361* – .443** – .363** 
Number of additional businesses – .495** – .577** – .394* 
TMT size  .150  .177 – .266 
TMT average age  .061  .074 – .041 
TMT members with university studies  .423**  .369*  .580*** 
CEO’s satisfaction with performance   – .309* – .740*** 
Perf. compared to the industry      .104 – 2.538** 
Perf. compared to the industry * CEO’s satisfaction with perf.      2.669*** 
 
 
R2  .387  .459  .608 
Adjusted R2  .216  .248  .429 
R2 change  .387*  .072  .148*** 
F-value  2.259*  2.172*  3.405*** 
 
 
N = 137 
Dependent variable: Magnitude of intended strategic changes 
Standardized coefficients are shown; *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (one-tailed) 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
 
 In Model 2 we include the independent and the moderator variables, 
respectively the CEO’s satisfaction with performance and performance compared to 
the industry (often called ‘social performance feedback’ by performance feedback 
scholars when measuring ‘attainment discrepancy’ – see methods section). As we 
proposed in Hypothesis 1, the CEO’s level of satisfaction is inversely related to the 
 







magnitude of the intended strategic changes (β = -.309; p < .1). Conversely, feedback of 
objective performance compared to the industry does not seem to have a direct effect 
on the magnitude of intended strategic changes. These results are consistent with our 
argumentation. CEOs’ levels of satisfaction seem to reflect ‘attainment discrepancies’ 
better than objective measures of performance do, as reflected in the observation that 
the former affect the magnitude of intended changes (in the expected direction), 
whereas the latter do not.  
In Hypothesis 2, we anticipated that performance compared to the industry 
would moderate the effect of the CEO’s level of satisfaction with performance on the 
magnitude of the intended changes in strategy. In line with Hypothesis 2, in Model 3 
we find a significant and positive interaction effect of the CEOs’ level of satisfaction 
and performance compared to the industry (β = 2.669; p < .01). To facilitate the 
interpretation of this interaction effect, we graphically represent it in Figure 6 (see 
below). Thus, we plot the effect of the CEO’s level of satisfaction with performance on 
the magnitude of intended strategic changes in case of high versus low performance 
compared to the industry (note that high and low refer to the mean +/- one standard 
deviation in Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. The interaction of the CEO’s satisfaction with performance and performance 













Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 































Consistent with the BTF’s baseline proposition, Figure 6 shows that the slope of 
the relationship between the CEO’s level of satisfaction with performance and the 
magnitude of intended strategic changes is negative in the context of low objective 
performance feedback (low performance compared to the industry). However, the 
slope appears to reverse and become positive in case of high performance compared to 
the industry. That is, for companies that objectively perform better than their 
competitors, managers seem to foster larger changes when they are more satisfied with 
results than when they are unsatisfied. Hence, the combination of the CEO’s level of 
satisfaction and (social) performance feedback appears to predict strategic change 
intentions better than either one of both in isolation. 
Note, however, that in a context of positive performance feedback, the 
differences in terms of magnitude of intended changes between unsatisfied and 
satisfied CEOs appear to be less pronounced (the slope is less steep). To assess the 
interaction effect more systematically and comprehensively, we applied the Johnson-
Neyman technique to define the regions in which the coefficient of the CEO’s level of 
satisfaction with performance is significantly positive or negative, conditional upon a 
certain context of performance compared to the industry (see Preacher et al., 2007). 
Figure 7 (see below) plots this conditional effect for the whole range of our moderating 
variable – performance compared to the industry – with a 95%-confidence band (full 
analyses are available from the authors upon request). Note that for this analysis, we 
standardized all variables. The interaction effect is significant when the confidence 
intervals (represented by the dotted lines in Figure 7) are either both above or both 
below zero – the former representing a positive conditional effect and the latter a 
negative one. The vertical lines in Figure 7 represent the boundaries of the regions in 
which the interaction coefficient is significant (at the .05-level). 
 Based on the Johnson-Neyman technique, the CEO’s level of satisfaction with 
performance has a negative effect on the magnitude of the intended strategic changes 
(following the BTF-inspired thinking) within contexts of low levels of performance 
compared to the industry. This situation includes 64.96% of the cases included in our 
sample. This negative effect becomes less pronounced the higher the level of 
performance compared to the industry and turns insignificant (at the .05-level) at a 
value of -1.4535 (for the standardized variable). This indicates, in line with our 
 








expectations (Hypothesis 2), that for moderate to high levels of objective performance 
(compared to the industry), the negative effect of CEOs’ satisfaction with performance 
becomes weaker. Interestingly, however, for very good performers in comparison with 
the industry (2.92% of the cases in our sample) – with a value of 24.9978 (for the 
standardized variable) or higher – we find that the relationship between the level of 
satisfaction with performance and the magnitude of intended strategic changes even 
becomes positive and significant.  
 
Figure 7. Coefficient of the CEO’s satisfaction with performance conditional upon 

















Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
 
3.4.2. Post-hoc analysis: Exploratory analyses of specific changes intended by CEOs 
As we mentioned above, the dependent variable in our analyses refers to the 
general, overall magnitude of strategic changes intended by the CEO. However, the 
literature on strategic change provides extensive evidence of the existence of different 
patterns of changes that organizations might adopt (e.g., Lant et al., 1992; Dominguez 
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in terms of the intensity or speed of strategic changes (Balogun & Hailey, 2004; 
Hrebiniak, 2006), or the variation of strategic repertories that they intend to implement 
(Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2005; Sánchez-Peinado et al., 2010; Wissema et al., 1980). In 
order to better understand the effects of ‘attainment discrepancies’ (CEOs’ level of 
satisfaction) and the contextual position of the organization (performance compared to 
the industry), in exploratory post-hoc analyses we provide a more detailed 
examination of the specific changes envisaged by CEOs. This allows us to investigate 
(exploratively) the differences in the number of intended changes, as well as the scope 
and direction of these intended changes, and how these differences might co-align with 
different combinations of CEO satisfaction and performance compared to the industry.  
We split our sample in four groups of companies: (A) companies with high 
performance compared to the industry (above average) and high levels of CEO 
satisfaction (above average), (B) companies with high performance compared to the 
industry but low levels of CEO satisfaction (below average), (C) companies with poor 
performance compared to the industry and high levels of CEO satisfaction, and (D) 
companies with poor performance compared to the industry and low levels of CEO 
satisfaction. In line with our theoretical predictions and our earlier findings on the 
magnitude of intended changes, we find that the two groups that intended to change in 
the highest number of domains were group A (high performance, high satisfaction), 
with an average intention to modify 2.49 (out of 6) strategic options and group D (poor 
performance, low satisfaction), with an average intention to alter 2.19 strategic options.  
First, satisfied CEOs from companies that are performing above average (group 
A) intend to make changes in the highest number of strategic options. Combined with 
our earlier finding that these CEOs’ overall magnitude of intended changes is still 
relatively low (see Figure 6), this suggests that these CEOs may consider relatively 
small adjustments in many dimensions of their strategies in order to experiment and 
explore new opportunities. In terms of scope, companies in this group mainly consider 
changes that increase internationalization and diversification efforts. This probably 
means that they intend to explore other markets (both in geographically and in terms 
of products and offerings). In terms of direction, they emphasize future efforts both in 
internal and external growth modes, with an emphasis on expansive moves. 
 







The second group that pursues a high number of changes is the one 
characterized by unsatisfied CEOs facing poor performance (Group D). Contrary to 
CEOs in group A, in terms of scope these CEOs rarely consider increasing efforts in 
internationalization, while they seem to be interested in market consolidation and 
diversification movements aimed to reconfigure a business model that is not 
performing well. In terms of direction of intended strategic changes, these CEOs show 
lower intentions to foster internal growth, but they are open to consider mergers, sales 
of business units or disinvestments. Hence, unsatisfied CEOs from poorly performing 
companies appear to prefer more contractive strategic changes, focused on market 
consolidation, retreats from diversification ventures or from international markets, 
together with a higher emphasis on disinvestments.   
Taken together, these exploratory analyses on the specific changes intended by 
CEOs give us some more insight into the specific responses to ‘attainment 
discrepancies’. In line with what the BTF expects in terms of ‘problemistic search’, CEOs 
that are unsatisfied with results appear to respond to the ‘problem’ generated by poor 
performance feedback by searching for remedies to solve this problem in the immediate 
vicinity of the organization’s current strategy (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963) – i.e., by 
proposing more contractive (exploitative) changes. In contrast, satisfied CEOs from 
well-performing organizations seem to react in a more exploratory, proactive way, by 
engaging in more expansion- and growth-oriented strategic changes. This is in line 
with the expectations of both the ‘organizational slack’ (Daniel et al., 2004) and the 
‘capability cue’ perspectives (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). More precisely, the high 
levels of satisfaction and positive performance cues both provide CEOs with more 
resources to engage in (proactive) search behavior (Daniel et al., 2004; Garbuio et al., 
2015) and boost these CEOs’ confidence in their skills to pursue risky, innovative 
strategies (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995).  
CEOs that show the lowest intentions to promote strategic changes, both in 
terms of magnitude and number of strategic options intended to modified, are those 
who show high levels of satisfaction with results that are objectively poor (Group C). 
Various perspectives may help to explain this lack of reaction. These companies are 
achieving poor results and, probably, they lack the necessary organizational slack to 
carry on with new initiatives (e.g., Daniel et al., 2004; Garbuio et al., 2015). Threat 
 







rigidity (e.g., Staw et al., 1981) may also play a complementary role for those cases in 
which CEOs are facing environmental or organizational contingencies, such as changes 
in the structure of competition, concentration processes of customers or suppliers, or 
organizational restructurations. In addition, the high satisfaction with performance of 
the CEO may be indicating that he/she is prioritizing or paying more attention to other 
organizational objectives rather than financial performance17. 
 
3.4.3. Additional analyses and robustness checks 
To further explore our results, we have performed some additional analyses 
and robustness checks. First, based on prior research and intuition, it could be 
proposed that the relation between performance compared to the industry, CEOs’ 
satisfaction with performance, and the magnitude of intended strategic changes is 
characterized by mediation (with satisfaction with performance as a mediator) rather 
than moderation – see also Audia et al.’s (2000) study in which they used satisfaction as 
a mediator between past success and persistency in strategies after environmental 
changes – or even a moderated mediation (with performance compared to the industry 
both predicting CEOs’ satisfaction with performance, and moderating the effect of 
CEOs’ satisfaction with performance on the magnitude of intended changes).  
To explore this possibility, we first tested whether satisfaction with 
performance could be considered as a mediator. In fact, our empirical findings provide 
initial support for this reasoning, as evidenced by the positive and significant 
correlation between performance compared to the industry and CEO’s satisfaction 
with performance (.371; p < .001; Table 5) and the negative and significant regression 
coefficient of CEO’s satisfaction with performance on the magnitude of intended 
strategic changes (see above). To formally test for the mediation effect, we followed 
Preacher et al.’s (2007) suggestions to look at bootstrapped confidence intervals of the 
indirect effect (b = -0.0011, 95% CI [-0.0083, 0.0023]) and size effect analyses (b = -
0.5836, 95% CI [-63.5625, 0.4914]). However, the results suggest that the CEO’s 
satisfaction with performance was not a mediator, as both confidence intervals do 
                                                             
17 Note that 88.8% of Spanish companies are family firms (Instituto de la Empresa Familiar, 2015) and, 
consequently, many CEOs may prioritize non-financial objectives, such as socio-emotional wealth 
preservation (Martin & Gomez-Mejia, 2016). For more information about these type of organizations, see 
Chapter 4. 
 







comprise zero (full analyses can be requested from the authors). This actually 
underscores prior findings (e.g., Christen et al., 2006) that the association between 
objective performance and satisfaction is only weak at best. 
Second, we assessed a moderated mediation model (see Preacher et al., 2007). 
To do so, we estimated coefficients independently in two regression analyses using 
bootstrapping (Alfes et al., 2013; Wiedemann et al., 2009). First, the CEO’s level of 
satisfaction with performance (Me) was regressed on performance compared to the 
industry (IV). Subsequently, the magnitude of intended strategic changes (DV) was 
regressed on performance compared to the industry (IV), the CEO’s level of satisfaction 
with performance (Me), and the interaction between them (IV * Me; using mean 
centered variables). An overall effect of the IV on the Me is a necessary precondition 
for moderated mediation: a significant interaction effect (IV * Me) is only indicative of 
moderated mediation if IV also affects Me (Preacher et al., 2007). Unfortunately the first 
requirement was not accomplished (b = 0.0195, 95% CI [-0.0472, 0.0861]). Again, this 
substantiates that poor/high objective results do not necessarily imply low/high 
satisfaction with performance. In sum, we can conclude that neither a mediation 
relationship nor a moderated mediation relationship is present in our data. 
Furthermore, we also executed a test to check for the robustness of our findings 
(analyses available from the authors on request). In particular, as mentioned in the 
methods section, in our study we chose to assess organizations’ performance against 
the industry mean and not against organizations’ own historical performance when 
contextualizing our baseline hypothesis. We did so because prior research has shown 
that both types of performance comparisons represent divergent approaches (Baum et 
al., 2005; Buyl & Boone, 2014) and we deemed the outward-oriented approach of the 
comparison of organizations’ performance to the industry the most appropriate for our 
setting and sample. Nevertheless, for the sake of robustness we redid the analyses 
using ‘performance compared to historical performance levels’ as a moderator variable 
(operationalized as ROA in year ‘t’ minus ROA in year ‘t - 1’). The results obtained are 
in the same line, though they are slightly less convincing – which is not surprising 
given the previously mentioned differences in the underlying logic of both types of 
performance comparisons. In particular, we found a significant positive moderation 
effect of performance compared to the organization’s historical performance levels on 
 







the relationship between the CEO’s level of satisfaction and the magnitude of intended 
strategic changes, though this effect was lower both in effect size and significance level 
as compared with the reported one (β = .916; p < .1; adjusted R² = .311 versus reported 
results: β = 2.669; p < .01; adjusted R² = .429).  
 
 
3.5. DISCUSSION  
 In this study, we aimed to explain the magnitude of changes CEOs intend to 
undertake in their organizations’ strategies, based on a combination of subjective 
interpretations of past performance in the form of CEOs’ satisfaction with prior results, 
and objective feedback of performance in comparison with their industry peers. Using a 
dataset comprising both archival and questionnaire information of 137 Spanish 
medium-sized firms, we found general support for our hypotheses. In particular, we 
found that CEOs’ satisfaction with performance negatively affected the magnitude of 
their intended strategic changes, in line with the BTF’s notion of ‘problemistic search’. 
However, this effect was less pronounced in case of higher performance compared to 
the industry. The Johnson-Neyman analysis even indicated that at extremely high 
levels of performance compared to the industry, the effect of CEOs’ satisfaction with 
performance turned positive, meaning that the magnitude of intended changes 
increased with higher CEOs’ satisfaction levels.  
All of this renders us to conclude that the joint assessment of subjective (CEOs’ 
satisfaction with performance) and objective (performance compared to the industry) 
performance cues provides the most explanatory power. To illustrate this conclusion, 
note that the direct effects of CEOs’ satisfaction and performance compared to the 
industry are only marginally significant and non-significant, respectively. This further 
underscores our proposition that subjective interpretations and objective performance 
cues jointly affect CEOs’ intentions, and that organizational decision-making processes 
cannot be unraveled when managers’ cognitions and interpretations are not taken into 
account. Hence, the combination of both objective and subjective performance cues is a 
better predictor of strategic responses than either one of them separately.  
Our exploratory post-hoc analyses on the number, scope, and direction of 
intended strategic changes furthermore suggest that CEOs’ specific strategic responses 
 







(in terms of envisioned change trajectories) differ based on their levels of satisfaction 
and their organization’s performance compared to the industry. Whereas unsatisfied 
CEOs facing poor performance appear to prefer reactive, contractive strategic changes, 
satisfied CEOs experiencing high performance rather opt for proactive, expansive 
moves. These insights further help us to integrate the different theoretical perspectives 
on organizational reactions to ‘attainment discrepancies’, such as the BTF (e.g., Greve, 
2003), ‘organizational slack’ (e.g., Daniel et al., 2004), and the ‘capability cue’ perspective 
(e.g., Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2011).  
 
3.5.1. Contributions 
 With this study, we contribute to the extant performance feedback literature in 
several ways. First, we contribute to this body of work by denouncing the common 
practice to proxy ‘attainment discrepancies’ by simple comparisons of prior 
performance with industry mean performance and/or the organization’s historical 
performance. In particular, we show that a direct (subjective) measure of ‘attainment 
discrepancy’ (i.e., the CEO’s satisfaction with performance) is superior in predicting 
CEOs’ intentions to change, as illustrated by the significant direct effect of the CEO’s 
satisfaction with performance and the non-significant direct effect of performance 
compared to the industry. 
Furthermore, we also contribute to the performance feedback theory by 
showing that the effects of ‘attainment discrepancy’ on intended changes are not 
universal, but contingent upon contextual conditions – here: performance compared to 
industry. In particular, dissatisfaction does not always lead to higher intentions to 
change – if objective performance signals that the current strategies are paying off (as 
reflected in the organization’s performance compared to the industry), it might lead to 
a lower magnitude of intended changes as it is more ‘rational’ to bank on and extend 
what you have been doing before. Similarly, satisfaction does not always lead to lower 
intentions to change (complacency), it might induce an upward strive and a boost in 
the CEO’s self-confidence, and consequently lead to an increase in the magnitude of 
intended strategic changes. With these findings, we were able to reconcile some of the 
apparently contradictory perspectives in the performance feedback literature, such as 
the classic BTF view of ‘problemistic search’, Labianca et al.’s (2009) notion of ‘striving 
 







aspirations’, and Chatterjee and Hambrick’s (2011) ‘capability cue’ perspective. Hence, 
rather than contradictory, we argue that these perspectives are complementary and 
context-driven.  
Finally, we add to the extant performance feedback literature by focusing on 
CEOs’ change intentions instead of actual, realized strategy, and by – in an exploratory 
way – investigating in more depth the different types of change intentions, based on 
the number, scope, and direction of intended strategic changes. These exploratory 
analyses, and the ensuing conclusions on reactive vs. proactive intended strategic 
changes, allowed us to further substantiate the reconciliation of the above-mentioned 
theoretical perspectives. More generally, they indicate that scholars need to be careful 
in operationalizing their dependent variable when assessing reactions to ‘attainment 
discrepancies’ (see also Kacperczyk et al., 2015), as many types of strategic change 
trajectories exist (Hailey Balogun, 2002). 
 
3.5.2. Limitations and future research avenues 
Like any study, ours has limitations that can set the stage for future research 
avenues. First, though our study assesses the effects that CEOs’ satisfaction levels have 
on their intention to change, we do not take into account the antecedents that might 
guide these satisfaction levels. Future scholars might try to disentangle why some 
managers appear to be more easily satisfied than others, which in turn affects how 
these managers interpret performance feedback cues (as the present study suggests). 
For example, they may explore whether older or longer-tenured managers are more 
easily satisfied due to their higher intrinsic disposition towards complacency 
(Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991), or whether CEOs surrounded by a larger or more 
functionally diverse TMT will be less easily satisfied due to differences in perspectives 
and opinions when confronted with performance feedback. On a related note, 
differences in satisfaction levels might also be attributed to industry- or organization-
level effects. Future scholars might try to tease out these multilevel antecedents of 
CEOs’ degree of satisfaction. Moreover, we already indicated that prior performance 
might be a determinant of satisfaction in itself, but that the relationship between both is 
not univocal. One opportunity for future scholars would be to investigate the link 
 







between objective performance cues and satisfaction in more detail, and explore the 
extent to which it is affected by, for instance, traits of the CEO.  
Second, we follow the example of many other scholars (e.g., Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2011; Greve, 2008 to name a few) when assessing performance as compared 
to the industry’s average performance level. However, a more fine-grained approach 
might be warranted. Some researchers (e.g., Fiegenbaum et al., 1996; Labianca et al., 
2009) advocate for comparing a focal organization’s performance against that of an 
organization-specific reference group, which might not be congruent with the whole 
industry. We do not implement such an approach in the present study, partly because 
of pragmatic reasons (related to the availability of information on specific 
organizations’ reference groups), but also because we believe that in our sample of 
SMEs in a variety of mostly mature industries – typically characterized by strong 
industry recipes – the performance levels of individual organizations’ specific 
reference groups will probably be close to the industry’s average performance level 
anyway (Lehner, 2000).  
Third, we intentionally chose to study CEOs’ intention to change instead of 
realized change behavior at the organizational level as the former is closer to CEOs’ 
decision-making processes (which we want to capture) as opposed to distal outcome-
related measures that assess actual, realized organizational change (Gavetti et al., 
2012). Nevertheless, a fruitful research avenue would be to test whether this 
willingness to change at the CEO-level leads, afterwards, translates into actual changes 
in strategies, improvement of results, survival rates, etc. This presumes insights in the 
implementation process of strategic changes (Hailey & Balogun, 2002) and might 
require longitudinal data. Furthermore, even when only intended strategic changes are 
taken into account (as in the current study), our exploratory analyses of the scope and 
direction of these intended strategic changes already indicate that these issues deserve 
further attention. For instance, the processes underlying contractive changes might be 
different from those underlying growth/expansion changes. Similarly, it is clear that 
‘attainment discrepancy’ drives change (either through a reactive, BTF-inspired logic or 
because of a proactive, ‘capability cues’/’slack’-related approach), but the magnitude, 
scope, and direction of change might differ. It would be interesting for future 
researchers to scrutinize how much an organization is willing to modify its strategic 
 







paradigm under different types of pressures (such as satisfaction and/or objective 
performance cues).  
Fourth, we used a sample of medium-sized organizations. Whereas we 
intentionally chose this context because of its suitability to test our hypotheses – i.e., 
CEOs are typically the most important actors in medium-sized firms (Lubatkin et al., 
2006) – this choice might have limited the generalization of our results. An interesting 
avenue for further research would be to explore the impact of the type and governance 
structure of organization (e.g., ownership concentration, board characteristics and 
board involvement in strategic decision-making, family ownership, etc.).  
In sum, our study represents one of the first to incorporate both objective performance 
measures and subjective interpretations of CEOs to explain their intentions to engage 
in strategic changes, and more precisely the magnitude of these changes. We hope that 
our study can set the stage for many others to come, and that it inspires scholars to 
account for both the ‘hard’ figures and the ‘soft’ perceptions when studying the effects 
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The economic reality of most nations is dominated by family firm businesses 
(Astrachan & Shanker, 2003; Morck & Yeung, 2004). As stated by Tagiuri and Davis 
(1996), these organizations are unique, have inherent features and are source of distinct 
advantages and disadvantages. This uniqueness comes by the fact that a father and a 
son may be part of the same family, members of the same owning group and also team 
members of the same management group. While most family companies are small, 
some are relatively large and several are giants in their respective industries (Tagiuri & 
Davis, 1996). But generally, they considerably contribute to the national product and 
employment of the economy which underlines its prevalence and importance in our 
society (Beckhard & Dyer, 1983). As a consequence, academia has recognized the 
importance of family business studies in the last several years. However, a lot remains 
to be done. For example, researchers continue to disagree over the definition of a 
family business, and similarly there has not yet appeared a framework to help to 
integrate the many promising approaches (e.g., from strategic management, 
organizational theory, economics, sociology, anthropology, and psychology) used by 
researchers to study family firms. On the contrary, some aspects have been analyzed 
thoroughly such as the son’s entry into the company and the rivalry between relatives 
who work together (Altman, 1971), the social structure and the particular strengths and 
weaknesses of family companies (Barry, 1975), the psychological characteristics of the 
owner-manager (Day, 1980) and the nepotism that is usually shown by these actors 
(Cambreleng, 1969), the management succession process (Hershon, 1975), etc. 
Family firms contain hard-to-duplicate capabilities – or what some scholars call 
‘familiness’ (Habbershon & Williams, 1999) – that make them peculiar and affect 
differently their survival and growth options (Chrisman et al., 2005). Moreover, the 
family’s approach of transgenerational sustainability usually leads to the 
institutionalization of their perceived value of the combined family and business 
systems (Selznick, 1957), suggesting that the family firms’ functioning may create 
utilities for members of a family business and shape their behaviors and decisions 
differently than in a non-family corporation. Hence, some scholars anticipate that the 
problems generated by close ownership, management of simultaneous roles, lifelong 
common history and conflicting intentions and behaviors may create inefficiencies 
 







which would limit the ability of family businesses to create or renew distinctive 
‘familiness’ within themselves (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001; Miller et al., 2003).  
On the other hand, several studies have argued that family businesses can also 
be driven by emotions (Baron, 2008; Houchin & MacLean, 2005) which permeate these 
organizations through blurred boundaries between family and business (Berrone et al., 
2010). Emotions may be present in all types of firms, but are likely to be more 
dominant within family firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). An important emotion-
related factor that captures the essence of family firms and is believed to be the single 
most important feature to separate family firms from other organizational forms 
(Berrone et al., 2010), is the socioemotional wealth. Socioemotional wealth refers to “the 
non-financial aspects of the firm that meet the family’s affective needs, such as identity, 
the ability to exercise family influence, and the perpetuation of family dynasty” 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007, p. 106). In this sense, literature argues that the preservation 
of the socioemotional wealth exists outside the realm of purposeful organizational 
activities and therefore it may cause family firms to consider the entity as something 
more than just a source of income but also as a context for family activity and 
embodiment of its pride and legacy (Meyer & Zucker, 1989). In fact, as stated by 
McConaughy (2000, p. 121), managers of family firms “have superior incentives for 
maximizing firm value and, therefore, need fewer compensation-based incentives”. 
That is to say, these managers will not have their individual interests as a priority but 
those of the organization. Thus, family ties seem to affect the way these companies 
invest, which is more related to efficiency because of their higher willingness to 
continue (Gimeno et al., 1997). This supposition is confirmed by several research such 
as Jensen (1986) who argues that family firms create greater cash levels, which make 
them rely less on debt as a form of financing; and Anderson and Reeb (2003) who 
anticipate that these firms have greater reliance on self-financing than non-family 
firms, which reduces their likelihood of default.  
Based on these findings, in this study we propose that family ownership18 will 
affect positively the financial strength obtained by an organization. In particular, we 
                                                             
18 Note that in this research we understand family ownership as a wider concept that the mere existence of 
family members within an organization. Consequently, we also pay attention to their involvement and 
influence into the business. More particularly, and following the commonly used essence approach (see 
methods section), we consider a family business that which has the following characteristics: (1) a family 
 







test this assumption using the latest and virulent crisis period as a time frame, which 
reached its most virulent peak during 2008 and 2009 and which has been characterized 
by its non-munificent features. This type of environments comprises a relative scarcity 
of resources (Keats & Hitt, 1988), fewer strategic options, fewer opportunities for 
expansion and development, more competitive pressure (Castrogiovanni, 1991) and 
unfavorable, complex and variable external forces for the companies to develop their 
activity (Haveman, 1992; Keats & Hitt, 1988). Consequently, we argue that under a 
non-munificent environment, the financial strength maintained by these firms will be 
even more relevant since this context may likely influence their immediate future and 
viability. That is to say, we anticipate that family firms’ prospects, which are mainly 
reflected in the preservation of its socioemotional wealth – and therefore on the 
perpetuation of the family dynasty (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), will 
keep on ruling the financial behavior shown by these organizations.  
Additionally, following Hofer and Schendel (1978) and Sharma et al.’s (1997) 
research we argue that considerable understanding could be gained by appending 
strategic management insights on the family firm research approach. In this vein, we 
establish that the effect of family ownership on firm’s financial strength will not be 
isolated but will be also affected by several aspects such as the organization’s scope of 
operation and the characteristics of its key-role players. Put differently, we anticipate 
that the financial strength obtained by family businesses will not be the same whether 
they operate just in one country or in a bunch of them, whether they focus their 
attention on a single industry or on several, whether they have one type of managers 
with high educational level or poorly educated ones, etc. 
Regarding the scope of their strategic decisions, we focus our attention on 
analyzing whether internationalization and diversification strategies influence the 
financial strength presented by such firms. In particular, and especially during the non-
munificent context where we set our analysis, we anticipate a positive moderation 
effect of both variables. We do so due to when a firm opts to internationalize its 
activities it obtains a greater access to exploit economies of scale, lower labor and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
influence over the strategic direction of a firm (Davis & Tagiuri, 1989); (2) an intention of the family to 
keep control (Litz, 1995); (3) a family firm behavior (Chua et al., 1999); and (4) a unique, inseparable, 
synergistic resources and capabilities arising from family involvement and interactions (Habbershon et al., 
2003). 
 







material costs, bigger market scope, etc. (Dicken, 2011); and when, on the other hand, 
an organization opts to diversify it produces an increase of the number of markets 
reached, reduction of the impact of fraud and bad information on firm’s portfolio, 
improvement of the situation of the firm to market volatility, etc. (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003). Thus, we predict that both actions will potentially minimize the global risk faced 
by such firms and will increase their opportunities for success due to their access to 
more heterogeneous markets – which will provide them more prospects of prosperity 
and growth (Goetzmann et al., 2005; Sanchez-Bueno & Usero, 2014).  
Since the seminal study of Hambrick and Mason (1984) on the upper-echelons 
perspective, research on TMTs has developed itself into one of the most prominent 
areas in the management research field (Menz, 2012). Top management teams, defined 
as the group of managers consisting of the CEO and those managers that directly 
report to the CEO (Boeker, 1997), are widely recognized as one of the most imperative 
decision-making units in organizations. Likewise, this stream of research has 
emphasized the relevance of these actors in monitoring environmental conditions and 
modifying organization’s strategies to maintain satisfactory alignments between both 
(Andrews, 1971; Child, 1972; Ling et al., 2008; Miles, 1982). In addition, in the particular 
context of family firms, TMTs are argued to be even more responsible for strategic 
decisions (e.g., Chua et al., 1999; Habbershon et al., 2003; Tagiuri & Davis, 1992). Thus, 
following this line of investigation, scholars have convincingly argued (and repeatedly 
found) that managers and their characteristics matter in affecting strategic decision-
making processes, and, in turn, organization-level outcomes. In line with this body of 
work, we anticipate that the relationship between family ownership and firm’s 
financial strength may not only be influenced by firms’ scope of operation (i.e., by the 
internationalization and diversification presented by the firm) but also by the 
characteristics of their managers. More particularly, we drive our attention on 
analyzing the influence of their educational level and average age; and expect an 
opposite effect between both variables.  
Thus, we argue that highly educated managers will leverage more due to their 
inherent characteristics such as higher confidence with investments, more openness to 
change, better deal with ambiguity and complexity, more facility to provide solutions, 
etc. (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Barker & Mueller, 2002; Day & Lord, 1992; Herrmann & 
 











Datta, 2005); therefore negatively affecting the financial strength presented by their 
(family) firms. Contrarily, we anticipate that older managers will leverage less as they 
tend to choose for more conservative capital structures (Chen et al., 2010), take less risk 
(Barker & Mueller, 2002; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), be more prudent with their actions 
and behavior (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), be less able to organize information 
effectively (Taylor, 1975) and possess less physical and mental stamina to seize 
perceived opportunities (Child, 1974; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Furthermore, in the 
non-munificent context where our study is set, which as previously mentioned will be 
an elevated uncertainty and variability, scarcity of opportunities, lack of demand, 
intense competition and risk (Acharya, 2009; Instituto de la Empresa Familiar, 2015; 
International Monetary Fund, 2009), we postulate that this higher/lower leverage (and 
especially the one dragged from the prior benevolent cycle) will have an even more 
clear negative/positive effect on the current firm’s financial strength (for a summary of 
the research model presented in this chapter see Figure 8). 
 
















Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
 
In this research we do find that founding family controlled firms are financially 
stronger than non-family firms under non-munificent conditions. Additionally, we 
argued that this relationship would be affected by the context where the firm operates 

















and TMT average age are found to negatively and positively moderate this relationship 
respectively. However, neither internationalization nor diversification strategies are 
found to have significant effects. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. First, a theoretical 
background and literature review of family firm and its relation with performance will 
be provided. Second, several components that may influence or frame this relationship 
are exposed. Third, the research methods of the study will be explained. Fourth, the 
results will be presented and discussed. The article ends with concluding thoughts, 
limitations and insightful future research directions. 
 
 
4.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
4.2.1. Defining the family firm  
Family firms are usually defined as a unique combination of two sets of rules, 
values, and expectations: the ones related to family and the ones related to business 
(Flemons & Cole, 1992; Gersick et al., 1997; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). Moreover, it is 
argued that these firms share certain characteristics that render them unique in terms 
of patterns of ownership, governance, succession and the desire for the continuity of 
the family involvement in the organization (Chua et al., 1999; Steier, 2003). Therefore, 
can we assert that family firms are different from non-family firms? One would think 
such question would be fairly easy to answer, but actually it is not. Indeed, several 
scholars have found little or no difference between family and non-family firms on 
dimensions such as sources of debt financing (Coleman & Carsky, 1999), strategic 
orientation (Gudmunson et al., 1999), management and governance characteristics 
(Westhead et al., 2001) and problems and assistance needs (Welsch et al., 1995). 
Oppositely, several other studies have determined that family and non-family 
businesses differ in terms of goals (Lee & Rogoff, 1996), ethics (Adams et al., 1996), size 
and financial structure (Romano et al., 2000), international structures and strategies 
(Zahra, 2003), and corporate governance (Randøy & Goel, 2003). Nevertheless, in 
general, literature on family business has extensively acknowledged divergences 
between both types of organizations (McConaughy et al., 2001). Next, we underline 
some of their implications. 
 







Firstly, empirical research has asserted that family firms’ longer outlook imply 
a more vital vision into firm’s intervention (Lee, 2006). This situation might come due 
to family firms have a distinct functioning from non-family firms and in particular for 
the consideration of their businesses as an asset to pass on to succeeding generations, 
instead of a temporary income provider (Casson, 1999). In other words, family firms 
may not only be a source of resources but also a context for family activity and 
embodiment of its pride and identity (Meyer & Zucker, 1989). In fact, several studies 
indicate that although some strategic decisions might contribute to achieve the 
economic goals of the business system, they could not be taken whether they threaten 
the non-economic goals inherent to the firm (Basco & Pérez-Rodriguez, 2009). These 
non-economic goals are captured in the literature by the concept of socioemotional 
wealth, which refers to “the non-financial aspects of the firm that meet the family’s 
affective needs, such as identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the 
perpetuation of family dynasty” (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007, p. 106). In addition, 
according to some scholars such as Berrone et al. (2012) the preservation of this 
socioemotional wealth could become an end in itself in family firms – which would 
mean that in spite of organizational features demanded the need for some actions, the 
high willingness to preserve the firm’s socioemotional wealth could hinder some of 
these ‘necessary’ operations and even making these firms to adhere to suboptimal 
choices (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007). 
In a relative vein McConaughy (2000) argues that family firms prioritize the 
obtaining of firm value to short term achievements, i.e., this author suggests that 
managers of these firms will think more of long-term incentives (such as the 
perdurance of the firm, stability, etc.) rather than of short-term incentives (such as 
immediate performance, higher salaries, etc.) or what is the same, they will probably 
superimpose the interests of the company to their own. Consequently, despite some 
other preferences showed up by non-owners members (Meyer & Zucker, 1989), family 
firm members will generate more efficient investments aligned with their willingness 
to continue operating in the long term (Gimeno et al., 1997).  
For its part, Anderson and Reeb (2003) state that family firms mitigate 
organizational risk by employing financing forms with low probabilities of default, 
which suggests a greater reliance on self-financing through their capital structure. 
 







Meanwhile, Jensen (1986) argues that concentrated ownership of family firms creates 
greater cash levels in these types of firms, thus allowing the organization to rely less on 
debt as a form of financing. Similarly, McConaughy et al. (2001) and Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) suggest that firms controlled by families have greater value, are operated 
more efficiently, and carry less debt than other firms.  
 
4.2.2. Performance in family firms 
As previously mentioned, non-economic goals are rather important to family 
firms since they usually guide their strategy and operations (Chrisman et al., 2003). 
However, empirical research on family business has rarely focused on these outcomes 
but has primarily dealt with its effects on economic performance issues (Chrisman et 
al., 2003). In this sense, family firm literature has mainly revealed that the particular 
ownership structure and characteristics of these firms will affect their efficiency and 
risk-taking, therefore influencing their value (McConaughy et al., 2001). We shall next 
review briefly some of the earlier work on this range of issues. 
The arguments for explaining the increased efficiency of family firms are 
generally derived from the agency theory. This theory was brought by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and basically explains the existing relationship and potential problems 
between principals and agents in business due to their unaligned goals or different 
aversion levels to risk. Jensen and Meckling (1976) hypothesize that the larger a firm 
becomes, the higher its agency costs will be due to the greater formal monitoring and 
control systems necessary in these types of firms. However, these authors also argue 
that agency costs may be reduced by increasing the level of managerial ownership 
since monitoring and control costs would be diminished under these circumstances. In 
other words, what Jensen and Meckling suggest is that a concentration of managerial 
ownership, such as the one occurred in family firms, would drastically reduce (or 
almost eliminate) these costs as owner-managers will be more involved in firm 
management and will present similar interests. Moreover, in these specific firms there 
will not be the elevated pressure and demand for accountability, disclosure, and 
transparency from external shareholders, market analysts and external constituents 
that exist in non-family firms (Carney, 2005). As a consequence, literature agrees to 
conclude that family firms will enjoy greater efficiency than non-family firms (Daily & 
 







Dollinger, 1992; Fama & Jensen, 1983; McConaughy et al., 2001). However, as every 
aspect in life, this is not free from detractors. Thus, Tosi et al. (1997) suggest that the 
agency theory approach oversimplifies the complexity of the agency relationship. In 
this vein, Morris (1989) explains that no separation between ownership and 
management can offset the positive long-term orientation of the business and may lead 
to behaviors that do not support the best interests of the firm. This, in turn, renders 
family firms more vulnerable to self-control problems. Indeed, family managers have 
the authority and legitimacy to pursue what they perceive as being the “best option” 
(Gedajlovic et al., 2004), making decisions that are less based on closely calculated 
risks, less grounded in a systematic way and with less incorporation of outsiders’ 
perspectives and opinions (Schulze et al., 2001; 2003). This can result in family firms 
investing in projects without thoroughly considering the pros and cons in terms of risk. 
Put differently, family firms may “have greater latitude to allocate resources on the 
basis of ‘animal spirits’ or ‘gut feel’ and to pursue opportunities that can only be 
rationalized by particularistic or intuitive criteria” (Carney, 2005. p. 23). Moreover, it is 
also argued that psychological conflicts within the family can offset the benefits of the 
reduced monitoring enjoyed by these organizations (Kets de Vries, 1993). Meanwhile, 
emotions are hypothesized to cloud financial vision in such issues as succession 
planning (Morris 1989). Nevertheless, despite these findings, positive arguments are 
extensively argued to overcome the negative ones (McConaughy et al., 2001), 
suggesting that family ownership will be beneficial in mitigating the principal-agent 
conflicts that afflict these firms and consequently positively affecting its efficiency. 
When it comes to analyze the risk taken by firms we will also focus on 
disentangling whether there are differences between family and with non-family firms. 
On the one hand, Zahra (2005) argues that family firms promote risk taking in general, 
while long CEO-founder tenures lead to the opposite. Yet, in the academic literature, 
family firms are commonly associated with weak risk bearing attributes (e.g., Meyer & 
Zucker, 1989). Particularly, Chandler (1990) and Fama (1980), among others, use 
concepts of the agency theory to support this statement. Hence, they establish that a 
high concentration of ownership will lead to risk avoiding strategic choices due to its 
governance structure. On this basis, there are reasons to believe that risk avoidance 
will be stronger in family firms than in non-family firms. First, in family firms, the 
 







management tends to have most of its wealth invested in the firm and so assumes the 
full financial repercussion of failed investments (Gedajlovic et al., 2004). Consequently, 
necessary but risky strategic decisions, such as international expansion, launch of new 
products to the market, investments in R&D, etc. may be postponed due to concerns 
about the safety of the family wealth (Schulze et al., 2002). Second, there is more at 
stake in family firms than the family’s current wealth: the financial and social 
wellbeing of future generations (James, 1999; Schulze et al., 2002). One example of it 
may be the family name and the family reputation – often built up over several 
generations (Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006). This situation is not the same in other 
types of firms, where the connection to a wider family and to previous and future 
generations is less clear. 
For its part, the value of an organization is assumed to be affected by the above 
two variables: the degree of efficiency and the risk profile (McConaughy et al., 2001). 
But, will there also be differences among family and non-family firms in this regard? 
Family firms are generally presumed to take longer-term outlook. Therefore, they will 
be less willing to take risks and will likely invest more efficiently, especially if their 
control allows them access to economic rents, which could be irretrievably lost if 
financial distress resulted in a change of control (Naldi et al., 2007). As a consequence, 
several authors such as Daily and Dollinger (1991), Kets de Vries (1993), Naldi et al. 
(2007) and McConaughy et al. (2001) propose that the value of these firms will be 
greater than the value of non-family owned businesses. Andres (2008) reinforces this 
assumption focusing more in detail on family involvement. Thus, he explains that 
family ownership will be only related to superior firm value if “the founding-family is 
still active either on the executive or the supervisory board” due to “if families are just 
large shareholders without board representation, the performance (and value) of their 
companies is not (will not be) distinguishable from other firms” (Andres, 2008, p. 431). 
That is to say, family ownership will generate higher firm values but only when family 
is actually involved in the business. Additionally, most of this research measures firm 
value through financial ratios (see methods section for a deeper explanation) which 
chiefly collect the organization’s financial situation – or percentage of stockholders' 
equity in comparison with firm’s liabilities (Fama & French, 1996). Accordingly, to be 
 







more specific about what we are measuring, hereafter we will refer to such firm value 
as firm’s financial strength.  
 
In this study, and despite prior findings, we will also assess the differences in 
firm value or financial strength between family and non-family firms. However, we will 
take a different approach and, in particular, we will analyze this relationship under a 
non-munificent context. Literature widely agrees that family firms are positively 
related to higher values and financial positions but, from our understanding, no 
previous research has specifically tested it within the last financial crisis. This period of 
time (which reached its most virulent peak during 2008 and 2009) was characterized by 
a turbulent context where organizations and customers had to face a global recession 
which generated an elevated credit, mortgage and trust crisis, high levels of 
uncertainty, raised variability and the rupture of the production-employment-
consumption wheel (International Monetary Fund, 2009). Therefore, to know the 
relationship between family ownership and firm’s financial strength during this specific 
context may help us to better understand the differences among both types of 
organizations, to unravel whether their characteristics and preferences are accentuated 
(or not) during these periods, and to even anticipate repercussions on their potential 
discontinuance.  
In particular, we argue that based on the previously exposed family-firm 
characteristics and peculiarities: such as elevated risk aversion (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003), higher efficiency (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Fama & Jensen, 1983), less 
dependence on debt as a form of financing (Jensen, 1986), will to continue in business 
(Gimeno et al., 1997), prioritization of the objectives of the company to the individual 
(McConaughy, 2000), relevant investment in their firms in terms of both financial 
investment, prestige and human capital (McConaughy et al., 2001), etc. these types of 
firms will (also) hold better positions in terms of value/financial strength than non-
family firms during this time lapse. In fact, we anticipate that the own idiosyncrasy of 
family firms, strongly influenced by their socioemotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007), will make them not to vary their way of acting and continue investing, financing 
and operating thinking about the ‘entity’ as something more than a mere firm (Meyer 
& Zucker, 1989). In light of this, we hypothesize: 
 







Hypothesis 1. During non-munificent periods, family ownership will be positively 
related to the magnitude of the firm’s financial strength. 
 
4.2.3. The impact of a non-munificent environment upon firm’s financial strength 
The competitiveness and viability of an organization depends, in a large 
percentage, on the ability of their managers to perceive, anticipate and respond to the 
pressures of the environment (Sánchez-Peinado et al., 2010). Over time, the 
accumulation of changes, both in the business environment and the internal level of 
organizations, often lead to situations of maladjustment that may jeopardize the 
competitiveness or survival of companies. To successfully overcome these 
circumstances managers must be able to adapt, modify or rethink the strategies of their 
companies to restore the desired company-environment adjustment (Sánchez-Peinado 
et al., 2010). However, this adaptation is not a fully discretionary process that can be 
carried out without any limits or obstacles. Deliberate changes in business strategy are 
motivated, facilitated or constrained by a multitude of interacting factors (Rajagopalan 
& Spreitzer, 1997). In fact, the identification and understanding of the factors that 
influence the adaptive capacity and strategic change of the companies has been a 
subject of great interest in the theories of the organization. Thus, for instance, Gordon 
et al. (2000) focus their analysis on studying the factors which limit or hinder 
organizational change and adaptation. Meanwhile, Santos and García (2007) assess the 
factors that impulse intentional changes in the strategy. On the other hand, Sánchez-
Peinado et al., (2010) provide an integrative perspective jointly analyzing the effect of 
the factors that motivate or impel the intention to change and the ones that provoke 
resistance to it.  
However, the aim of this research is not to deepen the analysis of these factors 
but to analyze and understand the effect of the environment on organizational 
decisions and results. In particular, this study is focused on a specific type of 
environment: the non-munificent environment, which has characterized the global 
economy during the last years. This situation has been deeply analyzed by both 
economists and scholars, establishing its inception in the financial crisis happened in 
the U.S. banking industry which subsequently spreaded to other industries and around 
the globe. Nevertheless, prior research has disagreed on the exact timing of this 
 







economic shock: hence, while some scholars suggest that it started as early as 2007 
(Aubuchon & Wheelock, 2010; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011), most researchers agree that 
2008 is the year the crisis really became apparent (Cole & White, 2012; DeYoung et al., 
2013; Grove et al., 2011) and 2009 is the year in which the industry hit its lowest point 
(Guillén & Suárez, 2010). Cole and White (2012) help to clarify this situation illustrating 
the number of banks that went bankrupt during those years. In this way, they argue 
that only 31 banks did so between 2000 and 2007, whereas 30 banks failed during 2008 
and over 100 bank failures were seen in the year 2009. At national level no different 
data is observed. Thus, Acharya (2009), Instituto de la Empresa Familiar (2015) and 
International Monetary Fund (2009), among others, similarly consider those years as a 
turning point for the Spanish industry – which comprises the basis of our study. 
Nevertheless, the characterization of an environment is not as simple as it 
seems and as proposed by Dess and Beard (1984), to better understand their 
peculiarities we should analyze three different areas or dimensions: the dynamism, 
complexity and hostility. In particular, these authors define dynamism such as the 
instability/volatility that exists in the environment and the difficulty to predict the 
changes that occur in it (e.g., market instability, technological instability, etc.); 
complexity such as the heterogeneity, sophistication, diversity and concentration of 
elements present in the environment which make it more difficult to understand (e.g., 
diversity of products and markets, technical complexity of these elements, etc.); and 
hostility such as the abundance of resources relative to the number of firms competing 
for those resources and its ability to sustain organizational growth (i.e., a market with 
low growth may be extremely munificent whether it has few competitors; however, a 
market with high growth may generate a low capacity to a given company in the 
presence of a large number of companies). Haveman (1992) and Keats and Hitt (1988), 
among others, took the baton on this issue arguing that the unpredictable nature of 
dynamic environments, which are characterized by the rapid and discontinuous changes 
in demand, competitors, technology and information, would increase the risk in 
companies and its capability to generate good results. On the other hand, these authors 
establish that complex environments would cause a series of resources to be required in 
order to understand and obtain information from the environment, therefore 
preventing the use of such resources for the growth of the company. As a consequence, 
 







they state that these environments would also intensify the risk in organizations and 
will negatively affect their performance. For its part, Covin and Slevin (1989) who 
define hostile environments as those characterized by a precarious industry position, 
resource scarcity, intense competition, technological, social, political and economic 
uncertainty, unbearable and difficult business climate, and a relative lack of 
opportunities for exploit; also consider that surviving and competing successfully in 
this type of environments would be harsh.  
DeYoung et al. (2013), Instituto de la Empresa Familiar (2015) and International 
Monetary Fund (2009) jointly gather these three characteristics under the umbrella of 
the non-munificence to define the latest economic crisis occurred globally in recent 
years. Its consequences are not new since they are repeated cyclically (DeYoung et al., 
2013). In this way, Wan and Hoskisson (2003) anticipate that this type of environment 
will be represented by a relative scarcity of all type of resources such as productive, 
financial, technological, bureaucratic, economic, political, legal and/or social, which 
will dramatically increase the risk of continuing in the market (Keats & Hitt, 1988). In 
addition, Castrogiovanni (1991) argues that under these circumstances firms will have 
fewer strategic options, fewer opportunities for expansion and development, and more 
competitive pressure. In fact, "although opportunities remain, they are (will be) more 
difficult to identify and exploit" (Castrogiovanni, 1991, p. 552). In sum, this 
environment indicates the existence of unfavorable, complex and variable external 
forces for the companies to develop their activity. Thus, overall poorer results and 
survival problems will be obtained as more resources are needed than are available 
under current environmental conditions. Moreover, this situation will be supported by 
the aggravation of the uncertainty, discouragement of investment, impediment to 
economic growth, forced adjustment of business strategies/structures and 
modification of entrepreneurial activities that will be normally carried out in the 
presence of a less munificent environment (Haveman, 1992; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). 
Consequently, we argue that under non-munificent environments, the financial strength 
hold by organizations will be even more important since it could act as a turning point 
and probably determine their immediate future and viability (Iwasaki, 2014). 
Therefore, we set our research on this time frame. 
 
 







4.2.4. The moderating role of internationalization 
Family ownership will (also) potentially influence firm’s financial strength 
during non-munificent periods. However, we argue that this interaction will not be 
isolated but will be affected by several aspects such as the organization’s scope of 
operation and the characteristics of its key-role players. Thus, we anticipate that it will 
not be the same to operate just in one country as in three, to be focused on one activity 
or on several, to have managers with high educational level or poorly educated ones, 
etc. Next, we will analyze and explain these ideas.  
Within the growing body of research on family businesses, the topic of 
internationalization is latterly receiving increased attention (e.g., Arregle et al., 2012; 
Fernández & Nieto, 2006). In fact, savage worldwide competition and technological 
developments beyond national borders are pushing family (and non-family) 
businesses to internationalize their operations (Claver et al., 2007). Among the benefits 
of internationalization we might highlight that it allows organizations to get a greater 
exploitation of the economies of scale, utilization of lower labor costs and access to 
better commodity prices, bigger market scope and different resources – such as specific 
knowledge and know-how  (Dicken, 2011). All these aspects may be translated into 
growth opportunities which in family businesses could be seen as employment 
opportunities for succeeding generations, higher income perspectives and continuity of 
the firm (Claver et al., 2009). However, the relationship between family ownership and 
internationalization is still inconclusive which has generated that this set of literature is 
still looking for consensus which reconciles and connects the findings produced so far 
(for a recent review see Pukall & Calabrò, 2014). In this sense, some authors suggest 
that family ownership is positively related to internationalization (e.g., Carr & 
Bateman, 2009). Meanwhile, some others argue just an opposite relationship (e.g., 
Graves & Thomas, 2006). For its part, several scholars do not even find differences 
between family and non-family businesses’ internationalization practices (e.g., Cerrato 
& Piva, 2010; Pinho, 2007), attributing these findings to differences in managerial 
control and/or ownership of the family (Arregle et al., 2012). 
Likewise, the relationship between internationalization and firm performance 
has been deeply evaluated in strategic management and international business 
literature (e.g., Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999; Hitt et al., 1997; Tallman & Li, 1996). 
 







However, despite the numerous studies that has examined this association, literature 
evidence contradictory results (Annavarjula & Beldona, 2000). In this light, some recent 
studies have argued that there exists an inverse U-shaped curvilinear relationship 
between internationalization and performance, as opposed to a linear relationship, 
which has been the underlying premise in earlier studies (Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999; 
Hitt et al., 1997). Nonetheless, some scholars belittle these surprising results arguing 
that most of the studies were based largely on samples of just manufacturing firms 
(Habib & Victor, 1991). Accordingly, these findings would suggest that this interaction 
might not apply similarly to every sector and should be somehow modified to account 
for their inherent differences. 
As can be observed, empirical evidence on this issue is found to be ambiguous 
and rather inconclusive. Yet, in this study we do not have interest in clarifying either 
the relationship between family ownership and internationalization or between 
internationalization and firm performance; but we do aim to analize the effect of 
internationalization on the relationship between family ownership and firm’s financial 
strength. With this, we expect to contribute to better understand whether family 
ownership acts as the main (and only) cause of firm’s financial strength or if firm’s 
diversity in terms of international scope of operation also affects this outcome19. In 
particular, based on the effects of internationalization such as the greater access to 
exploit economies of scale, lower labor and material costs, bigger market scope, etc. 
(Dicken, 2011); we argue that internationalized family firms will also contribute to 
generate higher levels of financial strength and especially during the non-munificent 
context where we set our analysis, which is characterized by an increase of the risk, 
scarcity of all type of resources, lack of strategic options and rise in competitive 
pressure (Acharya, 2009; Instituto de la Empresa Familiar, 2015; International 
Monetary Fund, 2009). More particularly, we predict that internationalization will 
potentially minimize the risk of firms and will increase their chances for success due to 
their access to heterogeneous markets – which will provide them bigger opportunities 
of growth and income (Buch et al., 2014; Moral-Pajares et al., 2015). Therefore, we 
                                                             
19 All these interactions will be tested during the last non-munificent context (to obtain further information 
about this aspect see prior section). 
 







anticipate that such firms will count on a better financial situation. The aforementioned 
arguments can be put together in the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2. During non-munificent periods, firm internationalization will positively 
moderate the relationship between family ownership and firm’s financial strength.  
 
4.2.5. The moderating role of diversification 
Family firms are usually considered as organizations with large and 
undiversified shareholders. In this vein, family business literature has argued that 
these actors, who hold a high influence and power over the firm, will be able to impose 
certain actions that are not present in other firms with diffuse ownership (e.g., Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1986). Such actions can take many forms, including the expropriation of 
wealth from small investors, the imposition of excessive compensation packages, and 
risk avoidance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). In this section we will focus our attention on 
this latter aspect which closely represent the undoubted desire about survival and 
continuity shown by family businesses (Gimeno et al., 1997). In fact, as previously 
mentioned, these firms will be generally understood by its members as an asset to pass 
to their relatives or descendants rather than wealth to consume during their lifetimes 
(Casson, 1999). Consequently, they will present strong incentives to minimize firm risk 
(Meyer & Zucker, 1989) and will generally evaluate projects on a different basis than 
non-family firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). 
Empirical research on this body of literature has mainly identified two ways for 
reducing such risk: the search for financing strategies that hold low probabilities of 
default (which indicates greater reliance on self-financing or lower use of leverage in 
the firm’s capital structure) or the diversification of the investment activities (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986). As the first one has been deeply argued and discussed in prior sections 
we will directly proceed to analyze the second. In this sense, several scholars have 
dived into this topic and examined the relationship between family ownership and 
corporate diversification. Thus, in particular, Berger and Ofek (1996) anticipate that the 
more control or undiversified shareholders in a firm, the more diversification this 
organization will experience – even at the cost of creating severe conflicts with the 
firm’s other constituents. Consequently, these authors anticipate that mitigating risk 
levels via corporate diversification may be an effective investment strategy for these 
 







firms. However, contrary results have been also documented in the literature. Hence, 
for instance, Anderson and Reeb (2003, p. 655) among others argue that “family firms 
(will) engage in significantly less corporate diversification”, estimating this difference 
in about fifteen percent. Sanchez-Bueno & Usero (2014) reinforce this assumption 
exploring how the ownership structure of family firms specifically gives these 
organizations a distinctive nature in terms of diversification. Thus, they show that 
“(although) the degree of family ownership has a negative impact on the degree of 
diversification [...] the presence and ownership share of a financial company as the 
second largest shareholder in a family firm (will) favor this diversification” (Sanchez-
Bueno & Usero, 2014, p. 1311). 
Similar to the influence of family ownership on internationalization, the 
relationship among family ownership and diversification is still blurry. However, the 
effects of the latter on risk reduction are out of discussion (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). In 
this way, past research has widely argued that diversification of the activities carried 
out by a firm will produce an increase of the number of markets reached, reduction of 
the impact of fraud and bad information on firm’s portfolio, improvement of the 
situation of the firm to market volatility, etc. (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Consequently, 
in parallel with the previous hypothesis, we anticipate that diversified family firms will 
also contribute to generate higher levels of financial strength and especially during the 
non-munificent context where we set our analysis, which is characterized by an 
increase of the risk, scarcity of all type of resources, lack of strategic options and rise in 
competitive pressure (Acharya, 2009; Instituto de la Empresa Familiar, 2015; 
International Monetary Fund, 2009). More particularly, we predict that diversification 
will potentially minimize the global risk faced by firms and will increase their 
opportunities for success due to their access to more heterogeneous markets – which 
will provide them more prospects of prosperity and growth (Goetzmann et al., 2005; 
Sanchez-Bueno & Usero, 2014). Taken together, we expect that these firms will enjoy 
greater financial situation. These arguments can be summarized in the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3. During non-munificent periods, firm diversification will positively 
moderate the relationship between family ownership and firm’s financial strength. 
 
 







4.2.6. The effect of TMT characteristics in organizational strategy 
Research from the strategic choice perspective, and more recently from the upper-
echelons theory, has highlighted the relevance of managers (upper echelons) in 
organizations (Haveman, 2000; Stinchcombe, 1997). This argument is primarily based 
on Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) seminal paper, through which it was postulated that 
organizations were, to a certain extent, a reflection of the attributes, attitudes and 
behaviors of their key-role members. Likewise, these authors also argued that because 
an individual's cognitive base evolves from its experiences, including training and 
background (Cyert & March, 1963), its demographic characteristics could be used as 
indicators of their qualities. This assumption inspired many scholars to empirically 
investigate the impact of such demographic characteristics on a myriad of outcome 
variables such as turnover, innovation, diversification, and organizational performance 
(Boone et al., 2005). Thus, following this line of investigation, scholars have 
convincingly argued (and repeatedly found) that managers and their characteristics 
matter in affecting strategic decision-making processes, and, in turn, organization-level 
outcomes.  
In line with this body of work, we anticipate that the relationship between 
family ownership and firm’s financial strength may not only be influenced by firms’ 
scope of operation (i.e., by the internationalization and diversification presented by the 
firm) but also by the characteristics of their managers. Next, we will study some of 
them. 
 
4.2.6.1. The moderating role of TMT educational level 
Prior research has associated managerial educational level with the cognitive 
ability and knowledge base maintained by these actors. Thus, despite some authors 
such as Herrmann and Datta (2005) pinpoint that TMTs with higher educational levels 
generate excessive and dilated analyses – which is to the detriment of decision-making; 
this body of literature agrees to determine that these actors will possess a better ability 
to tolerate ambiguity (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), to absorb new ideas (Barker & 
Mueller, 2002) and to generate creative solutions to difficult problems (Bantel & 
Jackson, 1989). Moreover, it is argued that these type of managers will also have 
bigger socio-cognitive capacities, will be more efficient at addressing vast information 
 







from varying categories, will be more capable to generate rich and complex ideas for 
problem-solving, and will generally be more open to change and opportunities (Bantel 
& Jackson, 1989; Barker & Mueller, 2002; Day & Lord, 1992). In this line, Grimm and 
Smith (1991) empirically tested these assumptions, arguing that strategic change would 
more likely to be generated through managers which possess MBA degrees. Similarly, 
Herrmann and Datta (2005) established that highly educated managers were quite 
more confident (and less uncertain about complexity and variation) of their decisions 
in investment and therefore, they would not need as much financial slack as less-
educated TMTs. Put differently, more-educated managers would be less likely to opt 
for a conservative capital structure (Herrmann & Datta, 2005).  
Based on these findings and in parallel with prior hypotheses we anticipate that 
the educational level of a company’s managers will also influence the relationship 
between family ownership and firm’s financial strength. More specifically, we argue 
that highly educated managers will leverage more due to their inherent characteristics 
such as higher confidence with investments, more openness to change, better deal with 
ambiguity and complexity, more facility to provide solutions, etc. (Bantel & 
Jackson, 1989; Barker & Mueller, 2002; Day & Lord, 1992; Herrmann & Datta, 2005); 
therefore negatively affecting the financial strength presented by their (family) firms.  
Furthermore, in the non-munificent context where our study is set, which is 
marked by an elevated uncertainty and variability, scarcity of opportunities, lack of 
demand, intense competition and risk (Acharya, 2009; Instituto de la Empresa Familiar, 
2015; International Monetary Fund, 2009), we state that this higher leverage (and 
especially the one generated in the prior benevolent cycle) will have an even more clear 
negative effect on the current firm’s financial strength. This argument is supported by 
Claessens et al. (2000, p. 23) who assert that difficulties shown by firms during crisis 
periods are not produced by these “external shocks, including a drop in aggregate 
demand [...] (but they are) apparent well before the crisis and the risky financial 
policies pursued by these firms (are the ones which truly) left them vulnerable”. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 4. During non-munificent periods, TMT educational level will negatively 
moderate the relationship between family ownership and firm’s financial strength.  
 
 







4.2.6.2. The moderating role of TMT average age 
Age can be assessed as a proxy of both the accumulated experience and the 
propensity for risk taking by someone. Focusing in the latter, prior research suggests 
that age will influence strategic decision-making in such a way that while younger 
managers will be more inclined to pursue high-risk strategies, older managers will be 
more conservative with their actions and behavior (Barker & Mueller, 2002; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Particularly, the upper-echelons 
literature bases this argumentation in three main motives. Firstly, because younger 
managers are usually more capable to learn and integrate information in decision-
making processes and thereby, they will have larger confidence in their decisions 
(Taylor, 1975). Secondly, due to younger managers have higher technological 
knowledge as a consequence of having received their education more recently (Bantel 
& Jackson, 1989). Finally, as a matter of their age and life expectancy, younger 
managers will take more risks because of their financial and career security concerns 
are far away from the end (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Child, 1974). Extending this 
argument, we can expect younger TMTs to be more comfortable with long-term 
investments – which are usually composed by higher sunk costs and payoffs that may 
be generated only in the long run, if at all (Barker & Mueller, 2002). Several examples 
of this may be found in the literature. For instance, Herrmann and Datta (2005) show a 
negative relationship between managerial age and international diversification; 
whereas Chen et al. (2010) do the same with R&D spending. For its part, Ryan and 
Wiggins’s (2001) research delves into this matter by determining that when manager’s 
horizon is shorter than firm’s investment horizon an agency conflict will occur. 
Consequently, these authors propose that managers should (always) have a short 
horizon and therefore, firms should offer managers stock-based awards oriented to 
short-term incentives (regardless of their age). 
Based on these implications and similar to prior hypotheses we anticipate that 
the average age of a company’s managers will also influence the relationship between 
family ownership and firm’s financial strength. More specifically, we argue that older 
managers will leverage less as they tend to choose for more conservative capital 
structures (Chen et al., 2010), take less risk (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984), be more prudent with their actions and behavior (Wiersema & Bantel, 
 







1992), be less able to organize information effectively (Taylor, 1975) and possess less 
physical and mental stamina to seize perceived opportunities (Child, 1974; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984) – contrary to younger TMTs, which are more inclined to use more debt 
(Chen et al., 2010), take further risk (Barker & Mueller, 2002), make long and uncertain 
investments (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Herrmann & Datta, 2005), seek growth through 
novel and innovative strategies (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and more easily adapt their 
home-grown mental maps (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994); therefore positively affecting the 
financial strength presented by their (family) firms.   
Moreover, in the non-munificent context where our study is set, which is 
characterized by low opportunities, high levels of uncertainty and variability, scarcity 
of resources and demand, fierce competition and incremented risk (Acharya, 2009; 
Instituto de la Empresa Familiar, 2015; International Monetary Fund, 2009), we 
anticipate that this lower leverage (and especially the one dragged from the prior 
benevolent cycle) will have an even more relevant positive effect on the current firm’s 
financial strength. In other words, we expect that the lower risk taken by such 
managers during these years of depression (and the immediately previous ones) will 
generate a lower probability of investment failure (and therefore more financial 
strength) (Claessens et al., 2000). Following this line of reasoning we propose the 
following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 5. During non-munificent periods, TMT average age will positively moderate 





To examine these relationships we used a sample composed by 137 Spanish 
medium-sized firms (SMEs). This dataset contained both subjective data, obtained by 
sending questionnaires, and objective data, collected from SABI Informa Database 
(Bureau Van Dijk), the most important source of business, accounting and financial 
information in Spain. Our sample was made up of SMEs with the aim of being as 
representative as possible of all Spanish companies, where about 99.9% of them are 
SMEs. These companies are large enough to possess a formal organizational structure 
 







and pre-established decision-making processes, while they usually lack the excess of 
resources, organizational structure and support functions that bigger companies 
preserve for their daily-basis operation. As a consequence, managers possess an even 
more relevant position in these firms (Lubatkin et al., 2006).  
We selected a random sample of 1000 SMEs (over 100 and up to 500 
employees). In particular, 60% of them were related to manufacturing industries, 
whereas 40% did so with operating in service industries. In addition, due to the 
significance that family ownership has in this study we also checked for its balance. 
Specifically, we found a similar percentage of family and non-family firms (55% family 
vs 45% non-family organizations).  
Later on, we sent a pre-notice letter to the CEO of each organization explaining 
the baseline of our research and assuring them total confidentiality. Our questionnaire 
was addressed to the CEOs of the organizations as they usually are considered as well-
informed and experienced enough actors who are highly involved in organizational 
strategic decision-making processes (Priem, 1994). To confirm its participation in 
completing the questionnaire, random telephone calls were made to 20 of these 
organizations. It is important to mention that three professors specialized on strategic 
management and organizational behavior area validated our questionnaire before 
sending it. Moreover, a revised version was pre-tested with five CEOs from SMEs (not 
included in the final sample).  
A total of 52 firms out of 1000 were excluded from our database due to incorrect 
addresses. Ten days after sending such pre-notice letter we sent to the rest of the firms 
(948) the questionnaire with its corresponding cover letter. In total, we obtained the not 
inconsiderable figure of 190 questionnaires (representing a response rate of 20,04%). 
This number was obtained after forwarding the questionnaire again to the firms who 
did not respond to our request in the first instance (in particular, we firstly obtained 
131 responses which were complemented with 59 more questionnaires afterwards). Of 
this figure we got to eliminate a total of 7 firms for reasons of incompleteness. As a 
consequence, our final sample was composed by a total number of 183 valid 
questionnaires (meaning a response rate of 19.3%). However, the test of our hypotheses 
demanded the combination of subjective and objective data from the organizations. 
Thus, we complemented the information gathered from the questionnaires 
 







(representing the subjective data) with organizations' financial statements obtained 
from SABI Informa Database, the most important source of business, accounting and 
financial information in Spain. Unfortunately, we had to drop 46 firms from our final 
sample as they did not have full information available (i.e., they did not possess both 
subjective and objective data). Eventually, this sample embraced full information from 
137 firms (representing a valid response rate of 14.45%).  
Among them, 57.66% were family firms, whereas 42.34% were not – which 
represented a fairly close percentage to our original sample of 1000 organizations. 
However, for the sake of completeness we developed a comparison t-test between 
them which did not show significant differences among both groups (p < .05) (full 
analyses can be requested from the authors). Additional verifications about the final 
sample were accomplished. Thus, we also performed other comparison t-tests between 
early and late respondents and between the sectorial distribution of the original and 
final sample. Similarly, no significant differences were perceived between both groups 
either (p < .05) (analyses available from the authors on request). Likewise, we tested for 
residuals behavior, linearity among variables and existence of collinearity between 
them in order to test the veracity of our analyses. No significant problems were 
observed in any of the preceding categories (full analyses are available from the 
authors upon request). 
In addition, we checked the validity of our subjective data (i.e., the one obtained 
by questionnaires) comparing it with the objective information obtained through the 
SABI Informa database. Consequently, potential common method variance20 problems 
associated with the collection of information from single informants were minimized to 
the extent possible. Moreover, to avoid that variance of our data was attributable to our 
measurement methods we mostly used independent and straightforward variables 
(e.g., TMT diversity, TMT average age, TMT educational level, etc.). Therefore, any 




                                                             
20 A most exhaustive definition of the controls for common method variance executed along the 
investigations of this dissertation may be found in Chapter 7. 
 








Dependent variable: ‘Firm’s financial strength’ 
Fama and French (1996) stress the importance of the equity ratio in measuring 
firm value. In particular, this ratio measures the company’s degree of financial leverage 
by dividing a company’s total liabilities by its stockholders' equity. Thus, it indicates 
the proportion of the total assets that are financed by stockholders, as opposed to 
creditors. That is to say, a low equity ratio would produce good results for 
stockholders as long as the company earns a rate of return on assets greater than the 
interest rate paid to creditors. Following these authors, several research has also 
measure firm value using this financial ratio along the literature (e.g., Amit & 
Villalonga, 2014; Jain & Shao, 2015; Mishra & McConaughy, 1999; Thomsen & 
Pedersen, 2000; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
Such ratio is similar to the Tobin’s Q: another indicator of the value of the 
company – although much complex – which is obtained from the division of the 
economic value in the market of the assets invested by the firm and the price to replace 
said assets (Villalonga & Amit, 2006) and which has also been used by several scholars 
such as Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990), among others. Indeed, 
Chung and Pruitt (1994) found that the equity ratio may act as proxy of the Tobin’s Q 
as it explains at least 96.6 percent of the variability of the latter. In particular, Tobin’s Q 
requires arbitrary assumptions about depreciation and inflation rates which sometimes 
are difficult to reach. Moreover, in this indicator the value of the assets is calculated as 
the product of the share price at fiscal year-end times the number of common shares 
outstanding which may also be the cause of some difficulties. For firms with multiple 
classes of tradable shares, the procedure is the same for each class of stock and only 
requires adding the market value of all classes (Nenova, 2003; Zingales, 1995). 
However, the problem appears for firms with multiple share classes, including at least 
one class that is not publicly traded. This approach, which is also used in Gompers et 
al. (2004), multiplies the total shares outstanding of all classes by the share price of the 
tradable shares while the non-tradable shares are multiplied by an average price per 
share related to the rest of tradable shares. Another option proposed by Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) would consist of ignoring the shares outstanding of all non-tradable classes 
and therefore valuing these shares at zero. The two alternatives disregard aspects that 
 







could modify the final market value of the assets of a firm. Furthermore in our sample 
a high percentage of the organizations are not publicly traded which would make more 
complex this calculation. 
Consequently, in this study we will not use Tobin’s Q to measure firm value but 
we will stick with equity ratio measurements. In particular, we will use the Finance 
MORE ratio, an equity ratio (among the many available in the literature) which is 
commonly used by scholars and practitioners in order to determine the financial 
situation or financial strength of a company as it includes predictions of yield spreads, 
financial  leverage and other relevant accounting information (Campbell & Taksler, 
2003). This ratio, which was obtained by SABI Informa Database (Bureau Van Dijk), the 
most important source of business, accounting and financial information in Spain, 
provides a scale from D to AAA (D, C, CC, CCC, B, BB, BBB, A, AA, AAA), where D 
represents the highest risk (or lower financial strength) and AAA the lowest (or higher 
financial strength). Several scholars have sometimes assembled these categories in four 
main groups: companies at risk (D, C, CC), vulnerable companies (CCC, B), risk-
balanced companies (BB, BBB) and healthy companies (A, AA, AAA). Nonetheless, as 
our study aims to achieve the richer information as possible and we have access to 
such fine-grained data, we will use a pure measurement of the variable. Additionally, 
to be able to operate with this variable we made a simple transformation of their 
categories into quantitative values, where: D = ‘100’; C = ‘200’; CC = ‘300’; CCC = ‘400’; 
B = ‘500’; BB = ‘600’; BBB = ‘700’; A = ‘800’; AA = ‘900’; and AAA = ‘1000’. Likewise, as 
previously mentioned in the theory and hypotheses section, in this study we are 
interested in analyzing the effect of family ownership on firm’s financial strength 
during the last non-munificent period suffered by the economy and, more concretely, 
during the years 2009 and 2010: which have been established by both economists and 
scholars as the years where the crisis reached its greatest virulence. Accordingly, we 
will take these years as reference of our investigation by calculating its average. Thus, 
for instance, whether financial strength for firm A in 2009 is ‘900’ and ‘800’ in 2010, we 
will allocate an average financial strength of 850 to this company during the 2009-2010 
period. Meanwhile, whether financial strength for company B in 2009 is ‘700’ and ‘700’ 
in 2010, we will assign an average financial strength of 700 to this firm for the 2009-
2010 time span. 
 







Independent variable: ‘Family ownership’ 
Literature does not agree about how to define ‘family ownership’ (Chrisman et 
al., 2005). Hence, scholars should start their research with a common definition of 
family ownership (or/and a classification system consistent with that definition) in 
order to be able to distinguish every particular type of family businesses that is present 
in their studies (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999). Traditional definitions of family 
businesses have been rather fragmented, paying attention to some different 
components of a family involvement in the business such as ownership, governance, 
management, and transgenerational succession (Chua et al., 1999). As a consequence, 
scholars have had serious problems making these components precise and attempting 
to reconcile them in their investigations. One illustration of this situation may be 
observed in the fact that these definitions lack a theoretical basis for explaining why 
and how each component reflects different behaviors and outcomes in family vs non-
family firms (Klein et al., 2005).  
The observation that firms with ‘similar’ family involvement may or may not be 
considered family or non-family firms (due to the existence of those imprecise 
components), and that scholars’ views may change over time, yielded that some 
scholars tried to define family businesses theoretically. Two approaches stand out 
mainly: the involvement approach and the essence approach. The involvement approach is 
based implicitly on the belief that family involvement is sufficient to consider a firm a 
family business. Meanwhile, the essence approach is based on the belief that family 
involvement is a necessary but insufficient condition; hence, family involvement must 
be directed toward behaviors that produce certain distinctiveness before a firm can be 
considered a family firm. In other words, two firms with the same extent of family 
involvement may not both be identified as family businesses if one of them lacks the 
intention, vision, ‘familiness’, and/or behavior that constitute the essence of a family 
business. Therefore, to consider an organization as a family firm, this approach 
established four main spots: (1) a family influence over the strategic direction of a firm 
(Davis & Tagiuri, 1989); (2) an intention of the family to keep control (Litz, 1995); (3) a 
family firm behavior (Chua et al., 1999); and (4) a unique, inseparable, synergistic 
resources and capabilities arising from family involvement and interactions 
(Habbershon et al., 2003). In a similar way, a more recent research from Astrachan et al. 
 







(2002) proposed that the extent to which a firm may be identified as a family business 
should be determined by how family involvement is used to influence the business. 
Thus, these authors developed and validated a scale to measure this involvement as a 
continuous variable rather than as a dichotomous one – as previous authors did (Klein 
et al., 2005).  
Particularly, in this study we do not use a continuous variable to measure such 
family involvement but a single-dummy variable. However, we totally intend to move 
away from a simple differentiation between companies that have family members 
within its governing body and firms which not. To do so, before answering this 
question on the survey we provided a full definition of what a family firm means 
according to previous paragraph insights to the CEO of the company. Specifically, we 
selected this actor to provide information about the degree of belonging of the 
organization to a family business as the CEO of the firm is usually considered central, 
well-informed and experienced enough to hold truthful and relevant information 
about the composition, structures and strategies followed by the organization (Arendt 
et al., 2005; Priem, 1994). Afterwards, they were asked to categorize their corporations 
as a: 1 = firm with ‘family ownership’; and 0 = firm with ‘non-family ownership’. 
 
Moderator variables: ‘Diversification’, ‘Internationalization’, ‘TMT educational 
level’ and ‘TMT average age’ 
Consistent with prior research, the ‘internationalization’ of an organization was 
operationalized as the ratio of the foreign sales to total sales (e.g., Tallman & Li, 1996 
among others). However, along the literature this variable has been measured through 
different ways (Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999; Ramaswamy et al., 1996; Sullivan, 1994). 
For instance, Sullivan (1994) claimed for the use of a multidimensional measure 
consisting of five elaborated items. Meanwhile, Ramaswamy et al. (1996) underlined 
serious doubts on the latter measure based on problems with content validity and 
reliability. In turn, Ramaswamy et al. (1996) argued for the use of single-item 
measures, whereas Tallman and Li (1996) advocated for simply including the number 
of countries in which the firm operates to measure this variable. Despite the existence 
of all these options, in our study we followed research mainstream and measured 
‘internationalization’ as a simple ratio of the foreign sales to total sales. Additionally we 
 







did so due to data availability limitation and for the aim of comparison with other 
studies. 
Following precedent research, firm’s ‘diversification’ was operationalized as the 
number of business the organization was involved in (e.g., Khanna & Palepu, 2000). As 
highlighted in the literature, we prevented that individual firms within a group 
appeared to be singularly undiversified asking directly to the firm’s CEO for the 
number of additional businesses of the organization (excluding the main business). In 
fact, it is notable to know that diversification is not synonymous with the number of 
firms within a group as usually there can be several firms (of that group) which belong 
to the same industry/ies or category/ies. As far as possible, these responses where 
validated through the objective information obtained from SABI database. In the 
literature there are some other diversification measures such as the Herfindahl index 
(Tallman & Li, 1996), the entropy measure (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985), 
and the concentric measure (Caves et al., 1980). However, for data availability 
constraints and clearness purposes we chose to apply the simplest measure, i.e., a 
simply count of the number of firms in different industries. 
‘TMT educational level’ was defined as the average of TMT members (including 
CEO) who had higher educational studies. We categorized managers into two different 
educational levels as follows: 0 = ‘non-university studies’; 1 = ‘university studies or higher 
ones’. Afterwards, a percentage of the TMT members with a minimum of university 
studies level was created. As may be observed in upper-echelons literature, there is not a 
unique and universal way of measuring this variable and therefore, some other studies 
have categorized the educational level of management members using different scales. 
For instance, Wally and Becerra (2001) used three educational levels: 1 = ‘university 
degree or less’; 2 = ‘master’s degree’; and 3 = ‘Ph.D.’. Meanwhile Herrmann and Datta 
(2005) established a seven-point scale: 1 = ‘high school’; 2 = ‘some college’; 3 = 
‘undergraduate degree’; 4 = ‘some graduate school’; 5 = ‘master’s degree’; 6 = ‘attended 
doctoral programme’; and 7 = ‘doctorate’. On the same vein, Chen et al. (2010) also 
suggested a seven-point scale, although with some dissimilarities from the prior one: 1 
= ‘elementary school’; 2 = ‘junior high school’; 3 = ‘high school’; 4 = ‘2-year college’; 5 = ‘4-
year university’; 6 = ‘master degree’; and 7 = ‘Ph.D’. degree. In this study, we measured 
TMT educational level distinguishing (just) among university and non-university 
 







studies for data restrictions and because, from a conceptual approach, we were just 
interested in differentiating between those two main groups. 
Concerning ‘TMT average age’, this variable was measured as the average 
number of age of the organization’s TMT members (e.g., Herrmann & Datta, 2005). To 
do so, at the questionnaire the CEO directly answered to the question: “indicate the 
TMT average age of the TMT (including CEO)”. 
 
Control variables 
CEOs are usually the central actor in decision-making processes within 
medium-sized firms. Nevertheless, CEOs unusually act alone. Most of them actively 
interact with other members of their decision-making team (or TMT) in order to 
pinpoint the situation, forecast results, assess threats and opportunities that they face, 
etc., and plan future actions (Hambrick, 1994; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Tang & 
Crossan, 2016).  
Hence, in our analyses we include control variables at this (managerial-) level. 
Prior scholars have also shown that organizational internal forces (e.g., political 
structures, inertia, sunk costs, firm’s prior results, etc.) and external ones (e.g., entry 
and exit barriers in industries, features of the sector, competitors and suppliers’ 
reactions, etc.) may limit the ability of firms to adapt themselves to the existing hostile 
and changing environment. Therefore, according to these studies, company- and 
industrial-level factors are considered as a control variables (i.e., at a company- and 
industry-level) as they will be able to affect current strategic actions and performance 
(e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Lant et al., 1992; Tushman et al., 1986).  
Organization decisions are complex by definition as they are influenced by 
multiple actors. However, in line with other scholars we argue that the TMT (together 
with the CEO) will be ultimately responsible for firm’s strategic decision-making 
(Arendt et al., 2005; Tang & Crossan, 2016). Thereby, TMT composition will affect 
decisions and in turn, firm’s long-term performance (Hoffmann et al., 2016). Thus, at 
the managerial-level we particularly control for ‘TMT functional diversity’ and ‘TMT 
educational diversity’. ‘TMT functional diversity’, i.e., the variety of job related knowledge 
derived from different functional experiences, is taken into account due to the basic 
assumption of research on TMT functional background: “team members with 
 







backgrounds and experience in different functional areas bring different but 
complementary knowledge and expertise to their teams” (Bunderson, 2003, p. 458). 
Therefore, functional background is expected to influence TMT problem solving, 
decision-making processes and organization performance in the sense of improving the 
access to external information and the attentiveness to various environmental sectors 
(Aguilar, 1967; Daft et al., 1988). For its part, ‘TMT educational diversity’, usually 
established as an indicator of the variety of skills, cognitive processes and basic 
knowledge embedded in a managerial team (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Boeker, 1997; 
Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) may also influence the relationship between family 
ownership and firm’s financial strength. Educational diversity enhances the knowledge 
base, cognitive abilities and overall problem-defining and problem-solving skills of the 
group (Bunderson, 2003; Hambrick et al., 1996). In addition, TMT educational 
heterogeneity may help to better study the industry environment, assess the strengths 
of the firms, and weigh the pros and cons of strategies (Olson et al., 2006). 
At the company-level we control for the ‘size of the organization’, ‘age of the 
organization’ and ‘prior financial strength’ due to these variables also might influence the 
organization’s economic situation. We account for ‘size of the organization’ (measured as 
operating income) because of larger organizations might have more organizational 
slack to engage in exploratory activities (Lavie et al., 2010) and to better analyze 
processes of change (Boeker, 1997). Moreover, literature claims that big-sized firms are 
generally more efficient than small-sized ones (Lo & Lu, 2006). Thus, we control for the 
size of the company as it may positively modify future organizational financial 
strength. For its part, ‘age of the organization’ (years that the organization has been 
functioning) is included as prior literature has tested that this variable might have a 
negative influence on the likelihood of strategic changes (e.g., Sánchez-Peinado et al., 
2010). Moreover, similar research has found that organizational age will be closely 
related to consolidated and unalterable routines (Hannan & Freeman, 1989), situations 
of inertia (Freeman & Boeker, 1984), and limitation of the capacity to adapt to 
environmental changes (Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Sánchez-Peinado et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, we control for this variable as it may negatively affect the financial 
situation of a firm. Finally, ‘prior financial strength’ (preceding economic status of the 
firm) is also taken into account due to its potential connectedness with the future one. 
 







Earlier research states the notion that prior resources or slack can be used to engage in 
search behavior and to pursue strategic changes which could improve firm’s long-term 
situation (Daniel et al., 2004). In fact, Cyert and March (1963) argue that slack fulfills 
both a stabilizing and adaptive role by absorbing environmental variability. 
Eventually, at the industry-level, we incorporate ‘industry innovation intensity’ 
(i.e., firm’s R&D expenses divided by its sales) to seize industry’s average degree of 
innovation. We capture this variable as a proxy of environmental dynamism, as this 
closely relates to survival and competitiveness in a particular sector (Covin & Slevin, 
1989). In other words, the dynamism or hostility of an environment will characterize 
the competence, technological, social, political and economic uncertainty, business 




The means, standard deviations and correlations for all variables included in 
the analyses can be found in Table 7 (see below). Our hypotheses of the effects of 
family ownership, firm’s context of activity and TMT’s characteristics on organization’s 
financial strength were tested using multiple hierarchical regressions (see below, Table 
8). Variables were centered (re-expressed as mean deviations) before interaction terms 
were generated. Interaction analysis using the centering procedure is preferable to 
simpler analyses, because it yields readily interpretable coefficients that are relatively 
free of multicollinearity. However, we also checked for the presence of 
multicollinearity in our analyses finding variation inflation factors (VIF) less than 5 for 
all the parameters (analyses available from the authors on request). 
 
 







Table 7. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Measures Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
Dependent variable               
1. Firm’s financial strength  579.08  139.59  1.00            
 
Independent variable               
2. Family ownership  .6000  .4920 – .104  1.00           
 
Moderators               
3. Internationalization  36.14  29.95 – .251* – .076  1.00          
4. Diversification  3.03  2.28 – .095 – .220*  .075  1.00         
5. TMT educational level  70.09  42.16  .064 – .069  .078  .095  1.00        
6. TMT average age  42.54  6.36  .029 – .064  .175  .191 – .135  1.00       
 
Control variables               
7. Size of the organization  31820.67  72234.13  .461**  .066 – .011  .378**  .209**  .140  1.00      
8. Age of the organization  37.20  28.18 – .027  .271**  .153 – .011  .088  .286** – .023  1.00     
9. Prior financial strength  620.35  134.03  .412** – .116 – .291* – .218*  .063 – .028  .400** – .009  1.00    
10. Industry innovation intensity  1.22  .7736  .032 – .053  .071  .190  .239***  .021  .041  .008  .058  1.00   
11. TMT functional diversity  .7375  .1203  .064 – .003 – .183 – .054 – .001  .050  .003  .159  .059  .185**  1.00  
12. TMT educational diversity  .3765  .2283 – .031 – .152  .063  .012  .370**  .056  .142 – .056 – .244*  .120  .003  1.00 
 
 
N = 137 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed) 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 







4.4.1. Hypotheses tests 
Model 1 (Table 8) includes control variables only. These results appear to 
highlight that firm’s financial strength will be higher in bigger organizations (B = .392; 
p < .05), in organizations with prior elevated financial condition (B = .452; p < .05) and 
in organizations which hold higher levels of TMT functional diversity (B = .188; p < .1). 
These findings are not surprising but follow patterns of expected results. Thus, larger 
organizations are argued to be more efficient than small-sized ones (Lo & Lu, 2006) and 
to dispose of more slack that will allow them to both engage in more exploratory 
activities (Lavie et al., 2010) and to better analyze processes of change (Boeker, 1997). 
Meanwhile, prior positive financial strength is argued to increase the availability of 
resources by an organization, therefore providing certain slack (Daniel et al., 2004) that 
could be used to boost the adaptability and long-term situation of the firm (Cyert & 
March, 1963; Daniel et al., 2004). Finally, organizations with more TMT functional 
diversity are associated to a better information processing, problem solving, width of 
perspectives and accuracy of assessments (Aguilar, 1967; Daft et al., 1988; Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1993). As a consequence, we may establish that the financial strength of a 
company will be likely increased in the presence of these variables.  
In Model 2 we include the variable ‘family ownership’, too. With this, we 
evaluate the effect of family involvement in the organization on firm’s financial 
strength. Our results indicate that there is a direct positive significant effect (B = .243; p 
< .05) of this variable on organization’s financial strength. Hence, we are able to 
support our baseline hypothesis or hypothesis 1 (H1). As we further argue in the 
discussion section, this supposition is closely related to the distinct functioning that 
family firms have from non-family ones and in particular to the self-consideration of 
the former as an asset to pass on to succeeding generations, instead of a temporary 
income provider (Casson, 1999). In other words, family firms will not be only a source 
of income but also a context for family activity and embodiment of its pride and 
identity (Meyer & Zucker, 1989), which will make them invest more efficiently 
(Gimeno et al., 1997) and employ financing forms with low probabilities of default 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003). 
In Model 3, ‘internationalization’, ‘diversification’, ‘TMT educational level’ and 
‘TMT average age’ are introduced. None of these variables shows a marginally 
 







significant effect on firm’s financial strength though. However, the variable ‘family 
ownership’ keeps its direct positive significant effect showed in Model 2 (B = .266; p < 
.05), suggesting that during periods of economic crisis family firms’ prospects will be 
crucial to determine the financial status of a firm, contrarily to the organization’s scope 
of operation or the characteristics of its key-role players. Although we did not formally 
hypothesize such effects this is not surprising given the maximization of the long-term 
orientation showed by these firms (Stein, 1988). Put differently, Model 3 indicates that 
despite the (individual effect of the) context where the firm operates or the 
characteristics of its management team, family firms’ inherent characteristics will 
overcome any other circumstances when explaining variations in firms' financial 
performance (Minichilli et al., 2010). 
 
Table 8. Results of linear regression analysis 
 








Controls         
Size of the organization  .392**  .350**  .322  .414** 
Age of the organization  .132  .045  .060  .175 
Prior financial strength  .452**  .547***  .558***  .487** 
Industry innovation intensity  .076  .123  .171  .182 
TMT functional diversity  .188*  .279***  .299**  .354*** 
TMT educational diversity – .013  .057  .092  .168 
 
Main effect     
Family ownership   .243**  .266**  1.345 
 
Moderators     
Diversification    .033 – .049 
Internationalization   – .106 – .108 
TMT educational level   – .026 – .516** 
TMT average age    .006  .136 
 
Interaction terms     
Family ownership * Internationalization    – .009 
Family ownership * Diversification    – .086 
Family ownership * TMT educational 
 
    .781** 
Family ownership * TMT average age    – 1.719* 
 
 
R2  .541  .578  .588  .651 
Adjusted R2  .495  .531  .508  .562 
R2 change  .541***  .037**  .010  .063** 
F-value  16.221***  16.526***  9.826***  9.547*** 
 
 
N = 137 
Dependent variable: Firm’s financial strength 
Standardized coefficients are shown; *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (one-tailed) 
 
 











In Model 4, we test for the interaction effect of ‘internationalization’, 
‘diversification’, ‘TMT educational level’ and ‘TMT average age’ with the variable 
‘family ownership’ on organization’s financial strength. With this, we intend to 
interpret and contextualize H1. Our results, however, indicate that there is no 
conditional significant effect between the first two interactions (‘family 
ownership’*‘internationalization’ and ‘family ownership’*‘diversification’) and the 
firm’s financial condition. Hence, we are not able to support hypotheses 2 and 3. This 
would denote that the context where the firm is embedded does not affect family firms’ 
longer outlook for survival (and therefore their financial strength). Several 
argumentations may be made for explaining these findings. For instance, we illustrate 
that the high cost to undertake both strategies could generate a neutral influence on 
firm’s financial strength (Wagner, 2004), therefore generating a non-significant effect 
for these interactions. In the discussion section, we extensively come back to this matter 
providing further potential explanations for these results. 
In hypothesis 4 (H4) we anticipated that TMT educational level would 
negatively moderate the existing relationship between family ownership and firm’s 
financial strength. However, our results show a significant positive interaction effect (B 
= .781; p < .05; Table 8, Model 4). Nonetheless, before stating that our hypothesis is not 
supported we must represent graphically this interaction (Preacher et al., 2006). Thus, 
by means of Figure 9 (see below) we plot the effect of family ownership on firm’s 
financial strength for high versus low TMT educational levels (note that high and low 
refers to mean +/- one standard deviation in Figure 9). 
Figure 9 shows that the slope of the relationship between family ownership and 
firm’s financial strength is less pronounced for TMTs with low educational levels than 
for TMTs with high educational levels. From this observarion we may make four 
points. First, we can assume that the interaction of family firms with the level of 
education of the TMT acts as a better predictor of firm’s financial strength than the sole 
family ownership. This leads us to point two, through which we may understand the 
reason of the positive significant interaction obtained in Model 4 (Table 8) as the slope 
for highly educated TMTs is steeper than for low ones. Third, and focusing our 
attention on the difference among TMTs with high educational levels (represented 
with a dotted line) and low educational levels (represented with a continuous line), we 
 







may perceive that the first ones will generate lower levels of financial strength. As a 
consequence, H4 would be supported. Finally, Figure 9 also helps to corroborate H1 – 
where we stated that family firms had greater levels of financial strength than non-
family firms; and our prior argumentations of Model 3 (Table 8) – where we suggested 
that family firms’ prospects would be crucial to determine the financial status of a firm 
despite the specific features hold by the organization. The former may be observed by 
the existing divergence between the left (non-family firms) and right part (family 
firms) of Figure 9. Meanwhile, the latter is depicted by the lack of differences showed 
between family firms with high vs low TMT educational levels (see right part of Figure 
9).  
 
Figure 9. The interaction of TMT educational level and family ownership on firm’s 
financial strength 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
 
These results become even more evident in Figure 10 (see below), which 
basically delineates the same interaction but for more ‘extreme’ values of TMT 
educational level (i.e., mean +/- two standard deviations). 
  
 







Figure 10. The interaction of extreme values of TMT educational level and family 
ownership on firm’s financial strength 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
 
To more systematically and comprehensively assess this interaction effect, in 
the present study we applied the Johnson-Neyman technique. In particular, the use of 
this technique allows defining the regions in which the coefficient of family ownership 
is significantly positive or negative, conditional upon the educational level of the TMT 
(see Preacher et al., 2007). Hence, we achieve to obtain a different approach to simple 
slopes captured by Figure 9 and 10. Figure 11 (see below) plots the conditional effect 
for the whole range of our moderating variable – TMT educational level – with a 95%-
confidence band (full analyses are available from the authors upon request). Note that 
for this analysis, we standardized all variables. Consequently, the interaction effect will 
be significant when the confidence intervals (represented by the dotted lines in Figure 
11) are either both above or both below zero – the former representing a positive 
conditional effect and the latter a negative one. To facilitate its understanding we have 
drawn a vertical line representing the boundary of the region in which the interaction 
coefficient turns significant (at the .05-level). 
Based on the Johnson-Neyman technique, it appears that family ownership has 
a positive effect on firm’s financial strength for managers who have high educational 
levels. Additionally, this positive effect seems to be the only significant range for the 
interaction as the conditional effect turns insignificant (at the .05-level) when TMT 
 








educational level reaches the value 44,62 (for the standardized variable). Hence, Figure 
11 would suggest that only high TMT educational levels (as opposed to moderate or 
low levels of this variable) would act as (positive) moderators for the relationship 
between family ownership and firm’s financial strength.  
 


















Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
 
These results do nothing but complement the ones obtained previously. Thus, 
the findings obtained through the Johnson-Neyman technique suggest that in the 
presence of an elevated educational level, the fact of being a family firm will have a 
positive significant effect on firm’s financial strength. In other words, among managers 
with higher educational levels, the financial strength obtained by family firms will be 
greater than the ones obtained by non-family firms, i.e., there will be significant 
differences among them. In particular, we argue that these differences will be given by 
family firms’ inherent prospects to invest more efficiently (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; 













































on debt (Jensen, 1986), look for a higher continuity of the firm (Gimeno et al., 1997), etc. 
which would reduce the negative effect over firm’s financial strength promoted by 
highly educated managers in non-financial firms. Nevertheless this conjecture is not 
something new, but statistically confirms what Figure 9 and 10 previously represented 
such as a steeper slope for highly educated TMTs. In the discussion section, we will 
extensively come back to this matter in order to better understand the effects shown by 
this conditional interaction. 
In hypothesis 5 (H5) we prognosticated that the average age of the managerial 
team would positively moderate the existing relationship between family ownership 
and firm’s financial strength. Nevertheless and oppositely to what proposed in this 
hypothesis, we find a marginally significant negative interaction effect (B = -1.719; p < 
.1; Table 8, Model 4). However, and as we did with the prior case, we will represent 
graphically this interaction effect to facilitate its interpretation and check its impact. We 
do so through Figure 12 (see below). Here we plot the effect of family ownership on 
firm’s financial strength for high versus low levels of TMT average age (note that high 
and low refers to mean +/- one standard deviation in Figure 12). 
 















Figure 12 shows that the slope of the relationship between family ownership and 
firm’s financial strength is less pronounced for TMTs with higher levels of average age 
than for TMTs with lower levels of this variable. Similarly to what we did with the 
previous moderation analysis, from this observation we will be able to make four 
points. First, we can assume that the interaction of family firms with the average age of 
the TMT acts as a better predictor of firm’s financial strength than the sole family 
ownership. Second, we may then comprehend the roots of the negative significant 
interaction obtained in Model 4 (Table 8) as the slope for ‘older’ TMTs is less positive 
than for ‘younger’ ones. In the third place, we may also identify that ‘older’ managers 
(represented with a dotted line) will generate higher levels of financial strength than 
managers with lower average age (represented with a continuous line) – note that due 
to the nature of both characteristics (TMT educational level and TMT average age), this 
situation will be just contrary to the one obtained for high vs low educational levels of 
TMTs. As a consequence, H5 would be supported. Eventually, through Figure 12 we 
will be also able to confirm what H1 and Model 3 (Table 8) advocated. H1 stated that 
family firms had greater levels of financial strength than non-family firms. This may be 
observed by the existing divergence between the left (non-family firms) and right part 
(family firms) of Figure 12. Meanwhile, in Model 3 (Table 8) we determined that family 
firms’ prospects would be decisive to outline the financial status of a firm despite the 
specific features hold by the organization. In this case, the lack of differences depicted 
among family firms with high vs low levels of TMT average age (see right part of 
Figure 12) help to support this assumption.  
In parallel to the analysis of the previous interaction, here we also applied the 
Johnson-Neyman technique with the aim of better understanding this conditional 
effect (see Preacher et al., 2007). Nevertheless, this statistical analysis showed no 
significant areas for the whole range of the moderating variable (full analyses are 
available from the authors upon request). This result is not surprising since if we look 
at the outcome provided by Model 4 (Table 8), we may observe that the interaction 
among these variables is ‘just’ marginally significant (B = -1.719; p < .1). Hence, the use 
of Johnson-Neyman technique would do nothing but enrich our analysis helping us to 
understand the weakness presented by this conditional effect. 
 
 







4.4.2. Additional analyses and robustness checks 
To further explore our results, we performed some additional analyses and 
robustness checks. In the first place, it could be proposed that some of the control 
variables used in our study, such as TMT functional diversity and TMT educational 
diversity, could be also considered as moderators of our model. In fact, our empirical 
findings provide initial partial support for this reasoning, as evidenced by the positive 
and significant correlation existing between TMT educational level and TMT 
educational diversity (.370; p < .05; Table 7). To explore this possibility, we redid our 
analyses. Firstly, we tested whether TMT functional diversity and TMT educational 
diversity presented more powerful marginal effects as moderator variables than TMT 
educational level and TMT average age. To do so, we exchanged both groups of variables 
establishing TMT educational level and TMT average age as control variables, while 
TMT functional diversity and TMT educational diversity were allocated as moderator 
variables. Our results, however, showed that although family ownership kept its direct 
positive significant effect on financial strength (B =.266; p < .05), no significant 
conditional effects were found in this model. This implies that TMT functional 
diversity and TMT educational diversity will generate better outcomes placed as 
control variables, otherwise partially distorting family firm’s conditional effects on 
firm’s financial strength (analyses available from the authors on request). Additionally, 
the use of TMT functional diversity and TMT educational diversity as moderators of 
our model diminished the robustness of our analysis (from an adjusted R2 of .562 to 
.476), therefore confirming the prevalence of our original model.  
Secondly, and based on the existing significant correlation between TMT 
educational level and TMT educational diversity someone could argue that both variables 
could be exchanged. To evaluate this situation, we placed TMT educational diversity as 
moderator of our model, while TMT educational level was allocated as a control 
variable. Similarly, our results showed a positive effect of family ownership on 
financial strength (B = .222; p < .05). Meanwhile, no significant conditional effect was 
found over TMT educational diversity (and, neither over internationalization and 
diversification). For its part, TMT average age kept its marginally negative effect (B = -
1.995; p < .05). Moreover, the exchange of these variables was also found to reduce the 
robustness of our model (from an adjusted R2 of .562 to .515). Therefore, we may also 
 







confirm the prevalence of our original model in this situation (full analyses can be 
requested from the authors). 
Thirdly, we evaluated our default model removing TMT educational level and 
placing TMT educational diversity instead (as a moderator variable). We did so to check 
whether the correlation level between TMT educational level and TMT educational 
diversity generated negative effects on our analysis, and therefore promoted less 
powerful results. Nonetheless, we anticipated that the relatively low level of 
correlation between both variables (.370; p < .05; Table 7) would not be worrisome, as 
several authors such as Frost (2013) had previously stated that only values over .7 
could be considered as dangerous. The results obtained supported these assumptions. 
Thus, they did not show relevant differences from the findings that we have just 
showed in the prior paragraph. In this way, family ownership was found to maintain 
its significance (B = .222; p < .05), while no significant conditional effect was found over 
TMT educational diversity (and, neither over internationalization and diversification). 
Meanwhile, TMT average age also hold a marginally negative effect (B = -1.989; p < .1). 
Additionally, the representativeness of the model was similarly found to be reduced as 
its adjusted R2 went down from .562 to .525 (full analyses can be requested from the 
authors). Despite these results and to further dig into this matter, we redid our analysis 
just removing TMT educational diversity from the group of control variables (i.e., TMT 
educational level was kept as moderator variable of our model). Our results showed a 
similar pattern of results than in prior scenario (analyses available from the authors on 
request). Hence, this again substantiated the strength and adequacy of our variables 
used. 
 
In order to check for the robustness of our findings we evaluated the 
appropriateness of the span of time covered by our dependent variable (analyses 
available from the authors on request). In particular, as mentioned in the theory and 
hypotheses section, in our study we chose to assess firm’s financial strength as an 
average of the years 2009-2010. We did so and did not take economic fortitude of a 
single year (e.g., 2009 or 2010) for two main argumentations. First, because both years 
have been jointly considered as a turning point of the Spanish (and international) crisis 
by many scholars and international reports (Acharya, 2009; Instituto de la Empresa 
 







Familiar, 2015; International Monetary Fund, 2009). And second, because single-year 
assessment could contain specific variations which could affect to the veracity and 
feasibility of our research. Nevertheless, despite these concerns and for the sake of 
robustness, we executed two independent regressions where firm’s financial strength 
was estimated both in 2009 and 2010. Although in the same line, the results obtained 
here were slightly less convincing than the reported ones in Table 8 – which is not 
surprising given the previously mentioned specificities among single-year assessments. 
For instance, this may be observed in the results achieved when using firm’s financial 
strength for the year 2009 as a dependent variable and regressing family ownership on 
it: B = .130; p < .05 (vs prior results: B = .243; p < .05). Regarding the moderator 
variables, we similarly found less powerful results in this model. Hence, for example, 
when using firm’s financial strength for the year 2009 as a dependent variable, the 
moderation effect of TMT educational level was found to present a lower effect both in 
effect size and significance level as compared with the reported one (B = .610; p < .1 vs 
prior results: B = .781; p < .05). Thus, we may affirm that poorer results would be 
obtained by using single-year analyses. 
Likewise, resembling evaluation was carried out by assessing firm’s financial 
strength as an average of the years 2012-2013. We did so due to, specifically, this period 
of time has been repeatedly considered as a second turning point of the Spanish crisis 
by several scholars (e.g., Montesinos et al., 2014) – mostly attributed to internal factors 
such as the housing bubble and the real estate crisis. Hence, it could be argued that the 
effects of family ownership, firm’s context of activity and TMT’s characteristics could 
also have a relevant impact on the financial strength obtained by the organizations of 
our sample in these years. Our findings, however, showed less convincing outcomes as 
compared with the reported ones in Table 8. Thus, for instance, although we still found 
a significant positive effect of family ownership on firm’s financial strength, this effect 
appeared to be less powerful (B = .184; p < .1 vs prior results: B = .243; p < .05). This 
lower strength in the results was even more clarifying when evaluating the moderator 
variables. Here, no significant interaction effects were found. Moreover, this situation 
was supported when analyzing the representativeness of the model which showed an 
adjusted R2 of .293 (vs prior results: adjusted R2 = .562) (full analyses are available from 
the authors upon request). These results would be explained by the existing time 
 







distance about the independent and moderator variables, and the financial strength 
obtained by an organization during the period 2012-2013. Consequently, we may state 
that to better understand the financial situation of the firms during this second period 
of crisis, we should focus our attention on updated values of our variables. 
 
 
4.5. DISCUSSION  
In order to understand family firm’s decision-making, Basco and Pérez-
Rodriguez (2009) state that both the business system and the family system of a family 
firm should be taken into account, because both interact (Habbershon et al., 2003; 
Stafford et al., 1999). Emotions may be present in all types of firms, but are likely to be 
more dominant within family firms (Baron 2008; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). More 
specifically, several studies acknowledge the intermingling of emotional factors 
(originated from family involvement) with business factors as a distinctive attribute of 
family firms that should be taken into account in family firm research (Berrone et al., 
2012; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). Therefore, in this 
chapter, we aimed to contribute to further unravel these specificities of family 
businesses21 analyzing its effect on financial strength and particularly under the last 
financial crisis, which according to several practitioner and scholars reached its most 
virulent peak during 2008 and 2009.  
Using a dataset comprising both archival and questionnaire information of 137 
Spanish medium-sized firms, we found general support for our hypotheses. In 
particular, we found that family ownership positively affected the financial strength 
obtained by an organization during this time lapse. We argue that this finding is in line 
with family firm characteristics and peculiarities such as their more elevated risk 
aversion (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), higher efficiency (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Fama 
& Jensen, 1983), less dependence on debt as a form of financing (Jensen, 1986), will to 
continue in business (Gimeno et al., 1997), prioritization of the objectives of the 
company to the individual (McConaughy, 2000), relevant investment in their firms in 
terms of both financial investment, prestige and human capital (McConaughy et al., 
                                                             
21 Which in Spain, where our dataset belongs to, represent 88.8% of the organizations (Instituto de la 
Empresa Familiar, 2015). 
 







2001), etc. But more generally, to the emotional component of family firms which may 
be reflected in the preservation of the socioemotional wealth that, as previously stated, 
refers to the affective needs such as the ability to exercise family control and the 
perpetuation of the family dynasty (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). In fact, this latter point 
may be reflected by the non-munificent context where our sample is set, therefore 
enhancing the effects of our relationship. 
Additionally, following Hofer and Schendel (1978) and Sharma et al.’s (1997) 
research we argue that considerable understanding could be gained by appending 
strategic management insights on the family firm research approach. In this vein we 
hypothesized that firm internationalization and diversification would influence the 
relationship between family ownership and firm’s financial strength. More specifically, 
we established that these variables would potentially minimize the risk of firms and 
would increase their chances for success due to their access to heterogeneous markets – 
which will provide them bigger opportunities of growth and income (Buch et al., 2014; 
Goetzmann et al., 2005; Moral-Pajares et al., 2015; Sanchez-Bueno & Usero, 2014). 
However, we did not find support for these hypotheses (H3 and H4). Several possible 
explanations may arise from these results. The first one is related to the own 
characteristics of this crisis period (where we test our hypothesis): its global influence. 
Hence, according to International Monetary Fund (2009) this time lapse generated a 
shared crisis in credit, mortgage and trust, high levels of uncertainty, raised variability, 
relative scarcity of all type of resources, fewer strategic options and an environment of 
fierce competition. Consequently, despite operating in diverse businesses, sectors or 
markets, family organizations could not have experienced any difference due to the 
existent economic and financial homogenization during those years.   
The second one could be related to the concept of socioemotional wealth. Thus, 
as family firms have a longer outlook – which imply a more vital vision into firm’s 
intervention (Lee, 2006) –, the presence of non-munificent environments and its 
corresponding negative performance figures could affect their aim of the perpetuation 
of the family dynasty (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Hence, this could cause that these 
firms tried to operate, sooner than later, in other markets such as the international 
ones. However, several scholars have established a negative relationship between 
internationalization speed and firm-level financial performance arguing that the high 
 







cost efficiency generated by this process would potentially cause value destruction 
(Wagner, 2004). Therefore, the interaction of internationalization with family 
ownership could have generated neutral effects on firm’s financial strength 
represented by a non-significant relationship. Similarly, these neutral effects have been 
also reinforced by Schmid et al. (2015) who suggest that founding families have to 
trade off the desire to preserve financial wealth (via diversification or 
internationalization) with the risk of losing control and endangering their 
socioemotional wealth.  
On the other hand, and based on prior literature about upper-echelons theory 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984) we also hypothesized that TMT characteristics, and in 
particular TMT educational level and TMT average age, would influence the 
relationship between family ownership and firm’s financial strength. Upper-echelons 
theorists emphasize the importance of studying the dominant coalition of the 
organization, and specifically its TMT, due to organizational outcomes (both strategies 
and effectiveness) are viewed as reflections of the values and cognitive bases of the 
powerful actors of the organization. Moreover, in the specific context of family firms, 
TMTs are argued to be even more responsible for strategic decisions (e.g., Chua et al., 
1999; Habbershon et al., 2003; Tagiuri & Davis, 1992). Following these propositions, we 
found support for our H4 and H5. Thus, we provided evidence that the level of 
education of the TMT negatively moderated the relationship between family 
ownership and firm’s financial strength during non-munificent periods. Therefore, it 
seems that these actors – which usually possess a better ability to tolerate ambiguity 
(Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), to absorb new ideas (Barker & Mueller, 2002), to generate 
creative solutions to difficult problems (Bantel & Jackson, 1989), to adhere to more 
change and opportunities (Day & Lord, 1992), to opt for less conservative capital 
structures (Herrmann & Datta, 2005) and to be more confident with investments 
(Herrmann & Datta, 2005) – will indeed leverage more, which therefore would 
negatively affect the financial strength presented by their (family) firms. Note that 
this study is set in a non-munificent context, which is characterized by low 
opportunities, high levels of uncertainty and variability, scarcity of resources and 
demand, fierce competition and incremented risk (Acharya, 2009; Instituto de la 
Empresa Familiar, 2015; International Monetary Fund, 2009). Therefore, we anticipate 
 







that the higher leverage shown by these managers (and especially the one dragged 
from the prior benevolent cycle) will have an even more relevant negative effect on the 
current firm’s financial strength. 
Furthermore, based on the results provided by the Johnson-Neyman analysis, 
we found that only relatively high educational levels of TMT (positively) moderated 
such relationship among family ownership and firm’s financial strength. This piece of 
work is rather interesting as complements our prior findings suggesting that when 
managers have low levels of education the relationship of family ownership and firm’s 
financial strength will not be significant. This would suggest that those with little 
training will leverage less, despite belonging to a family or a non-family firm, and for 
that reason, there would not exist significant differences in their firm’s financial 
strength.  
However, when managers are highly educated, the financial strength obtained 
by family firms will be greater than the ones obtained by non-family firms, i.e., there 
will be significant differences among them22. As previously mentioned, we argue that 
such differences could be explained by family firms’ inherent characteristics such as to 
invest more efficiently, take less risk-averse options, rely less on debt, look for a higher 
continuity of the firm, etc. which would reduce the negative effect over firm’s financial 
strength promoted by highly educated managers in non-financial firms. 
Finally, we also found support for our H5 about the positive relationship that 
managerial average age exerts on the relationship between family ownership and 
firm’s financial strength during non-munificent periods. Thus, it appears that the more 
conservative capital structures (Chen et al., 2010), less risk-taken (Barker & 
Mueller, 2002; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), more prudence with their actions and 
behavior (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) and worse ability to organize information 
effectively (Taylor, 1975) presented by these actors will actually generate lower 
leverage which will be translated into a positive effect on the financial strength shown 
by their (family) firms. Note that as with H4, we argue that this study is set in a non-
munificent context and as a consequence of their characteristics this lower leverage 
presented by these actors (and especially the one dragged from the prior benevolent 
                                                             
22 That is to say, this conjecture would statistically confirm what Figure 9 and 10 previously represented 
such as a steeper slope for highly educated TMTs.  
 







cycle) will have an even more relevant positive effect on the current firm’s financial 
strength. 
However, based on the marginally significant effect of this interaction (B = -
1.719; p < .1; Table 8, Model 4), the non-significant results generated by the Johnson-
Neyman technique and the visual exploration of this moderating effect where no clear 
differences were pinpointed among high vs low levels of managerial average age (see 
figure 12) we cannot undoubtedly make assumptions about its interpretation. 
 
4.5.1. Contributions 
With this study, we contribute to the extant literature in several research 
streams. First, we contribute to the family firm literature by denouncing the 
fragmentation that exist on the definition of family business, which difficult the 
replication of studies and the understanding of the implications of every particular 
type of research. More specifically, we show the two main streams that literature has 
followed: the involvement approach and the essence approach, and provide some 
propositions for its reconciliation. Thus, we stand up for measures that collect the 
involvement and influence of the family into the business. Furthermore, we also take 
into account that theoretical issues with respect to defining the concept of family firm 
are still open to debate and therefore, forthcoming research should work in generating 
a more clear and integrative definitions and measurements of family involvement 
which allows differentiating between family and non-family businesses. In the next 
section, we widely come back to this issue to further discuss the limitations of the 
different measures and specify future research avenues. 
Additionally, we also contribute to the family firm literature by assessing 
whether the characteristics and features which define these companies – that have as 
its main exponent the socioemotional wealth – are also maintained during periods of 
economic fluctuation and in particular during the latest economic crisis occurred 
globally in recent years. To our knowledge, no systematic empirical research exists 
addressing this question in the literature. Our results support our assumptions that in 
turn, reinforce that the uniqueness of these firms which comes by its longer outlook for 
the survival of a firm (Lee, 2006), greater conservatism (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), 
higher risk aversion (Meyer & Zucker, 1989) but also due to the particular existing 
 







interplay among individual family members as a family ‘system’ and a business 
‘system’ (e.g., Gersick et al., 1997; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). 
Besides the contributions to family firm literature, the specific context of 
managers within these companies also leads to several adding to the research domain 
based on TMT literature. Since the seminal study of Hambrick and Mason (1984) on the 
upper-echelons perspective, research on TMTs has developed itself into one of the most 
prominent areas in the management research field (Menz, 2012). Furthermore, in the 
particular context of family firms, TMTs are argued to be even more responsible for 
strategic decisions (e.g., Chua et al., 1999; Habbershon et al., 2003; Tagiuri & Davis, 
1992). Between the amount of TMT studies in family firms, most have studied the effect 
of family and non-family member presence in the TMT on several team and firm 
related aspects such as TMT benevolence toward the CEO (Cruz et al., 2010), pay 
dispersion in TMTs (Ensley et al., 2007), entrepreneurial orientation (Sciascia et al., 
2013), firm performance (Ling & Kellermanns, 2010; Minichilli et al., 2010), 
management succession processes (Hershon, 1975), divergences in the psychological 
characteristics among owner-manager (Day, 1980), etc. However, as stated by several 
scholars (e.g., Menz, 2012), TMT research in the context of family firms still remains 
scarce. In this study, we intend to contribute to this matter not so much looking to the 
effects of the composition of the team (which from our understanding has already been 
widely screened) but to the effects of the characteristics of such teams on a firm-level. 
More particularly, we aim to look for the modifications in the results (in our study 
measured by the financial strength) obtained by family firms when one of those 
characteristics is present in the team, i.e., for instance, we argue that family businesses 
that have on average older managers in their teams will generate even higher levels of 
financial strength23 due to its characterized lower intention to leverage. As expected we 
do find support for our results but we also find out that these characteristics (in our 
study TMT average age and TMT educational level) have just a marginal effect among 
family businesses. That is to say, despite the presence of high or low values of these 
TMT characteristics, the financial strength shown by these organizations keeps stable. 
However, within non-family firms, we observe that TMT characteristics do matter in 
                                                             
23 Note that H1 already stated that family firms generate higher levels of financial strength (see results 
section). 
 







affecting organizational outcomes. Consequently, we suggest that family firms’ 
perspectives and idiosyncratic characteristics seem to rule the behavior of these 
organizations, prevailing in this way over different characteristics of their management 
team. 
Finally, we add to the organizational ecology literature which establishes that 
firm discontinuance must be seen only as a consequence of environmental conditions. 
Therefore, just two options are conceived in this research stream. However, following 
Gimeno et al.’s (1997) work we propose to observe this variable as a choice affected by 
several variables instead of as a given external consequence. In particular, we do so by 
the use of firm’s financial strength, that although a proxy of firm value, it may be also 
considered as a pre-determinant of the potential shutdown of an organization (Gimeno 
et al., 1997). Consequently, with this variable we achieve to present a relevant 
improvement for the palette of options and thereby complement the existing literature. 
 
4.5.2. Limitations and future research avenues 
Like any research, ours has limitations that can set the stage for future research 
avenues with the ultimate objective of pushing the field towards more rigor and 
impact.  
First, our results although relevant and significant for the family firm literature, 
must be viewed carefully because we do not properly distinguish between the degree 
of ownership concentration, managerial ownership, and family involvement. 
Therefore, future research is needed in order to fine-grained these results and obtain 
more information upon the degree of these variables in our study. In fact, determining 
whether family involvement affects performance is harder than it appears at first 
glance. Put otherwise, differences in performance between firms where ownership 
control belongs to families and firms where ownership control does not belong to 
families cannot be unequivocally interpreted as being caused by family ownership; 
similarly differences between firms with controlling ownership held by families and 
firms with controlling ownership not held by families, cannot either be interpreted 
(McConaughy et al., 1998). Thus, as previously explained, in order to open the deck of 
results and integrate them, research on this matter should generate similar definitions 
and measures of family ownership which collect the degree of involvement and 
 







influence of the family into the business. This difficulty extends to testing for 
differences caused by family involvement in family firm research which rarely has 
been analyzed in the literature. 
Second, related to the previous point and following Astrachan et al. (2002) 
research, scholars could further analyze the differences between dichotomous and 
continuous way of assessing family involvement within an organization. This idea 
would allow literature to dig into the definition of family businesses and would help to 
clarify an issue that is still open to debate. Differences should be identified and 
explained through both theory and practice. 
Similarly, an interesting trajectory for future research would be to capture the 
drivers of the preservation of such ‘familiness’ (also called socioemotional wealth or 
involvement/influence of the family within the firm) or to examine differences 
between family firms’ characteristics, based on the importance of the preservation of 
such ‘familiness’. Thus, we argue that a more in-depth understanding of the concept 
would increase the explanatory value of family firm-oriented research. 
Family firm research has revealed that family firms represent a highly 
heterogeneous group with different levels of family involvement and emotional 
attachments to the family firm (Berrone et al., 2012). That is to say, ‘familiness’ is 
argued to not be something homogenous. However, within these dissimilarities among 
organizations it has been supposed that each family member hold a relative equal level 
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2014). Recent studies are opposed to this, showing that the 
level of emotional attachment to the family firm differs between family members 
(Berrone et al., 2012) and that even non-family members can also possess strong 
emotional endowments to the family firm (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2014). All this 
suggests what we have already pinpointed in the first point: univariate measures may 
not faithfully represent the reality of family firm’s involvement. However, we argue 
that what truly underlies from this assumption is that different levels of ‘familiness’ 
among members of a firm can result in fundamental differences of opinion about the 
course of action and strategies followed by the firm, and thus increase the likelihood of 
relational tensions that may therefore hamper decision-making. A fruitful research 
avenue would be to test first the existence of these differences; and second to check 
whether the potential friction and conflicts originated from such dissimilarities in 
 







family involvement may actually affect the quality of the decisions made by a TMT. 
Jehn et al. (1999) present incipient evidence for this matter in a study of ninety-two 
work teams of large organizations. In particular, they find that value diversity is 
negatively related to objective team performance measures such as actual group 
performance and group efficiency, and to the affective performance measures 
satisfaction, intention to stay, and commitment.  
A final limitation of our research is its cross-sectional design. Although cross-
sectional designs in this type of research are currently standard practice, claims about 
causality cannot be substantiated with such a method. However, our study focuses on 
interactions which are difficult to explain with reverse causation logic (Cummings, 
2004). We used family ownership to explain the financial strength showed by a firm. 
Thus, we argue that the own characteristics inherent to these type of firms would 
increase the financial position of such firms. The reverse causation logic where the 
decision to become a family firm is derived by the financial strength presented by a 
firm is rather unlikely for obvious reasons, which eases endogeneity concerns.  
In sum, we view the current analysis as illustrative rather than definitive and 
hope to encourage further replication in samples with different width and 

































The purpose of this doctoral dissertation is to gain more insights in the 
decision-making processes and, more particularly, in better understanding how 
managerial decisions are made and in which degree they rely on objective vs 
perceptual indicators. As no decision can be evaluated without its consequences, in this 
research we also intend to unravel the reasons why some organizations have better 
(financial) results than others and, especially, during the last financial crisis occurred 
globally. Based on three independent studies, this dissertation sheds light and fills 
gaps in several literature streams. This final chapter summarizes the empirical findings 
of each independent study and discusses the main theoretical and practical 
contributions. Finally, some important suggestions for future research are outlined.  
 
 
5.2. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Findings of Chapter 2 
The goal of this chapter was to deepen the knowledge upon the intermediate 
hidden mechanisms whereby performance feedback cues generate specific reactions in 
organizations and specifically, to accentuate the relevance of evaluating the effects of 
executives’ perceptions and cognitions in these strategic decision-making processes.  
In particular, we argued that contrary findings found in the literature (Bowen et 
al., 2010; Shinkle, 2012) about performance feedback consequences could be caused due 
to the way scholars have measured this variable, almost fundamentally using objective 
performance figures (Lawrence, 1997; Ocasio, 1997). In fact, we stated that as 
performance feedback theory is essentially a cognitive theory (Labianca et al., 2009; 
Shinkle, 2012), a more comprehensive model of how decision makers assess 
organizational performance and respond to it should go beyond this objective 
assumption. In this sense managerial complacency with firm’s results, a cognitive 
variable which combines the traditional (objective) measurement of performance 
feedback with the CEO’s satisfaction (or perception) with these results, was proposed 
as a better way to collect the reality and the organizational behavior.  
Our findings indicate that managerial complacency presents a negative effect 
on organizational change behavior. Therefore, they confirm that firm’s strategic change 
 







will be enhanced (just) in front of low managerial levels of complacency with 
organizational results, disregarding the sign of the objective performance feedback 
obtained by the firm. Additionally, in this study we also explored some of the 
determinants of managerial complacency finding that TMT functional diversity 
negatively affects this variable; while TMT tenure has a positive effect on the level of 
complacency shown by managers in their evaluations. Overall, by incorporating 
insights from a cognitive approach, this chapter builds upon recent efforts to advance 
performance feedback theory (Greve, 2003). 
 
Findings of Chapter 3  
The objective of this chapter was to also contribute to performance feedback 
literature through a critique of the use of objective cues to determine subsequent 
strategic change.  
Particularly, it proposed to individually consider CEO’s satisfaction with 
performance as a direct measure of performance feedback or ‘attainment discrepancy’ 
(Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2005) instead of using a combination of it with objective 
values. To do this, it was provided a comprehensive theoretical review of the 
significance of managerial satisfaction, its impact and its potential relationship with 
objective measures of performance feedback. Our findings confirm the superior 
explanatory power of this variable as opposed to the use of the firm’s relative objective 
performance. 
Furthermore, we also contribute to the performance feedback theory by 
showing that the effects of performance feedback on intended changes are not 
universal, but contingent upon contextual conditions – here: performance compared to 
industry. As a consequence, a wider palette of options was generated. Thus, for 
instance, our results establish that dissatisfaction will not always lead to higher 
intentions to change because if objective performance signals that the current strategies 
are paying off (as reflected in the organization’s performance compared to the 
industry), it might lead to a lower magnitude of intended changes as it is more 
‘rational’ to keep on acting in the same way you were doing before. Similarly, 
satisfaction will not always be related to lower intentions to change, hence it might 
 







induce an upward strive and a boost in the CEO’s self-confidence, and consequently 
generate an increase in changes pursued by the firm.  
 
Findings Chapter 4 
In this chapter, the goal was to understand why some organizations obtained 
better financial results during the last financial crisis than others and whether family 
ownership affected this situation.  
To do so, it started by defining family firms and highlighting its strong 
emotional component in their decision-making process which clearly separated them 
from other organizational forms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). This emotional component 
was argued to be reflected in its will to preserve the socioemotional wealth of the firm 
which according to Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) referred to the affective and non-
economic needs such as the ability to exercise family control and the perpetuation of 
the family dynasty. Our results indicate that family ownership will affect positively the 
financial strength obtained by an organization and as we tested this phenomenon 
under a non-munificent context (which could affect the future and viability of the firm) 
we argue that these findings would do nothing but support our prior definition of 
socioemotional wealth. 
Furthermore, we found that this relationship is not influenced by the 
internationalization or diversification of the firm. Contrarily, we found evidence that 
the managerial average age positively moderate this interaction due to the lower level 
of leverage presented by these actors; while managerial educational level do the 
opposite. In a further analysis, we also found that there were not significant differences 
among those managers who had little training and belonged to either a family or a 
non-family firm. This suggested that despite belonging to one type of firm or the other, 
these managers would leverage less than highly educated ones and for that reason, 
there would not exist differences among this group. However, when managers were 
highly educated, the financial strength obtained by family firms would be greater than 
the ones obtained by non-family firms, i.e., there would be significant differences 
among them. We suggest that such differences could be explained by family firms’ 
socioemotional wealth which would reduce the negative effect over firm’s financial 
strength – actually promoted by highly educated managers in non-financial firms. 
 







Related to this aspect, an interesting finding to highlight is that TMT characteristics 
seem to have just a marginal effect among family businesses. However, within non-
family firms, we observe that TMT characteristics do matter in affecting organizational 
outcomes. Thus, overall, this chapter provides evidence to determine that the 
perspectives and idiosyncratic characteristics of family firms seem to govern the 
behavior of these organizations, prevailing over different characteristics of their 
management team, scope of action or economic context. 
 
 
5.3. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In this section, the main theoretical contributions of this doctoral dissertation 
are summarized. More particularly, this dissertation contributes to several streams of 
literature that we will analyze next. 
Our first contribution could start with the following question: how do 
managers react to ‘attainment discrepancies’ in their organizations’ performance? 
Inspired by the Behavioral Theory of the Firm’s, scholars have argued that (only) when 
performance falls below a certain aspiration level, CEOs intend to engage in new 
strategic initiatives. However, empirical evidence on this issue is ambiguous and 
inconclusive. Thus, we attend to this puzzle and contribute to the performance 
feedback literature by denouncing the common practice to proxy ‘attainment 
discrepancies’ by simple comparisons of prior performance with industry mean 
performance and/or the organization’s historical performance. In particular, we show 
that the use of cognitive variables such as the managerial complacency or the satisfaction 
with firm’s results is superior in predicting strategic intended change as they allow to 
better capture managerial interpretations of performance feedback. As a consequence, 
different interpretations of ‘attainment discrepancies’ could be able to be obtained, 
which may have important implications for some of the key predictions made by the 
conventional performance feedback research and thus, become source of 
reinterpretation of their expected responses.  
With this, we build upon recent efforts to advance performance feedback theory 
(Greve, 2003). 
 







Secondly, we also contribute to the performance feedback literature by showing 
that the effects of ‘attainment discrepancy’ on intended changes are not universal, but 
contingent upon contextual conditions. In this way, we show that a feeling of 
dissatisfaction generated by a high ‘attainment discrepancy’ will not always provoke 
higher intended strategic changes as a motive of fixing the current situation. However, 
whether there are some positive contextual conditions (such as a performance of the 
firm above the industry mean), strategic change could not be promoted due to the 
confirmation of the accuracy of the current strategies followed by the firm. In a similar 
way, despite obtaining a high satisfaction, intended strategic changes could be 
promoted when observing that the firm is performing above the industry mean, which 
could could instigate self-confidence and efficacy beliefs and, subsequently, proactive 
behaviors such as strategic changes (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Haleblian & 
Rajagopalan, 2005; Mahto & Khanin, 2015). With these findings, we are able to 
reconcile some of the apparently contradictory perspectives in the performance 
feedback literature, such as the classic BTF view of ‘problemistic search’, Labianca et al.’s 
(2009) notion of ‘striving aspirations’, and Chatterjee and Hambrick’s (2011) ‘capability 
cue’ perspective. Hence, rather than contradictory, we argue that these perspectives are 
complementary and context-driven. 
Our third building block of theoretical contributions also relates to performance 
feedback literature. As previously mentioned scholars do not appear to come to an 
agreement in terms of reporting homogeneous evidence in this matter. One of the 
causes of such results may be grounded on the use of distinct or, even more 
remarkably, distal variables of performance feedback consequences (Ketchen & 
Palmer, 1999; Shinkle, 2012) as can be risk-taking, innovation, R&D expenditures, etc. 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Chen, 2008). Following this argumentation, some 
authors such as Holmes et al. (2011) and Schillebeeckx et al. (2016) have questioned the 
use of these variables due to its difficulty and distance to reflect the decisions that 
organizations’ key decision makers actually make based on organizational 
performance feedback. Consequently, with the aim of solving this situation and 
reducing the noise in the analysis of our hypotheses, in this study we propound to 
measure the intentions to change (cf. Greiner & Bhambri, 1989; Sánchez-Peinado et al., 
2010) instead of the actual change. This point of view is not new in the literature, as 
 







Schillebeeckx et al. (2016) do something similar by analyzing the preference to collaborate 
instead of actual collaboration, stating that “preferences that do not result in established 
ties remain hidden from investigation so that existing ties are a poor proxy for tie-
formation intention” (Schillebeeckx et al., 2016, p. 1494). In addition, the use of the 
intention to change in place of the actual change allows collecting a broader and richer 
variable (as opposed to, e.g., only changes in specific investments such as R&D) due to 
the possibility of analyzing a higher number of domains or categories of change (see 
methods section of Chapter 2 or Chapter 3). Consequently, we indicate that scholars 
need to be careful in operationalizing their dependent variable when assessing 
reactions to ‘attainment discrepancies’ (see also Kacperczyk et al., 2015), as many types 
of strategic change trajectories could be studied (Hailey & Balogun, 2002). 
In the fourth place, our research also complements performance feedback 
literature with ideas from the upper-echelons research tradition, which emphasizes the 
relevance of managers' values, perspectives and experiences on strategic decision-
making processes and organizational outcomes (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). However, to predict these variables the extant research has typically 
focused on managers’ observable characteristics of management teams (such as 
demographics or functional experiences) and has rarely considered managerial 
cognitions and perceptions explicitly – even though the latter are actually assumed to 
act as perceptual filters of reality and therefore could generate richer interpretations of 
the decision-making processes (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Hambrick, 1994; Lawrence, 
1997). Our study addresses this dearth of research by analyzing how managerial 
perceptions, and more specifically the managerial complacency or CEO’s satisfaction with 
firm’s results, affect organizational strategic response. As a consequence, our findings 
allow us to further substantiate the explicative value of these variables (Cho & 
Hambrick, 2006; Hambrick, 1994; Lawrence, 1997) and cognitive implications for 
strategic choices (Herrmann & Datta, 2002). 
Furthermore, our study also adds to the multi-lens perspective of strategic 
change (Haleblian & Rajagopalan, 2005; Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997) which argues 
that a comprehensive understanding of the antecedents and effects of strategic changes 
requires taking into consideration how managers interpret the external and internal 
pressures and variations, as well as the direct effect of environmental and 
 







organizational conditions and changes when they plan an agenda for change. 
Similarly, in their theoretical piece, Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1997) called for studies 
that take into account cognitions (perceptions of the situation and of the necessity and 
ability to change), actions (intentions, initiatives) and objective measures of contextual 
forces or influences. However, research that directly assesses these three angles is still 
rather scarce. We contribute in this regard with our studies from Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 that shows how managerial actions and intentions are distinct from the 
interpretation of the situation, and that such actions are shaped by the interaction 
between the manager’s cognition and contextual influences (measured by the objective 
performance compared to the industry). 
Through Chapter 4, we contribute to the family firm literature in several 
research streams. Below we will mention some of them. Thus, we add to this body of 
work by denouncing the fragmentation that exist on the definition of family business, 
which difficult the replication of studies and the understanding of the implications of 
every particular type of research. More specifically, we show the two main streams that 
literature has followed: the involvement approach and the essence approach, and 
provide some propositions for its reconciliation. On top of that, we highlight that the 
concept of family firm is still open to debate and therefore, we suggest that 
forthcoming research should work in generating a more clear and integrative 
definition and measurement of family involvement which allows reconciling future 
investigations. 
In addition, we anticipate and find that the own idiosyncrasy of family firms, 
strongly influenced by their socioemotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), will 
make them not to vary their way of acting and continue investing, financing and 
operating thinking about the ‘entity’ as something more than a mere firm (Meyer & 
Zucker, 1989); even during periods of economic fluctuation (which could affect the 
future and viability of the firm) and in particular during the latest economic crisis 
occurred globally in recent years. Based on these findings, we corroborate the 
distinctiveness of these firms which will basically rule their behavior and actions based 
on the preservation of its socioemotional wealth (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2011). 
 







Last but not least, we also find support to determine that such uniqueness 
presented by family firms similarly govern their behavior over other type of 
characteristics different from the context. Thus, for example, we show that despite 
family firms’ managers present a high or a low level of education (or average age), the 
financial strength shown by these organizations keeps stable. However, within non-
family firms, we may observe that different levels of TMT characteristics do matter in 
affecting organizational outcomes (see Chapter 4). 
 
 
5.4. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
This dissertation has several practical implications for managers, TMT members 
and family firms. However, the main focus of them is related to handling with 
performance evaluations in order to more accurately understand organizational 
subsequent actions. An initial inference of our analysis is that the performance 
assessment process may become more complex than suggested by the problem-solving 
mode assumed by performance feedback theory. This research perspective argues that 
decision makers define standards of performance evaluation prospectively and, later 
on, assess actual performance by comparing it to their predefined standards – 
generally assumed as its historical results or performance of organizations’ peers 
(Shinkle, 2012). Therefore, if performance is below the aspiration level, it is concluded 
that a performance gap (or ‘attainment discrepancy’) exists and therefore, the firm 
would initiate a change process (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003). However, our 
results show that the incorporation of insights from a cognitive approach generate a 
better understanding of managerial strategic decisions (Greve, 2003).  
Hence, a key to managerial success can be to search for measures of its 
perceptions or satisfaction over firm’s objective performance in order to discern and 
understand the inception of their change intentions. Consequently, the selection of 
procedures or tools through which managers can objectively measure or know their 
cognitive values is likely to lead to success practices. To allow these specific subjective 
evaluations to emerge, a firm could for instance set up regular meetings to discuss 
about the output of the firm, elaborate scenarios, define prior and future expectations, 
establish future goals, etc. Another option to make those perceptions to show up could 
 







be to incorporate in those meetings external actors that objectively and impartially 
could ask managers about their feelings and insights. Therefore, firms should pay 
special attention to these supportive and oriented practices and might even follow 
specific trainings to learn or to improve these abilities. 
Note that in our research we have described two different situations in which 
we expect a higher magnitude of intended strategic changes: (1) dissatisfied managers 
who face negative feedback of poor performance compared to the industry, and (2) 
highly satisfied managers whose companies are performing very well compared to the 
industry. Furthermore, we have also related each situation with a type of change. Thus, 
while the former situation corresponds to a reactive, ‘problemistic search’-driven 
argumentation, the latter is founded on a logic of proactive search behavior, prone to 
the idea of ‘organizational slack’. Thus, we propose that it will be rather relevant for 
managers to know the change streams proposed by the literature and once placing 
themselves in one or another position to understand the change processes followed by 
their firms. A drastic way to cope with this situation would be to ask them directly 
whether they are the mercy of external forces or if is what happens to them under their 
own control. This question relates to the concept of locus of control where two main 
positions are defined (Nowicki & Strickland, 1973): an external one, where it is 
believed that fate, luck or outside forces guide what happens; and an internal one, 
where it is believed that one’ s own ability, effort, or actions determine what happens. 
With this, we suggest that managers could understand the benefits of knowing in 
which quadrant of the graph they are located and for instance, better grasp the 
behavior of some relevant actors for its own decision-making process (which 
previously was considered as strange or incomprehensible) or the behavior developed 
by their competitors. We will provide examples for both situations. 
For the first one we will based on our findings, which show that dissatisfied 
CEOs that experience high levels of performance compared to the industry (e.g., when 
they are highly ambitious) will likely not pursue higher intentions to change. One of 
the reasons for this stagnation is argued to be the opposed position that organization’s 
stakeholders may have against change due to such positive performance may impede 
CEOs to convince them for the urgency of the situation (Chowdhury & Lang, 1996; 
Garbuio et al., 2015). In this way, managers could understand, for example, the 
 







underlying (and theoretical) reasons why that investor was so stubborn with its ideas. 
Similarly, for the second situation, managers could better comprehend why despite 
reaching similar results such market leader continues innovating and changing 
strategic aspects. 
Practitioners should also be aware that emotions which emanate from family 
firms can limit the organization in its ability to adapt to certain business demands. It is 
important that family firms acknowledge that putting a large emphasis on emotions 
through for example the preservation of the socioemotional wealth can help the family 
firm to keep family in control, invest more efficiently, take less risk-averse options, rely 
less on debt, look for a higher continuity of the firm, etc. but can also negatively affect 
the decision-making process. Thus, they might for example be more reluctant to sell 
the firm or take some strategic actions that could benefit the firm in the long run 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). One illustrative example could be the opposition that could 
show the firm to be acquired or merged with a partner that potentially would help the 
firm to drastically improve its results and/or to professionalize. Hence, ‘familiness’ 
might be sometimes synonymous with a missed opportunity. 
Consequently, family firms should try to reach a balance where both business 
and family needs are met. In this sense, several actions could be undertaken. First, 
family firms could professionalize their governance system by for instance including in 
its board of directors external actors. In addition, family governance practices such as a 
family forum can reach the same goal. These practices can create clear formulation of 




5.5. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
To finalize this dissertation, we want to point out some interesting pathways for 
future research with the ultimate objective of pushing the field towards more rigor and 
impact. 
First, we intentionally chose to study CEOs’ intention to change instead of 
realized change behavior at the organizational level as the former is closer to CEOs’ 
decision-making processes (which we want to capture) as opposed to distal outcome-
 







related measures that assess actual, realized organizational change (Gavetti et al., 
2012). Nevertheless, a fruitful research avenue would be to test whether this 
willingness to change at the CEO-level leads, afterwards, translates into actual changes 
in strategies, improvement of results, survival rates, etc. This presumes insights in the 
implementation process of strategic changes (Hailey & Balogun, 2002) and might 
require longitudinal data.  
Additionally, another fruitful research line could be obtained by assessing the 
type of change achieved. As previously explained, the variable organizational change 
behavior includes both scope (internationalization; market penetration/consolidation; and 
diversification) and growth methods (organic growth; strategic alliances; and mergers & 
acquisitions). However, this variable is calculated by the sum of the absolute differences 
between the importance given to each of these six categories in the present and in the 
future/intended strategy. Thus, we argue that to improve our findings we could report 
actual change based on these six categories or a group of them. In this way, for instance, 
a firm could present a high level of change based on an increase of market 
penetration/consolidation and organic growth. However, another firm could present a 
similar level of change but in this case based on internationalization and strategic 
alliances. Therefore, despite its similar meaning in terms of absolute change values, the 
first case would be more related to exploitative or inner solutions. Meanwhile, the 
latter would be more associated with exploratory or expansive actions. 
In the third place, as our research focuses on CEOs’ satisfaction with firm’s 
results, we do not take into account the antecedents that might guide these satisfaction 
levels. Future scholars might try to disentangle why some managers appear to be more 
easily satisfied than others, which in turn affects how these managers interpret 
performance feedback cues. On a related note, differences in satisfaction levels might 
also be attributed to industry- or organization-level effects.  
Fourth, we assessed performance cues comparing firm’s performance with the 
industry’s average performance level. However, a more fine-grained approach might 
be warranted. Some researchers (e.g., Fiegenbaum et al., 1996; Labianca et al., 2009) 
advocate for comparing a focal organization’s performance against that of an 
organization-specific reference group, which might not be congruent with the whole 
industry. We do not implement such an approach in the present study, partly because 
 







of pragmatic reasons (related to the availability of information on specific 
organizations’ reference groups), but also because we believe that in our sample of 
SMEs in a variety of mostly mature industries – typically characterized by strong 
industry recipes – the performance levels of individual organizations’ specific 
reference groups will probably be close to the industry’s average performance level 
anyway (Lehner, 2000).  
 Fifth, our results although relevant and significant for the family firm literature, 
must be viewed carefully because of our use of a univariate measure of family 
ownership, which may not faithfully represent the reality of family firm’s involvement. 
This idea would allow literature to dig into the definition of family businesses and 
would help to clarify an issue that is still open to debate. Differences should be 
identified and explained through both theory and practice. 
Similarly, another topic which opens up some interesting research 
opportunities would be to capture the drivers of the preservation of such family 
involvement or to examine differences between family firms’ characteristics, based on 
the importance of the preservation of such variable. Thus, we argue that a more in-
depth understanding of the concept would increase the explanatory value of family 
firm-oriented research. 
Finally, our sample is intentionally formed by SMEs due to its suitability to test 
our hypotheses. Thus, although the size of these organizations allows them to present a 
formal organizational structure they are normally short of resources, support functions 
to make strategic decisions. Consequently, the abilities of their managers but also their 
attitudes, perceptions and cognitions turn up as even more important tools for the 
decision-making processes in this type of firms (Lubatkin et al., 2006). However, an 
interesting avenue for further research could be to explore our hypotheses under 
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Muchas de las decisiones tomadas por los equipos directivos de una 
organización tienen una alta probabilidad de fracaso (Nutt, 1999). Esta afirmación, que 
puede llegar a resultar un poco impactante es, de hecho, mucho más común de lo que 
uno pudiera imaginar (Bloom et al., 2012). Así, simplemente ojeando la prensa actual 
probablemente encontraremos varios casos de errores empresariales que han generado 
fatales consecuencias para el devenir de una compañía. Por supuesto, también 
encontraremos casos de éxito, directivos ejemplares y recetas de buenas prácticas (Eide 
et al., 2016; Schrage, 2013), aunque estos serán mucho menores. Sin embargo, tal y 
como afirman Bloom et al. (2012), el conjunto de empresas mal gestionadas será mucho 
mayor que el de las que están bien gestionadas. 
En general, esta condición cuando menos preocupante hace hincapié en la 
importancia de estudiar a los equipos de alta dirección y, de esta manera, intentar 
desentrañar la compleja interacción existente entre sus características, los procesos de 
toma de decisiones y los factores contingentes que indudablemente influirán en el 
comportamiento adoptado por las organizaciones (Hambrick y Mason, 1984). La 
investigación sobre los equipos directivos comenzó a florecer tras la publicación del 
trabajo seminal de Hambrick y Mason (1984) donde se propuso la teoría de la upper-
echelons. Esta teoría básicamente destacaba la importancia de analizar a los equipos 
directivos para poder explicar los resultados, las decisiones y el comportamiento 
adoptado por una empresa (Bantel y Jackson, 1989; Buyl et al., 2014 Hambrick y 
Mason, 1984). En otras palabras, para comprender por qué las organizaciones hacían 
las cosas que hacían o se comportaban de una manera u otra, Hambrick y Mason (1984) 
sugerían que había que estudiar las características, experiencias y valores cognitivos de 
estos actores (Hambrick y Mason, 1984). Esta suposición inspiró a muchos académicos 
a investigar empíricamente el impacto de tales características en una miríada de 
variables de resultado tales como volumen de negocios, innovación, diversificación y 
desempeño organizacional (Boone et al., 2005). Sin embargo, a pesar de generar un 
elevado número de contribuciones empíricas, la investigación existente en esta área se 
ha centrado esencialmente en el estudio de variables directamente observables (como 
pueden ser las demográficas o funcionales) y rara vez ha considerado explícitamente 
las actitudes y percepciones de los directivos – a pesar de que generalmente se asume 
 







que estas últimas actúan como filtros o percepciones de la realidad y por tanto de la 
toma de decisiones (Cho y Hambrick, 2006; Hambrick, 1994; Lawrence, 1997). 
De una forma análoga, la literatura sobre el performance feedback se fundamenta 
sobre unas bases similares a las que acabamos de mencionar. Así, fuertemente 
influenciada por la Behavioral Theory of the Firm (BTF, Cyert y March, 1963), esta 
perspectiva se centra en estudiar los efectos que tiene la percepción de los directivos 
sobre el rendimiento alcanzado por la organización en el comportamiento de esta 
última. Su proposición más ampliamente aceptada se basa en que las personas 
encargadas de tomar las decisiones en una empresa (es decir, sus directivos) 
únicamente decidirán apostar por un cambio estratégico cuando el desempeño de su 
organización esté por debajo de los niveles que aspiraban a alcanzar con anterioridad 
(Greve, 2003). Es decir, la idea que subyace es que dicha ‘discrepancia al logro’ 
generará una insatisfacción dentro del equipo directivo, el cual intentará subsanarla 
mediante un cambio en su estrategia implementada en la actualidad.  
Sin embargo, la literatura también ha desarrollado perspectivas teóricas que 
contradicen a la anterior (Bowen et al., 2010) y que básicamente se centran en 
reconsiderar los niveles de aspiraciones que los directivos utilizan para determinar 
cuándo se produce el cambio estratégico y cuando no. Por ejemplo, Jordan y Audia 
(2012) determinan que, aunque los resultados de la empresa estén por debajo de sus 
niveles pretendidos, esta situación podría no conducir a un mayor cambio si los 
directivos optan por modificar sus evaluaciones y considerarlo como satisfactorio en 
una búsqueda de por ejemplo mejorar su imagen frente a sus empleados. Otro ejemplo 
similar lo propone Labianca et al. (2009) estableciendo que a veces, las empresas que 
tienen unos resultados por encima de sus aspiraciones siguen cambiando (en vez de no 
hacerlo como sugeriría la BTF) y esto es debido porque comparan sus resultados con 
los de las empresas con las que quieren competir en un futuro. Estos resultados 
equívocos ponen de relieve la necesidad de realizar una mayor investigación sobre el 
verdadero significado de la ‘discrepancia al logro’ y del impacto que esta tiene sobre el 
comportamiento de las organizaciones (Jordan y Audia, 2012). Exactamente, esto es lo 
que intentaremos resolver a través de la presente tesis doctoral. 
Para ello, lo primero que haremos será destacar la forma (casi inamovible) en la 
que se ha medido la ‘discrepancia al logro’. Así, esta variable se ha establecido 
 







comúnmente como la diferencia entre los resultados obtenidos por una empresa por un 
lado y los resultados obtenidos por la propia empresa en años anteriores/o los 
resultados medios obtenidos por su sector (Shinkle, 2012). Por lo tanto, lo que 
implícitamente se está asumiendo en la literatura es que los niveles de aspiración (y 
por tanto la ‘discrepancia al logro’) se basan únicamente en resultados objetivos y 
directamente observables; y por extensión, que los directivos tomarán sus decisiones 
de cambio estratégico únicamente siguiendo parámetros objetivos. Sin embargo, tanto 
el mundo profesional como el académico (Fiegenbaum et al., 1996; Labianca et al., 
2009) han clarificado que muchos otros factores pueden también afectar a las 
aspiraciones de los directivos y por tanto a sus percepciones sobre la ‘discrepancia al 
logro’. Para abordar esta cuestión, en este trabajo proponemos utilizar indicadores 
alternativos a los previamente utilizados a la hora de medir la ‘discrepancia al logro’ de 
los directivos y que estos estén mucho más relacionados con sus percepciones y los 
sentimientos. En concreto, proponemos dos opciones, las cuales se representan 
respectivamente en el capítulo 2 y en el capítulo 3 de esta tesis doctoral. 
 
De esta manera, el capítulo 2 propone el uso de la complacencia con los 
resultados obtenidos por la empresa como medida más aproximada de ‘discrepancia al 
logro’. En concreto, esta puede ser definida como un estado de conformismo o 
sentimiento de tranquilidad ficticio ya que supone el desconocimiento de algún peligro 
o amenaza potencial que puede hacer peligrar los resultados obtenidos por la 
organización (Pascal, 2011). Sin embargo, según Kawall (2006) la propia definición de 
complacencia podría llevar a cierta confusión al vincular sentimientos de satisfacción 
justificados como ejemplos de evaluaciones complacientes. Así, este autor matiza que 
la complacencia requerirá de una confusión sobre el nivel logrado por un individuo o 
institución, llevando a generar un nivel excesivo de satisfacción. En consecuencia, 
según esta línea de razonamiento, mediremos la complacencia de los directivos como 
la diferencia entre la medida tradicional y objetiva de la ‘discrepancia al logro’ 
efectuada previamente por la literatura y la satisfacción del CEO con dichos resultados. 
Es decir, para poder considerar que un directivo presenta evaluaciones complacientes 
sobre sus resultados éste tendría que mostrar altos niveles de satisfacción a pesar de 
que objetivamente sus resultados no mostraran lo mismo. 
 







Como consecuencia, a lo largo de este trabajo argumentamos y hallamos que el 
cambio estratégico no estará directamente relacionado con los resultados objetivos 
obtenidos por una organización, sino que dependerá del nivel de complacencia 
mostrado por sus directivos (y el CEO como su máximo representante) con esa 
determinada situación (Gordon et al., 2000). Es decir, mientras que los directivos no 
estén descontentos con los resultados obtenidos por su empresa (lo cual significaría la 
consecución de evaluaciones poco complacientes), no presentarán una intención de 
cambio estratégico (Sánchez-Peinado et al., 2010).  
Por lo tanto, nuestros resultados seguirán los preceptos establecidos por la BTF 
proponiendo una relación negativa entre complacencia y cambio estratégico. Sin 
embargo, al introducir variables cognitivas a la ecuación, conseguiremos dar respuesta 
a las teorías contradictorias que únicamente se basaban en valores objetivos a la hora 
de determinar sus conclusiones. Otra de las consecuencias de nuestra investigación es 
que gracias a sus resultados se podría entender mejor, por ejemplo, por qué algunas 
empresas presentan comportamientos de cambio estratégico y otras no a pesar de 
contar con los mismos resultados. 
Para finalizar este capítulo y con el objetivo de ampliar nuestro conocimiento 
sobre la complacencia mostrada por los directivos de una organización, analizaremos 
el efecto que algunas variables demográficas del equipo directivo ejercen sobre ésta. 
Concretamente encontramos que la diversidad funcional del equipo directivo afectará 
negativamente al nivel de complacencia mostrado por los directivos en sus 
evaluaciones; mientras que su antigüedad media en el puesto tendrá un efecto positivo 
sobre esta variable. 
 
Mientras tanto, el capítulo 3 propone el uso de la satisfacción del CEO de una 
organización con los resultados obtenidos por ésta como una medida más directa sobre 
la ‘discrepancia al logro’ (Haleblian y Rajagopalan, 2005). Es decir, en este capítulo ya 
no se propone el uso de una combinación de ésta última con las medidas objetivas 
sobre los resultados obtenidos por la compañía. Así, además de abordar su posible 
relación con las medidas tradicionales objetivas sobre los resultados obtenidos por una 
organización, en esta sección se presenta un estudio más pormenorizado sobre el 
significado de la satisfacción y su impacto sobre el cambio estratégico. Más 
 







específicamente, se argumenta que dicha variable podría ser vista como una ‘variable a 
posteriori’ a través de la cual se añadiría información perceptual (como por ejemplo las 
expectativas individuales, experiencias previas, presiones externas, características 
demográficas, etc.) a la evaluación objetiva generada por los directivos sobre los 
resultados obtenidos por su organización (Matho y Khanin, 2015).  
Nuestros resultados confirman nuestra propuesta mostrando a la satisfacción 
como una variable con un poder explicativo superior al presentado por la medida 
tradicional y objetiva de la ‘discrepancia al logro’. En consecuencia, siguiendo la lógica 
propuesta por la BTF esperamos que cuanto menor sea la satisfacción del CEO con los 
resultados obtenidos por su organización (es decir, cuanto mayor sea su ‘discrepancia 
al logro’), mayor cambio estratégico será generado.  
Además, el utilizar únicamente la variable satisfacción para articular la 
‘discrepancia al logro’ nos permite introducir indicadores objetivos – y más 
específicamente los resultados obtenidos por una empresa en comparación con la media de su 
sector – como moderadores de esta relación. En particular, esta interacción es propuesta 
debido a que aunque la investigación relacionada con la BTF propone una relación 
universalmente negativa entre la insatisfacción generada por la ‘discrepancia al logro’ 
y el cambio estratégico; otras teorías han sugerido relaciones distintas. Así, por 
ejemplo, según algunos autores una alta satisfacción con los resultados obtenidos por 
la organización (como consecuencia de una ‘discrepancia al logro’ baja o negativa) 
podría instigar sentimientos de confianza y de eficacia en uno mismo por el resultado 
alcanzado y, consecuentemente, comportamientos proactivos tales como los cambios 
estratégicos (Haleblian y Rajagopalan, 2005; Mahto y Khanin, 2015). Por el contrario, 
una alta insatisfacción con los resultados obtenidos podría causar un comportamiento 
conservador por un razonamiento similar al anterior (Chatterjee y Hambrick, 2011; 
Staw et al., 1981). En un esfuerzo por conciliar estas perspectivas aparentemente 
contradictorias, proponemos que los resultados obtenidos por una empresa en comparación 
con la media de su sector podrían actuar como un indicador de la posición de la empresa 
en el sector (Kacperczyk et al., 2015) y de esta forma servir como señal de adecuación 
de la estrategia actual (Baum et al., 2005), así como de las capacidades de los directivos 
para la obtención de estos resultados (Chatterjee y Hambrick, 2011). En consecuencia, 
esperamos que esta ‘señal’ de la contextualización de la empresa dentro de su sector 
 







interactúe con la satisfacción presentada por los CEOs y que, con ello, el efecto 
negativo entre esta última y el cambio estratégico sea menos pronunciado cuanto 
mayor sea el resultado obtenido de una empresa en comparación con su sector. Como 
resultado de esta interacción podremos observar una mejora relevante de las opciones 
consideradas hasta el momento.  
Recapitulando, tanto el capítulo 2 como la primera parte de este capítulo 3 
establecen (únicamente) una relación negativa entre, respectivamente, la complacencia 
(representada como la diferencia entre la satisfacción obtenida con los resultados de la 
organización y los propios resultados objetivos) y la satisfacción, y el cambio 
estratégico. Es decir, ambos dos anticipan (y hallan) que cuanto mayor sea la 
‘discrepancia al logro’ (y por tanto el descontento con los resultados), mayor será el 
cambio generado.  
Sin embargo, al introducir los resultados obtenidos por una empresa en comparación 
con la media de su sector como variable moderadora, encontramos que la insatisfacción 
no siempre conducirá a un mayor cambio estratégico. Así, por ejemplo, cuando los 
resultados objetivos obtenidos por la organización (respecto a la media del sector) 
señalan que las estrategias actuales están dando sus frutos, esto podría generar un 
menor cambio estratégico puesto que lo ‘racional’ sería continuar con la estrategia 
actual. Del mismo modo, la satisfacción puede no siempre estar relacionada con un 
menor cambio estratégico. En este sentido, nuestros resultados muestran que, ante 
niveles extremadamente altos de rendimiento en comparación con su sector, los 
directivos podrían ver incrementada la confianza y eficacia en su forma de trabajar y, 
consecuentemente, impulsar comportamientos proactivos que se reflejarían en un 
mayor cambio estratégico.  
De esta forma, los resultados obtenidos en este capítulo refuerzan las del 
capítulo anterior determinando que, para analizar el comportamiento de las 
organizaciones, tendremos que tener en cuenta no solo variables objetivas sino también 
aspectos cognitivos, los cuales nos ayudarán (1) a predecir las interpretaciones 
efectuadas por los directivos ante su nivel de rendimiento y (2) a unir las diferentes 











Una vez analizado el modo en el que las organizaciones toman sus decisiones 
de cambio estratégico, el objetivo del capítulo 4 es alejarse un poco del prisma de los 
procesos y centrar su atención en el efecto que las características generales de una 
empresa pueden tener a la hora de generar unos resultados u otros dentro de las 
mismas. Más concretamente, lo que pretendemos conseguir con el desarrollo de esta 
investigación es poder dar respuesta a las siguientes preguntas: ¿Por qué algunas 
organizaciones obtienen resultados favorables durante los períodos de crisis mientras 
que otras atraviesan dificultades o simplemente desaparecen? ¿Afectará a esta 
situación el hecho de que una empresa sea familiar? Para ello, antes de todo, en este 
capítulo definiremos el periodo de crisis utilizado para comprobar nuestras hipótesis. 
Así, específicamente nos centraremos en la última crisis financiera y económica 
ocurrida a nivel global, la cual alcanzó su pico más virulento durante los años 2008 y 
2009, y con la que se han obtenido efectos devastadores sobre la economía tanto 
española como mundial. 
A lo largo de la literatura, diversos estudios han destacado las diferencias entre 
las empresas familiares y no familiares en función de sus objetivos, ética, tamaño, 
estructura financiera, estrategias, gobierno corporativo, etc. (Basco y Pérez-Rodriguez, 
2009; Berrone et al., 2010; Distelberg y Sorenson, 2009; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). En 
este sentido, los académicos concluyen que todas estas diferencias revertirán 
finalmente en distintos niveles de rendimiento, opciones de financiamiento e inversión, 
y toma de riesgos llevados a cabo por unas empresas u otras. En particular, estos 
resultados se atribuyen principalmente a un componente emocional presente en las 
empresas familiares: la riqueza socioemocional, la cual es destacada como la 
característica más importante para diferenciar a una empresa familiar de una no 
familiar (Berrone et al., 2010) y definida como "aquellos aspectos no financieros de la 
empresa que satisfacen las necesidades afectivas de la familia, como la identidad, la 
capacidad de ejercer influencia familiar y la perpetuación de la dinastía familiar" 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007, p. 106).   
Basándonos en estos argumentos, en el presente estudio encontramos que la 
propiedad familiar afecta positivamente a la fortaleza financiera obtenida por una 
organización. Es decir, nuestros resultados apoyan lo que previamente destacábamos 
sobre estas empresas, las cuales priorizarán la preservación de su riqueza 
 







socioemocional y por tanto la continuidad del negocio familiar (Berrone et al., 2012; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Consecuentemente, podemos afirmar que, durante periodos 
no benevolentes, los preceptos (financieros) que guían a estas organizaciones se verán 
mantenidos.  
Además, siguiendo la investigación de Hofer y Schendel (1978) y Sharma et al. 
(1997), argumentamos que añadiendo conceptos relacionados con la dirección de 
empresas sobre el enfoque de la empresa familiar obtendremos unos resultados más 
óptimos y clarificadores. En este sentido, se propone que el ámbito de actuación de una 
organización (medido por su grado de internacionalización y diversificación) y las 
características de sus actores clave (medidos por el nivel educativo y la edad media de 
sus directivos) afectarán a la relación previamente propuesta entre propiedad familiar 
y fortaleza financiera. Sin embargo, nuestros resultados muestran que ni la 
internacionalización ni la diversificación que presenta una organización moderan esta 
relación. Es decir, esto indicaría que el contexto en el que una empresa familiar está 
inmersa no afecta a las perspectivas de supervivencia de ésta (y por lo tanto a su 
solidez financiera). 
Por el contrario, encontramos que la edad media del equipo directivo sí modera 
positivamente nuestra hipótesis básica. Por lo tanto, parece que está característica 
afectará a las estructuras de capital (Chen et al., 2010), el riesgo tomado (Barker y 
Mueller, 2002; Hambrick y Mason, 1984), el comportamiento de inversión (Wiersema y 
Bantel, 1992) y la capacidad para lidiar con información (Taylor, 1975); generando, por 
lo tanto, menores niveles de apalancamiento financiero entre los directivos más 
‘mayores’ y, como consecuencia, provocando un efecto positivo sobre la fortaleza 
financiera obtenida por su organización.  
En esta investigación también encontramos que los directivos con un nivel 
educativo más alto (lo cual está relacionado en la literatura con una mayor confianza 
en sus inversiones, mayor apertura al cambio, mejor trato con la ambigüedad y 
complejidad, mayor facilidad para proporcionar soluciones, etc. – Bantel y Jackson, 
1989; Barker y Mueller, 2002; Day y Lord, 1992; Herrmann y Datta, 2005) generarán 
niveles más bajos de fortaleza financiera que los directivos con un nivel educativo 
menor; por lo tanto, presentando una moderación negativa en la relación entre la 
propiedad familiar y la fortaleza financiera obtenida por una empresa. Así, parece que 
 







los equipos directivos más altamente educados se apalancarán más y, por tanto, 
provocarán menores niveles de fortaleza financiera en sus organizaciones.  
Asimismo, analizando estos resultados con más detenimiento, encontramos que 
las diferencias entre los directivos con bajo nivel educativo son inexistentes tanto si 
pertenecen a una empresa familiar como si no. Esto sugeriría que a pesar de pertenecer 
a un tipo de empresa u otra, estos directivos presentarán un nivel de apalancamiento 
bajo (y en particular, como hemos mencionado anteriormente, más bajo que el de los 
directivos con altos niveles educativos) y por tanto esto haría que no existieran 
diferencias significativas entre este grupo. Sin embargo, cuando los equipos directivos 
mantienen de media niveles educativos elevados, la fortaleza financiera obtenida por 
las empresas familiares será mayor que la obtenida por empresas no familiares, es 
decir, sí que existirán diferencias significativas entre este grupo. Particularmente, 
argumentamos que tales diferencias podrían explicarse por las características 
inherentes de las empresas familiares, tales como las de invertir más eficientemente, 
tomar menos alternativas de riesgo, depender menos de la deuda, buscar una mayor 
continuidad de la empresa, etc., lo cual reduciría el efecto negativo de esta 
característica (es decir, del alto nivel educativo presentado por los directivos) sobre la 
fortaleza financiera alcanzada por una organización. 
Relacionado con este último punto, un hallazgo interesante a destacar dentro de 
los resultados presentados por este capítulo es que las características del equipo 
directivo (en nuestro estudio la edad media y el nivel educativo medio) parecen tener 
únicamente un efecto marginal dentro de las empresas familiares. Es decir, a pesar de 
la presencia de valores altos o bajos de estas características directivas, la fortaleza 
financiera mostrada por estas organizaciones se mantiene estable (y elevada). Sin 
embargo, dentro de las empresas no familiares, observamos que las características del 
equipo directivo sí que importan, afectando de manera divergente a la fortaleza 
financiera obtenida por una organización (p.e., cuando presentan equipos directivos 
con niveles educativos más elevados, su fortaleza financiera será menor; mientras que 
cuando éstos presentan menores niveles su fortaleza financiera presenta valores mucho 
más superiores).  
Así, como consecuencia de nuestra investigación podemos determinar que las 
perspectivas y características idiosincráticas de las empresas familiares parecen 
 







gobernar el comportamiento de estas organizaciones, prevaleciendo de esta forma ante 

































































































































7.4. CONTROLS FOR COMMON METHOD VARIANCE 
With the aim of checking for the validity of our subjective data we compared it, 
to the extent possible, with the objective information obtained through the SABI 
Informa database24. With this, we attempted to minimize potential common method 
variance problems associated with the collection of information from single 
informants. Nevertheless, due to the substantial complexity of this issue in behavioral 
research (Podsakoff et al., 2003) we also addressed it using different procedures and 
analyses. We list them below.  
Firstly, in the design stage we used different sources to measure some of the 
key variables used in this dissertation. Hence, while for instance the magnitude of 
intended strategic changes (or organizational change behavior) was obtained by 
questionnaire responses of the CEOs of the organizations, the performance compared to 
the industry, size of the organization or industry innovation intensity, among others, were 
collected from secondary sources. In the second place, for the gathering of the survey 
data, we followed the recommendations established by Chang et al. (2010) and 
Podsakoff et al. (2003). Thus, we assured respondents confidentiality of the study, we 
apprised that there were no right or wrong answers and we asked them to answer as 
honestly as possible. Moreover, we structured questions related to the dependent 
variables (i.e., to organizational change and firm performance) in such a way that it 
was difficult for the respondent to find any pattern or theoretical link with the 
independent variables or any way to edit their answers to be more socially desirable, 
acquiescent or consistent. Likewise, we used different types of questions and scales, 
and we avoided using ambiguous, vague or unfamiliar terms.  
However, as Podsakoff et al. (2003) state, the use of all these procedural 
remedies in the design stage may not completely eliminate the effects of common 
method variance. Therefore, we explicitly ran several ex-post statistical tests to control 
for the potential problems present in each of our investigations (for a review, see 
Podsakoff et al., 2003). An exploratory factor analysis (or Harman’s one factor test) 
provided evidence that the majority of variance of our models did not account for one 
general factor (full analyses can be requested from the authors). To better understand 
                                                             
24 SABI Informa database  (Bureau Van Dijk) is the most important source of business, accounting and 
financial information in Spain. 
 







this test we will provide an example from Chapter 3. Thus, in this study three different 
factors accounted for 19%, 15% and 13% of the variance respectively, suggesting that 
common method variance was not a problem in this research. In addition and taking 
into consideration the increasing criticisms towards this technique (Chang et al., 2010), 
we complemented this analysis with a partial correlation procedure (Lindell & 
Whitney, 2001). To do so, we adjusted the correlations between the independent 
variable and the dependent variable of each of our investigations, controlling for the 
potential bias of the respondent by compensating this effect with a marker variable 
(which according to these authors consists of a variable that is not theoretically linked 
to the relationship being studied and which has a low or inexistent correlation with the 
constructs). Next, we computed the corresponding statistics. The relationships of our 
models (from Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) remained significant and with its 
corresponding signs, which allowed us to conclude that our results were not 
significantly influenced by the contaminating effect of common method bias (full 
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